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Under what circumstances, can descriptive representatives produce a 
representation, which may not be merely descriptive, but still substantive in nature? In 
other words, do descriptive representatives provide representation that produces salient 
black constituency policies, yet not be strictly black interest substantive policies? Do 
these black Democrats still “substantively represent” their black constituents and if so, to 
what extent? More importantly, what legislative actions do they undertake to represent 
their black constituents? Moreover, can these black Democratic legislators form strategic 
alliances successfully to prevent passage of policies detrimental to the interest of their 
black constituency?  Can they form alliances to enhance passage of their strategically 
sponsored measures?  
Some empirical studies find that black lawmakers’ descriptive representation 
behavior translates into meaningful, substantive representation. A few studies have 
disputed this claim. However, most empirical works that examine the descriptive versus 
substantive representation issue only look at the black legislators’ legislative bill 
sponsorship and bill passage count. They have neglected other important dimensions of 
representation where the black lawmakers’ strategic behavior may be a key explanatory 
factor.      
This research fills this gap by presenting a new theory- A Theory of Strategic 
Representation. This theory posits that minority caucus members strategically engage in 
three distinct legislative actions to pursue interests germane to their minority constituents 
vi 
 
when acting as representatives in a politically constrained legislative environment. 
Specifically, this research determines the effect of The South Carolina Legislative Black 
Caucus members’ behavior of (1) strategic bill sponsorship; (2) strategic self-selection 
committee assignments; (3) and strategic coalition formations, including negative veto 
coalitions, on the substantive representation of their black constituents. These questions 
are answered by examining the legislative Black Caucus members’ strategic introduction 
of primary and secondary measures, strategic preference for black interest committees’ 
appointments, and strategic coalition formations during selected roll call votes. 
Quantitative analyses of the 109th, 110th, 114th 115th, and the 119th legislative sessions 
of The South Carolina House of Representatives are conducted. The findings show that 
strategic representation by black descriptive lawmakers yields substantive representation 
in a politically constrained state legislative chamber when measured by legislative 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv 
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................v 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... . ix 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ xi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1 
CHAPTER 2: THEORIZING STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION .................................19 
 
 2.1 HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BLACK LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION 
                    IN SOUTH CAROLINA ....................................................................................19 
 
 2.2 COMPETING THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION .......................................45 
            2.3 EXPECTATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS: BILL SPONSORSHIP, 
                    COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS AND COALITIONS FORMATION ............57 
 
CHAPTER 3: BILL SPONSORSHIP BEHAVIOR: A MEASURE OF STRATEGIC 
REPRESENTATION .........................................................................................................68 
 
 3.1 HYPOTHESES: STRATEGIC BILL SPONSORSHIP AND EFFECT OF 
                PARTY CONTROL ON SPONSORSHIP AND PASSAGE ............................71 
 
 3.2 RESULTS: SCLBC STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION THROUGH BILL 
                SPONSORSHIP, STRATEGIC BILL CHOICE AND BILL PASSAGE 




CHAPTER 4: HOUSE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS: SCLBC STRATEGIC SELF-
SELECTION ....................................................................................................................105 
 
 4.1 SCLBC LEGISLATORS COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS: ANOTHER 
                    MEASURE OF STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION ......................................106 
 
 4.2 RESULTS: ARE SCLBC LEGISLATORS MAKING STRATEGIC 
                    COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS REQUESTS ................................................118 
 
CHAPTER 5: STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION THROUGH COALITION 
FORMATION ..................................................................................................................136 
 
 5.1 EXAMINING SCLBC COALITION FORMATION STRATEGY .................138 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS .................................................177 
 
 6.1 OVERVIEW: STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION IN A POLITICALLY 
               CONSTRAINED LEGISLATIVE ENVIRONMENT .....................................182 
 
 6.2 IMPLICATIONS ..............................................................................................184 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................188 
APPENDIX A - LIST OF CURRENT AND FORMER LEGISLATIVE BLACK 
CAUCUS MEMBERS .....................................................................................................196 
 
APPENDIX B- LEGISLATORS’ OVERALL BILL SPONSORSHIP AND BILL 
PASSAGE BY SESSION AND PARTY ........................................................................201 
 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1 South Carolina Comparison by Race, 2010 .......................................................31 
Table 2.2 Trend of House Descriptive Representation 1971-2012, Selected Years ..........33 
Table 2.3 Rates of Registration and Turnout in South Carolina and Neighboring 
                 States, 2012 Presidential Election .....................................................................38 
Table 2.4 Registration in Counties where one-third or more of the population is 
                 black, 2010 General election.............................................................................40 
Table 2.5 Registration in Counties where less than one-third of the population is 
                black, 2010 General Election .............................................................................40 
Table 2.6 Black and White Voter Turnout where one-third or more of the population 
                is black- 2010 General Election .........................................................................41 
Table 2.7 Black and White Voter Turnout where less than one-third of the population 
                 is black, 2010 General Election ........................................................................41 
Table 2.8 Trend of Black Elected Officials in South Carolina, Selected Years ................43 
Table 2.9 Categorized Number of Bills Sponsored and Passed in the SC House for 
                Selected Sessions ...............................................................................................64 
Table 3.1 Percentage for Bill Sponsorship Activity in the House for Selected Sessions ..83 
Table 3.2 Negative Binominal Regression Analysis of Number of Bills Sponsored During 
                Selected Sessions ...............................................................................................85 
 
Table 3.3 Incidence Rate Ratios of Bill Sponsored ...........................................................89 
Table 3.4 Likelihood of SCLBC Primary and Secondary Bills Sponsorship during 
                Selected Sessions ...............................................................................................91 
 
Table 3.5 Logistic Regression Analysis: Effect of Bill Type and Sponsor on Bill Passage 




Table 3.6 Logistic Regression Analysis: Effect of Party Control on Bill Passage ..........100 
Table 4.1 Saliency and SCLBC Representation on House Standing Committees by 
                Committee Type and House Sessions ..............................................................119 
Table 4.2 SCLBC Influence Potential on House Standing Committees by Legislative 
                Sessions ............................................................................................................122 
 
Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Model Analysis of Appointments to Selected Committees, 
                Democrat-Controlled 109th and 110th Sessions   ..............................................125 
Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Model Analysis of Appointments to Selected Committees, 
                 Republican-Controlled 114th, 115th, and 119th Sessions .................................127 
 
Table 4.5 Odds Ratio of Appointments to Selected Committees, Democrat- Controlled 
                109th and 110th Sessions ...................................................................................129 
 
Table 4.6 Odds Ratio of Appointments to Selected Committees, Republican-Controlled 
                114th, 115th, and 119th Sessions   ......................................................................130 
 
Table 5.1 Coalitions Formation in Democratic-Controlled 109th and 110th House 
                Sessions ............................................................................................................157 
 
Table 5.2 Coalitions Formation in Republican-Controlled 114th, 115th and 119th House 
                Sessions ............................................................................................................160 
 
Table 5.3 Logistic Regression Analysis of Coalitions Formations -Democratic-Controlled 
                House Sessions (109th-110th) ...........................................................................164 
 
Table 5.4 Logistic Regression Analysis of Coalitions Formations-Republican-Controlled 
                House Sessions (114th,115th, and 119th) ...........................................................166 
 
Table 5.5 Odds Ratio Analysis of Coalition Type Formation Success............................171 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Formal Representation in Typical Political Environment ..................................6 
Figure 1.2 Model of Strategic Representation .....................................................................7   






Research on the question of whether increased black descriptive representation 
produces more empowerment and substantive policies for blacks remains unsettled. On 
the one hand, scholars who study black Americans’ legislative  representation have 
vigorously debated the issue by asking, is black substantive representation best achieved 
by what Hanna Pitkin (1967) called descriptive representation, defined as when a 
representative reflects the social traits of his or her constituency’s race and social class? 
On the other hand, is the black constituency better served by substantive representation, 
defined as when a representative reflects the policy interests of his or her constituency 
regardless of the representative’s background? Pitkin further alludes to representation as 
being symbolic in nature, which refers to the constituent’s feelings of being fairly and 
effectively represented1.  
However, in addressing the descriptive and substantive representation questions, 
previous scholarly research has produced mixed answers. For example, in her study of 
responsiveness by members of Congress to black interests, Swain (1993) argues that 
while some value can be accorded to descriptive representation, it is the constituency that 
 _______________________________________ 
1Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) theory identifies four distinct, but interconnected dimensions of 
representation including formal representation which refers to the institutional rules and 
procedures through which representatives are chosen. She also identifies the symbolic 
dimension of representation which refers to the constituent’s feelings of being fairly and 
efficiently represented.  This study examines only the descriptive and substantive aspects 




motivates the behavior of legislators. Similarly, Lublin (1997) argues that the creation of 
majority-minority districts, which have led to an increase in black representatives, may 
also result in losses in substantive representation. Conversely, Whitby (1997), in his 
study of black substantive representation, argues that both race and constituency can have 
a positive effect on descriptive representation.  
Additional research has also shown that although minority representatives 
propose and support minority interest legislation to a greater extent than white 
representatives, they also tend to be less successful in seeing their policies eventually 
pass through the legislative process (Hedge, Button, and Spear 1996; Bratton and Haynie 
1999; Canon 1999; Tate 2001; Hawkesworth 2003). In sum, empirical support for the 
impact of minority descriptive representation to positively advance black constituency 
interests is somewhat ambiguous. 
A Theory of Strategic Representation 
  Perhaps descriptive representation does involve other dimensions that can further 
explain the level of representation blacks receive. Representation of black interest does 
not occur in a legislative vacuum. Legislators must consider various competing forces, 
such as party or constituency pressure, when they make their decision to either support or 
not support black interest legislation. These forces can become very problematic, 
particularly when black Democrat legislators seek to provide their black constituency 
representation in a legislative chamber controlled by Republicans. In those instances, 
black Democratic members must strategically decide what actions they should undertake 
to provide meaningful political representation to their black constituents. Under such 




be merely descriptive, but still substantive in nature? In other words, does descriptive 
representatives provide representation that produces salient black constituency policies, 
yet not be strictly black interest substantive policies? Do these black Democrats still 
“substantively represent” their black constituents and if so, to what extent? More 
importantly, what legislative actions do they undertake to represent their black 
constituents? Do they negotiate with legislative committees in such a way as to trade 
votes and influence? Moreover, can these black Democratic legislators form strategic 
alliances successfully to prevent passage of policies detrimental to the interest of their 
black constituency?  Can they form alliances to enhance passage of their strategically 
sponsored measures? In building their alliances, do they play one part of the Republican 
caucus against another? Do they pursue “strange bedfellows” approaches to creating 
negative vote coalitions? These are serious questions that require a thorough analysis in 
regards to the study of descriptive representation. 
In seeking answers to these questions, this study poses a new theory- A Theory of 
Strategic Representation- as a guide to this inquiry. This theory posits that minority 
caucus members strategically engage in three distinct legislative actions to pursue 
interests germane to their minority constituents when acting as representatives within a 
politically constrained legislative environment. I define a politically constrained 
legislative environment as a legislative institution in which minority legislators are 
pursuing interests germane to a minority community, inside a majoritarian institution 
controlled by a different political party.  
The legislative process is multi-faceted with strategic behavior amongst 




politically constrained legislative bodies engage in strategic behavior throughout the 
legislative process to provide favorable representational outcomes for their black 
constituents. These legislative actions, namely, strategic bill sponsorship, strategic self-
selection committee assignments, and strategic coalition formations, including negative 
veto coalitions, allow black representatives to provide substantive measures of 
descriptive representation while serving in a majoritarian institution controlled by a 
different political party. Through their strategic behavior, black representatives can 
provide meaningful, descriptive representation despite representing their constituents 
within the politically constrained environment.  
This project employs the strategic representation theory to examine fully, the 
descriptive representation offered by black representatives in those situations. It examines 
The South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus (SCLBC) representational behavior within 
the South Carolina House of Representatives to conduct this study. The South Carolina 
House of Representatives is currently under firm Republican Party control. All SCLBC 
members are black Democrats and are currently pursuing their minority constituents’ 
legislative interest in the politically constrained legislative environment. I surmise that 
first, rather than attempting to engage in descriptive representation through sponsorship 
and perhaps, passage of strictly black interest legislation during all legislative sessions, 
SCLBC members will seek to sponsor more primary legislation strategically during 
legislative sessions when the Democrats control of the House of Representatives. Primary 
legislation as characterized by Whitby and Krause (2001) is legislation that contains 
“concentrated effects” or black interests, explicitly. Conversely, during a constrained 




SCLBC members will sponsor more secondary legislation. Secondary legislation is 
legislation that “have diffused effects for the general population” or black interest 
implicitly2. While not strictly black interest legislation, secondary legislation may still be 
significant black constituency measures.  
Secondly, SCLBC legislators strategically seek membership on committees that 
have jurisdiction over minority interest policies to help facilitate passage of their 
sponsored legislation. This action is extremely beneficial for SCLBC legislators since 
previous research indicates that committee action and informal discussions are the 
primary loci for legislative deliberations (Bessette, 1994; Hall 1996). The third activity 
involves strategic alliance formation for strategic bill passage and derailment of anti-
minority measures (negative veto) purposes. I posit that SCLBC members will 
strategically seek to build inter-party alliances and intra-party alliances to move their 
sponsored bills further through the legislative process. They will also seek to create 
coalitions to block unwanted anti-minority legislation. Previous research involving 
descriptive representation has neglected to consider the idea that the promotion of black 
interests may come in the form of “blocking” unwanted or detrimental legislation. When 
linked together, these three legislative actions provide a depiction of the strategic 
behavior SCLBC members undertake to represent their constituency. 
The following two models illustrate my conceptualization of political 
representation. Figure 1.1 details Pitkin’s Theory of Representation. Pitkin’s theory 
_____________________ 
2 see Kenny J. Whitby and George A. Krause, “Race, Issue Heterogeneity and Public 
Policy: The Republican Revolution in the 104th US Congress and the Representation of 
African-American Policy Interest.” British Journal of Political Science., 31(2001), 555-
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Figure: 1.1 Formal Representation in Typical Political Environment  
posits that representation is a complex concept that includes four forms of representation. 
The four components of representation (formal, substantive, descriptive and symbolic) 
are linked together, and each is a part of the larger whole. However, the strategic 
representation theory expands Pitkin’s (1969) Theory of Representation by including the 
dimension of strategic representation as a viable component of both substantive and 
descriptive representation. 
  Figure 1.2 shows how strategic representation occurs when minority legislators 
seek to represent minority interests in a majoritarian legislature controlled by members of 
a different political party. For instance, the model shows that there may not be a clear-cut 
monotonic relationship between substantive and descriptive representation but that this 










Substantive                                           
         Descriptive                                              Symbolic 














Strategic Bill Sponsorship 
Strategic Self-Selection Committee Assignments 
Strategic Coalition Formations 
 




literature as to whether substantive representation can lead to descriptive representation 
or vice versa lends support to this point. The strategic model goes on to outline three 
separate actions SCLBC members undertake to provide representation for their black 
constituency within a politically constrained legislative environment. These actions 
identified as strategic committee self-selection, strategic legislation sponsorship, and 
strategic coalition formations, collectively form an integral part of their legislative 
strategy. Given the recursive nature of this collectively, they may produce some measure 
of descriptive representation.   
This strategic representation model may be a dominant model for analyzing 
states’ legislative environments when black Democratic legislators’ representation occurs 
in a legislative chamber controlled by the Republican Party. As the model shows, 
strategic representation occurs within a wider legislative environment that may affect the 
entire process of representation. South Carolina is a good state to test this model. Over 
the last eighteen years, Democrat SCLBC members have represented their black 
constituents in a House of Representative dominated by Republican Legislators. Thus, 
my integrated model of strategic representation highlights the theory that underscores 
each section of this dissertation project.  
The goal of this project is to test the strategic representation theory by examining 
the legislative activities of the South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus (SCLBC) 
members during selected legislative sessions of the South Carolina House of 
Representatives. It examines the South Carolina House of Representatives for the 109th, 
(1991-1992), 110th (1993-1994), 114th (2001-2002), 115th (2003-2004) and the 119th 




pursued interest germane to their black constituents by using strategic actions. All of the 
legislative sessions under Republican majority control are of keen interest to this 
research.  
In this project, I empirically test the linkages between the SCLBC members’ 
legislative actions involving usage of strategic representation to give a much fuller 
picture of black representation than previously presented in the literature. I test 
empirically, the act that involves sponsorship of both secondary and primary legislation 
during periods of Democrats control and periods of Republican control of the House of 
Representatives. As previously mentioned, secondary legislation, while not strictly black 
interest legislation is nevertheless, salient to the black constituency’s interest and goes 
directly to the question of whether black legislators provide effective descriptive 
representation.  
I also empirically test SCLBC members’ committee assignment preferences. I 
examine whether SCLBC members actively seek membership on committees that have 
jurisdiction over those core legislative policies articulated by the SCLBC. I also examine 
their behavior during roll call votes from two perspectives. I first analyze whether the 
SCLBC members strategically form inter-party and intra-party alliances to gain passage 
of their sponsored legislation. I then examine whether SCLBC members also build 
alliances for negative veto purposes, to block legislation that is detrimental to their black 
constituency interests. If so, how successful are they? 
Contribution of the study 
While other studies have examined various issues involving descriptive, substantive and 




though the literature is clear that descriptive representation does lead to symbolic 
representation, this project’s primary focus is squarely upon the issue of whether 
descriptive representation within a constrained legislative environment creates strategic 
representation that leads to substantive representation. In doing so, this study provides 
another dimension of representation to help reconcile existing ambiguities between 
descriptive and substantive representation. Indeed, previous studies that  examine issues 
involving descriptive, substantive and symbolic representation either reach the conclusion 
that black legislators adequately represent the interests of their black constituency 
(descriptive representation) or they do not (symbolic representation). In other words, 
most of these studies analyze black legislative representation in a dichotomous fashion.  
However, I argue that black legislative representation does not occur in a 
dichotomous manner. Other dimensions of representation beyond the traditional bill 
sponsorship and/or bill passage analysis should be considered. Factors such as the 
SCLBC members’ committee memberships, their strategic secondary legislation 
sponsorship, and their strategic negative veto-coalitions may show that their 
representation can still be fully descriptive even if it is not completely substantive. 
Collectively, these factors form the basis for strategic representation. These additional 
elements are the other dimensions of descriptive representation that merits consideration. 
The data set in this study lends itself to an analysis of these added descriptive   
representation components to better fit the theoretical underpinnings involving black 
descriptive representation in a legislative body controlled by members of the opposite 
political party.  




substantive representation tend to focus primarily on bill sponsorship or bill passage. I  
posit that blocking and/ or defeating undesirable bills are a part of a legislator’s job in 
representing his or her constituency’s interests and also deserves attention. The exclusion 
of the negative-veto dimension of representation is a serious oversight that needs to be 
corrected. In order to understand fully, the linkage between black descriptive 
representation and substantive representation within state legislatures, this component 
must be included in descriptive legislative studies. This research seeks to address that 
omission by including minority legislators’ actions involving coalition formations as an 
included element of the strategic and descriptive representation examination. I argue that 
these alliances seek to either facilitate passage of favorable legislation or prevent passage 
of undesirable anti-minority legislation.  
Moreover, this study seeks to bridge the existing literature by examining 
descriptive representation at the state level. Governments of states are fundamental to 
governance in the United States and directly affect everyone’s daily lives. Those who 
understand governance at the grass-roots level have a more accurate picture of the United 
States than if they focus only on what happens in Congress (Rosenthal, 1981; Dresang 
and Gosling 2010). As indicated earlier, research on state level descriptive representation 
is quite limited. Given the importance of state governance in our governmental structure, 
state-level descriptive representation clearly warrants a more comprehensive look, 
particularly one that considers additional facets of representation previously ignored in 
previous research involving this issue.  
There are numerous and compelling reasons for conducting an analysis of this  




representation, this study will provide a mechanism for testing the generalizability of the  
findings generated by congressional research. Second, the states are a valuable venue 
from which to investigate the effects of minority representation. Race and ethnic 
population size are well established determinants of state policy (Brown 1995; Fellowes 
and Rowe 2004; Fording 1997; Hero 1998; Key 1949; Soss et al. 2001). Also, there are 
substantial variations in descriptive representation among state legislators compared to 
congressional representation. Consequently, state–level analysis holds an advantage over 
a national focus for the study of minority representation involving both descriptive and 
strategic questions. Overall, the state legislative setting provides an ideal environment not 
only to test the theory of strategic representation involving black legislators 
responsiveness within a constrained legislative environment, but in the process, may also 
help reconcile existing ambiguities in descriptive representation literature. 
  Rather than placing its focus upon many states, this research will look principally 
at one chamber of South Carolina’s state legislature. South Carolina is a fascinating case 
study for several reasons. Throughout its legislative history, South Carolina’s white 
legislators have shown that race has been a key determinant of the distribution of public 
goods and services. As Willingham (1985) notes, “South Carolina’s legislature, similar to 
legislatures throughout the South, was a “bastion of prejudice and reactionary social 
policy.” 
Committee Self-Selection 
Additionally, there is a significant gap in the literature concerning state level  
black representatives’ involvement during committee deliberations. The overall  




legislative context is limited. This is due, in part, by the lack of research on committees. 
Committees and subcommittees develop most of the language of bills. Committees 
collect information on issues through hearings and they are responsible for distributing 
information to legislative chambers through committee reports. Most legislative 
deliberation is likely to occur in committees because the committee system separates 
policies based upon legislation content and committees’ jurisdiction. Consequently, 
committee assignments play a pivotal role in black legislators’ abilities to influence the 
legislative process. Black legislators are aware of the importance of committee selection 
and should gravitate toward the committees with jurisdictions closest to their interests, 
particularly since these interests are predominantly ones that would further the member’s 
chances of reelection (Fenno, 1973, 1978; Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1989). Thus, an 
examination of each SCLBC member’s committee assignments and their vote on policy 
while in committee will provide a better understanding of black legislative representation 
within a politically constrained legislative environment.  
Coalition Formation and Negative Veto 
A final dimension of representation explored in this research project involves 
SCLBC members’ ability to create alliances to achieve passage of sponsored legislation 
or prevent passage of undesirable policies by the full legislative chamber (negative veto). 
As previously mentioned, legislative research has largely ignored the negative veto 
component of representation. Most research that involve legislation veto relates to   
legislation passed by the legislature and is subsequently vetoed by the executive branch. 
However, this study seeks to explore the issue of alliance formation for prevention of the 




executive veto of the bill after passage. Alliance formation is central to politics and can 
occur almost anywhere. Indeed, a coalition defined as “the joint use of resources to 
determine the outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation” approximates what 
many would agree politics involves (Wiseman, 2004). 
The idea that state legislators may form alliances to pass legislation they favor is 
also applicable to negative veto alliances. I argue that alliances can also be created to 
prevent passage of undesirable legislation, as well. When considered in light of personal 
remarks made by an SCLBC member to Professor Willie Legette, this argument is not 
farfetched. In his research, Legette (2000) noted SCLBC member Kay Patterson’s answer 
to a question concerning SCLBC members’ bill sponsorship. In his response Patterson 
replied: 
No, I don’t introduce legislation. We already have 24 volumes…  
What I do is grab a piece of legislation that is about to pass and 
bring it to a …halt! If all your legislator can do is cite you pieces  
of legislation he or she introduced… then your legislator is just  
about as useful to you as tits on a boar hog.  
(Personal Communication, November 8, 1982; cited Legette, 2000). 
 
Clearly, South Carolina’s SCLBC members engage in some negative veto actions. 
Given the relatively small number of SCLBC members, they will often have to create 
negative veto alliances to be successful in their negative veto efforts. However, instead of 
looking at the concept of bargaining between the legislative and executive branch of 
governments, this research will examine interparty and intraparty veto coalitions. These 
coalitions are created when black Democrat legislators along with their white Democrat 
counterparts and/or Republican colleagues join, to prevent passage of unwanted policies. 




necessary to examine the kinds of alliances they form, the conditions under which these    
alliances appear, and the number of SCLBC members’ victories and defeats. Inclusion of this 
dimension of representation will offer a fuller picture of the relationship that exists between 
descriptive, substantive and strategic representation.  
Conclusion  
Are there instances when descriptive representation produces a representation that is not 
entirely substantive but is more than symbolic? This dissertation seeks to answer this question 
along with others raised in this chapter. It explores strategic representation involving SCLBC 
members and will employ a longitudinal and cross-sectional approach to test my strategic 
representation theory. It will examine patterns of legislative sponsorship, bill content and 
outcomes, committee assignments, and alliance formations among SCLBC members and Non-
SCLBC members within the South Carolina House of Representatives. This study will analyze 
their strategic legislative behavior during the 109th, (1991-1992), 110th (1993-1994), 114th 
(2001-2002), 115th (2003-2004) and the 119th (2011-2012) legislative sessions. The ultimate 
goal of the study is to add to the overall understanding the impact black representatives may have 
on the representation process.  
Although, this study will examine bill sponsorship by black representatives, this is 
only the starting point. The representation process extends beyond the single action 
involving bill sponsorship. Critical legislative actions occur in committees, primarily 
during deliberation. As such, I will explore theoretical arguments concerning the link 
between descriptive representation and committee membership requests while extending 
those arguments to strategic representation, as well.  
I will also consider interparty and intraparty coalition formations for negative veto 
purposes in more detail. This dissertation explores these key dimensions of representation 




constituents. This exploration requires the development of a conceptual understanding of 
strategic representation, presentation of the necessary components inherent in this type 
representation, and examination of the legislative behavior that SCLBC members must 
undertake to garner success in their strategic legislative efforts. In doing so, this study 
will contribute to ongoing debates that center on the importance of black representation.  
Plan of the Dissertation  
This discussion has provided an overview of significant questions that undergird 
this project and how this research fits into current scholarship on minority representation 
and legislative behavior. To accomplish the objectives of this project, I analyze strategic 
legislative actions SCLBC members undertake to provide representation for their 
constituents while legislating within a politically constrained environment. Each chapter 
begins with an overview of the strategic legislative action under review. This procedure 
will provide the background that is crucial for a thorough understanding of the theoretical 
underpinnings associated with the strategic representation theory.  
Chapter 2 analyzes the theory of strategic representation. After a brief summary 
of the history of the black struggle to gain access to the voting booth in general and South 
Carolina in particular, the discussion then turns to the theoretical literature on substantive 
and descriptive representation. It also discusses the linkages between substantive, 
descriptive and strategic representation. This chapter also provides a description of the 
collected data examined to test the theory of strategic representation. It also includes the 
expectations and hypotheses that will be tested for the examination of the theory of 




minority representation than has previously been provided by other scholarly research on 
this subject.  
In Chapter 3, the following questions are addressed: Do black legislators sponsor  
more primary measures during the legislative sessions in which Democrats are in control? 
Do black legislators in the South Carolina House of Representatives strategically sponsor 
more secondary legislation rather than primary legislation during periods of Republican  
legislative dominance? This chapter contains a comparative bill content and vote analysis 
of black interest policies sponsored by SCLBC members during selected legislative 
sessions to provide answers to these questions.  
Chapter 4 explores the theoretical expectations as to whether black legislators 
actively seek assignments to black interest committees. In other words, do they employ a 
self-selection process in seeking their committees’ assignments? This chapter also 
examines the potential of the black legislators’ committee assignments to influence 
legislative policy.  
Chapter 5 analyzes how SCLBC members strategically form alliances with 
different groups within the legislature to gain passage of their sponsored legislation. It 
also examines whether SCLBC members form alliances to prevent unwanted measures 
from achieving final passage. In other words, do they engage in coalition formation for 
negative veto purposes? If so, who are the political actors in each alliance and how 
successful are they?   
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the dissertation. It summarizes the results of this 




legislative research, and democratic institutions. It will also identify new questions raised 





THEORIZING STRATEGIC REPRESENTATION 
This chapter begins by providing a backdrop for discussing the shifting political 
nature of race and racism in South Carolina. Given the long shadow of Reconstruction in 
this state, it would be useful to examine how race has framed South Carolina politics. As 
part of that discourse, the concept “new racism” as discussed in Shaw and Black (2008) is 
presented. The chapter goes on to outline recent history of black enfranchisement, current 
rates of black voter registration and turnout to highlight the potential and current limits of 
an effective black vote. The discussion then turns to internal and external challenges 
members of the SCLBC face as they struggle to obtain positive, substantive legislative 
outcomes. These struggles are partly due to Republican Party dominance and partly due 
to Democratic Party weakness. This chapter also presents a detailed analysis of state 
representation scholarly literature. The final section of the chapter presents a discussion 
of theoretical expectations and methodological procedures for testing the theory of 
strategic representation. 
2.1: Historical Context of Black Legislative Representation in South Carolina 
 
Old South Carolina Politics  
Has there been a significant change in black South Carolinians political 
empowerment in the past 50 years? It is necessary to understand precisely the 
implications of race in South Carolina’s political history to articulate a meaningful 




 South Carolina has a troubled racial past. Its’ problematic racial history has its roots in 
the political and economic treatment black South Carolinians received during the 
Reconstruction era and arguably continues to receive today. Reconstruction in South 
Carolina was an era defined by violent struggles over who would determine past 
meanings and future directions of the political and economic power in the state. Within 
months of the Confederacy's defeat, South Carolina adopted a new constitution designed 
to limit the newly freed blacks, recently won freedom. The Constitution of 1865, passed 
only a few months after the Civil War ended, failed to grant blacks the right to vote. It 
also retained racial qualifications for the legislature. Consequently, the newly freed 
blacks had no power to combat the unfair laws (South Carolina-“Black Code and Jim 
Crow Laws”n.d. para 1)  
Moreover, the 1865 Constitution was riddled with Black Codes, or what later 
became known as Jim Crow laws. These laws were designed to restrict the freed blacks’ 
activity and ensure their availability as a labor force now with slavery's abolishment. 
South Carolina’s Provisional Governor Benjamin Franklin Perry unashamedly summed–
up the white politicians’ position in drafting the 1865 Constitution, this way:  
To extend this universal suffrage to the "freedmen" in their present ignorant and 
degraded condition, would be little less than folly and madness ... [because] this is 
a white man's government and intended for white men only (B F. Perry-,1865,: 
cited in Hummel, 1971) 
 
To combat the southern states discriminatory actions, in 1867 Congress enacted 
the Reconstruction Act. The Act effectively divided the South into five military districts 
and called for the creation of new southern state governments which would grant blacks 
the right to vote. Only after the new governments ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 




In response to the federal legislation South Carolina, grudgingly developed a new 
constitution in 1868 that supposedly gave black South Carolinians equality before the 
law. Among other things, the resulting 1868 South Carolina Constitution established a  
balanced, three branches of government and created a detailed Declaration of Rights 
which mandated political equality regardless of race. The Constitution also introduced 
several changes that included removal of racial and property barriers for blacks to obtain 
the right to vote. Given the state’s black population majority voting, many blacks in the 
Republican Party were elected to state office for the first time in South Carolina's history 
(Trinkley, 2009).  
However, the 1868 Constitution included the requirement of South Carolina's 
citizen's ratification and as such, was not well received by the white citizenry.  Not 
surprisingly, the political power that blacks gained through the 1868 Constitution quickly 
dissipated a few years later. By 1873, the entire country had plunged into a severe 
economic depression.  
The national economic problem quickly diverted Congress’ attention from 
Reconstruction issues, which in turn permitted an increase in the level of violence 
perpetuated by white South Carolinians towards blacks.  Black South Carolinians 
witnessed a further erosion of their political power with the 1876 gubernatorial election 
of Wade Hampton, one of the state's most racist Confederate veteran. Hamptons' election 
as South Carolina’s governor also impacted the 1876 Presidential Election.  
In 1876, the two major candidates, Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican, and 
Samuel J. Tilden, a Democrat were locked in a very close presidential race. Congress 




presidential inauguration, political leaders of both parties struck the Bargain of 1877. 
Essentially the agreement required President Hayes to recognize Democratic control of 
the Southern states and subsequent removal of all federal troops from the South. 
Consequently as a result of the agreement, Reconstruction ended in South Carolina and 
the white Democrats, ultimately regained political power in the state. 
The white legislature promptly began their dismantlement of black South 
Carolinians political enfranchisement after they assumed power. In 1882, South 
Carolina's new white legislature began to pass various disenfranchisement laws aimed at 
black voters. Two glaring examples are the "eight box" law which required voters to 
place ballots in each category of office in eight separate boxes and an 1894 law that 
required potential first-time voters to provide affidavits from two reputable citizens 
attesting to the applicant's good character are just.   
The Constitution of 1895 completed the state's legislature total 
disenfranchisement of potential black voters by requiring them to pass a literacy test 
successfully and pay a poll tax six months before the election (Simkins,1966). The 1895 
Constitution also created state-sanctioned segregation and swept away laws that raised 
taxes designed to provide benefits to blacks South Carolinians. 
For example, the law allowing poll taxes to be used to fund public education was 
repealed, virtually eliminating public education. In sum, the rights that black South 
Carolinians obtained during the Reconstruction era were systematically eroded, 
particularly with the reinforcement of the transformed 1865 Black Codes and the new 
1890’s Jim Crow laws. Repeal of these disenfranchisement laws would not begin until 




almost a century, and were only abolished with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. 
Moreover, throughout South Carolina’s political history, white politicians have  
used the issue of race to provide a toll for the diversion of attention from significant  
political matters. Early on, white politicians in South Carolina utilized the political 
strategy “When the going gets rough, when a glimmer of informed political self-interest 
begins to well up from the masses, the issue of white supremacy may be raised to whip 
them back into line” (Key, 1949, p. 131; cited in Shaw and Black 2008, p. 4).  
Indeed one of V.O. Key’s most significant observations about politics in the 
South has alternatively been labeled the “black threat,” “racial threat” or “white 
backlash” hypothesis. It asserts that after the post-Civil War Reconstruction, white 
politicians such as Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman, Cole Blease, and “Cotton Ed” Smith were 
successful in stoking the fires of white supremacy and anti-black animosity because 
working-class whites were fearful of black South Carolinians commanding nearly 60% of 
the state’s population by1900. Key noted that such political leaders used race as a decoy 
to distract rank-and-file whites from a range of more pertinent concerns: “South 
Carolina’s preoccupation with the Negro stifles political conflict...Mill worker and 
plantation owners alike want to keep the Negro in his place. (Lublin & Key, 1949, p. 131; 
Voss, 2000). This tactic successfully stifled black political participation for a period and 
consequently in the early 1960’s virtually all state legislators, in the United States, were 
white males.   
However, the Civil Rights Movement and the 1965 Voting Rights Act dismantled 




newly enfranchised and/or empowered black voters, who in turn eventually elected record 
numbers of blacks to public office. While only about 16% of black South Carolinians in 
1960 were registered to vote, none held elective office. Approximately 50 years later at 
least 70.1% of black South Carolinians were registered voters. Ernest A. Finney, Jr., a 
former legislator, went on to served 15 years on the State Supreme Court, the last six 
(1994-2000) as Chief Justice. Donald W. Beatty began his tenure as an associate justice 
of the Supreme Court in February 2007. Civil Rights Attorney and Federal Judge 
Matthew J. Perry's induction into the South Carolina Hall of Fame occurred (Bositis, 
2003; Botsch, 2003; Brundrett, 2007, Fleischer, 2007; Hill, 2000; Shaw and Black 2008), 
and more recently a federal courthouse was named in Judge Perry's honor. Currently, 
there are over 600 black elected officials serving in different levels of government in 
South Carolina (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2011). Thirty-seven of 
those elected officials serve in South Carolina’s General Assembly3. Two black South 
Carolina elected officials, James “Jim” Clyburn and Tim Scott, respectively, serve in the 
United States House of Representatives and The United States Senate4. Approximately 
six years ago, the city of Columbia, the states’ capital city, elected Steven Benjamin as its 
first black mayor. 
Still, the above-cited progress may disguise existing deep political and economic  
inequities between blacks and whites in this state. Simply stated, the political nature of  
___________________________________ 
3 In the midst of a South Carolina Senate Ethics Investigation, SCLBC member, Senator 
   Robert Ford, resigned from the Legislature near the end of the 2013 Legislative Session 
 
4 Senator Tim Scott, (a Republican US House member) was appointed by Governor  





the racial discrimination in the Palmetto State may now be less overt and more covert in 
its present form. 
In other words, maybe covert racism does exist, as well. Stokely Carmichael and 
Charles V. Hamilton argues that overt racism consists of overt acts by individuals while 
the second type, covert racism, originates in the operation of established and respected 
forces in the society (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, p.3). Conceivably, covert racism 
may be at work given black South Carolinians lack of political and economic parity with 
the white citizens of this state. It may very well play a role in black elected officials’ 
efforts to provide substantive representation to their black constituents.  
New Racism and South Carolina Politics  
To develop a fuller picture of the dilemma black elected officials’ face in  
addressing the racial problems and concerns of the black citizenry, a brief historical 
account of South Carolina’s protest politics is essential to understand precisely how race 
and racism have impacted South Carolina’s politics since the 1960s. Otherwise, the lack 
of understanding may lead to erroneous conclusions.  
Perhaps the first evidence of black South Carolinian’s use of protest politics to 
acquire new meaningful political power in the state since Reconstruction could be traced 
to the opening of the first National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s 
(NAACP) chapters in Columbia and Charleston in 1917. Evidence of The NAACP work 
in helping black South Carolinians attain meaningful political empowerment is apparent 
through their assistance in providing legal representation to the black plaintiffs Harry and 
Eliza Briggs in Briggs v. Elliott, (1952). The case brought against the Clarendon County 




Briggs (1952), was the first desegregation case to reach the United States Supreme Court 
and was later consolidated in 1954 with Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas 
(1954) in which the Court struck down the “separate but equal” doctrine. 
Nationally, by the beginning of the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement had begun  
in the United States.  Black communities all throughout the South rose up in protest 
against the segregationist policies that kept them systematically in a separate but unequal 
society. These discriminatory policies belied the “separate but equal” treatment promised 
in the 14 Amendment and articulated by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896)   
(Warren, 1954). 
Black South Carolinians played an important role in the Civil Rights Movement. 
Alongside many important struggles that occurred in the other Southern States, black 
South Carolinians actively protest for political equality here as well. One notable 
example includes the protest activity engaged in by The Friendship Nine (sometimes 
referred to as the Rock Hill Nine), a group of black Rock Hill's Friendship Junior College 
male students that went to jail after staging a sit-in at a segregated lunch counter in Rock 
Hill in 1961. The group gained nationwide attention because they followed an untried 
strategy called "Jail, No Bail," which lessened the huge financial burden civil rights 
groups were facing as the sit-in movement spread across the South. (Felder, 2012).  
Another example of black South Carolinian’s protest for political and economic 
equality is the 1969 Charleston Hospital Workers Strike. Mary Moultrie, a nurse, became 
one of the leading organizers of the 113-day strike against the Charleston hospital 
system- the Deep South’s oldest medical school and teaching hospital.  This strike 




and recognition they deserved (Taylor, 2013).  All of these protests, involving black 
South Carolinians shared a common goal; the goal of attaining meaningful black political 
and economic power in the state of South Carolina. 
However, even with South Carolina’s flagrant usurpation of the blacks’ citizens  
political power in this state, historians such as Jack Bass and Walter DeVries assert that 
the racial climate in South Carolina has lessened over the years. They recite the often-
quoted comparison between the racial change in South Carolina and elsewhere: “Unlike 
the deeper South, where even the poorest white could count his skin color as a badge of 
superiority, South Carolina valued stability as a higher social value than segregation and 
rejected extremist rhetoric. Once segregation had crumbled, the social transformation 
followed with little violence” (Bass & DeVries, 1995 [1976], p. 252).  
Yet, two frequently cited incidents seem to contradict this view. One is the 1968 
Orangeburg Massacre in which police killed three students, injured 27, and arrested 
others after the students attempted to desegregate a bowling alley. The other incident 
involves an early 1970 anti-busing violence by whites against blacks in Lamar (Beazley, 
2004). 
 Even as late as the year 2000, many white candidates defended South Carolina as 
the last Deep South state officially to fly the Confederate flag (Woliver, Ledford, & 
Dolan, 2001). Furthermore, during the 2006 election season, Governor Mark Sanford 
publicly apologized for the use of the term “tar baby” during a State Budget and Control 
Board meeting (WLTX-TV and WCSC, 2007; cited in Shaw and Black, 2008).  
In concert with these outward racist acts, perhaps, newer and more subtle forms of 




South Carolinians political and economic progress. To capture a much truer picture of 
this state’s shifting racial politics, I use Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (1999) plausible theory of 
racial change to support this assertion. As cited in Shaw and Black, (2008), Bonilla-Silva 
argues that to assess objectively whether meaningful changes in race relations has 
occurred, we must look to see if there has been a transformation in the racial structure of 
South Carolina. “Racial structure,” as defined by Bonilla-Silva, is the network of “social, 
political, economic, and ideological [factors} that shape the life chances of different 
races” (1999, p. 56). Bonilla-Silva posits that there are elements that comprise the post-
1960s racial structure of the United States including South Carolina. He lists the 
following factors to explain  the United States racial structure:  (1) government 
institutions reproduce racial inequality through the routine practices of supposed“ race-
neutral mechanisms”; (2) racist practices and language are more covert or at least not as 
overt/blatant; (3) certain racist practices language linger as vestiges of the Jim Crow 
period; (4) appeals to so-called “color-blind” governmental action and language increase 
while whites allege they are the victims of “reverse racism” and (5) public policymakers 
avoid considering the direct racial impact of various public policies. These five “new 
racism” factors, which clearly overlap, can be labeled as institutional racism: latent 
racism, residual Jim Crow racism; color blind/reverse racism; and racial policy impacts 
(Shaw and Black, 2008). In this project, I only analyze the racism factor involving 
institutional racism, to highlight the existing racial structure that undergirds South 
Carolina’s political environment. 
Institutional Racism   




conceptualizations of “institutional racism” when they delineated its features and  
consequences in their book entitled Black Power: The Politics of Liberation. Carmichael 
and Hamilton introduced the term ‘institutional racism’ to account for attitudes and 
practices that led to racist outcomes through unquestioned bureaucratic procedures. In 
their work, they treated individual and institutional racism as comparable to the 
distinction between overt and covert racism. They opined that while individual racism 
could be seen and heard, institutional racism was a more elusive process that could not be 
reduced to the acts of persons. They argued that white people collectively benefit from 
the process, even if individual whites did not wish to discriminate (Carmichael and 
Hamilton, 1967). Thus, institutional racism or the maintenance of racial disparities 
through routine governmental practices has created conditions that hamper the progress 
of South Carolina’s black citizens in their quest for economic and political equality. 
For example, the South Carolina General Assembly did not enact a Fair Housing 
Law and establish a monitoring commission until 1989-twenty- one years after the 
federal government’s 1968 Fair Housing Act (Washington, 2002; Shaw and Black, 2008). 
Similarly, within the educational arena, the state of South Carolina has for decades, 
severely underfunded minority-majority school districts. It has steadfastly defended such 
educational inequities in court and continues to assert it has met the state constitutional 
mandate that requires each student receive a “minimally adequate” education (Marshall 
Bradley & Bradley 2001 Morrison 2007; Shaw and Black, 2008). 
To further illustrate this point, Table 2.1 displays the results of institutional racism  
as it pertains to black South Carolinians both economically and educationally. Although 




behind their white counterparts in every significant economic and social indicator, and 
government plays a role in this inequality (Botsch, 2003). The educational disparities 
between whites and blacks involving local school funding, educational quality, and 
college preparedness are evident from the fact that almost 16% fewer black South  
Carolinians receive their high school diplomas as compared to their white counterparts  
(approximately 65% versus 81%). Similarly, approximately 14% fewer black South  
Carolinians attain a college degree when compared to whites (10% versus 24%). A 
substandard public education combined with economic discrimination have a bearing  
upon black median household income. Black household income is only 60% of white 
household income or $25,032 versus $42,068. Also, approximately 29% of black South 
Carolinians live below the poverty line compared to about 9% of whites. Undoubtedly,  
institutional racism is alive and well in South Carolina5. 
Recent History, Limits, and Potential of the Black Vote 
Having analyzed the broad economic and educational status of Black South 
Carolinians, this discussion now gives attention to the history and health of the black 
vote. Much like the fight for black southern enfranchisement or re-enfranchisement after 
the 1940s, there were a series of devices used either to deny black South Carolinians the 
right to vote or to dilute their ability to cast a meaningful vote. Those devices included: 
whites-only party primaries; separate boxes for state and federal elections (to circumvent 
federal scrutiny); the eight-box law (to confuse the under-educated voter); the literacy  
___________________ 
5  On November 12, 2014, The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a ruling in  
Abbeville School District et.al. South Carolina et al.(2014) that the South Carolina 
Legislature did not meet the constitutionally minimally adequate mandated funding level 




Table 2.1.   South Carolina Comparison by Race, 2010 (Percentages Rounded) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
       South Carolina 
     __________________________________________ 
 
Category    Total State      Blacks                Whites  
 
Population    4,625,364   1,290,684   3,060,000 
% White Population       ---------             ---------            66.2 
% Black Population       ---------                   27.9     ---------- 
% High School Graduate, age 
25+               83.6                  64.9                          80.9 
% Bachelor’s Degree or higher 
Age 25+                                                        20.2                    9.9                            24.2 
Median Household Income      $37,082      $25,032                      $42,068 
% Persons below Poverty                       16.8                  28.7                              9.3 
Median value of Owner 
Occupied Home             $94,900            $67,300                     $105,300         
% Minority owned firms            11.8               -------                         -------- 
 
Source: US Census of the Population, 2010 
 
test; the poll tax; appointment of all state legislators by local officials; and the constant 
re-registration of all voters (Burton et al., 1994; Shaw and Black, 2008). More recently, 
in 2011, the Republican-dominated legislature passed, and Governor Nikki Haley signed 
the Voter ID Bill into law. The law requires voters to show a driver’s license or other 
photo identification, passport, military identification or a voter registration card with a 
picture on it to vote (Act #0027, 2011). Critics have argued that implementation of this 
law will unduly burden and significantly suppress minority voters’ participation in the 
electoral process. 
Maneuvers such as the Voter ID law are not new in South Carolina’s politics. 
Civil rights activist James T. McCain noted during the mid-I900’s that denial of the vote 




morality crimes, among which was the racial crime of “miscegenation” (McCain, 1957, 
p. 360). He concluded that the chief among “several factors that are retarding [the 
Negro’s] progress of becoming a first class citizen politically” were “apathy and the lack 
of political consciousness” as conditioned by white supremacy and an “economic 
dependency” on whites. He further opined, “The Negro in South Carolina seems not to 
have learned the advantages of the ballot” (McCain, 1957, p. 360).  
Despite McCain’s’ assertion, beginning in the 1970’s black voters in South  
Carolina began to utilize their vote to provide themselves with some measure of 
descriptive representation in increasing numbers. As a result of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, black South Carolina voters began voting in large enough numbers to elect black 
officials to office. Even though in 1970, the percentage of black voters still lagged behind 
their percentage of the state population by about ten percentage points, nonetheless, black 
voters were able to elect three blacks to the legislature. The three newly elected black  
legislators were the first blacks to serve in the South Carolina General Assembly since  
1902 (SCLBC History, 2001)6 
Table 2.2 displays the trend in black descriptive representation in the South 
Carolina legislature over time. It shows that the number of blacks in South Carolina’s 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act forced South Carolina to redraw district lines into individual 
districts for each legislator. The redrawing of the district lines ultimately increased the 
number of districts that had high percentages of Black voters. Thus, the number of Blacks 
elected to the House of Representatives increased from 3 to 13 in the 1974 election. At 
_________________________________ 
6Herbert Fielding, James Felder, and I. S. Levy Johnson were elected to the S.C. House. 




Table 2.2  Trend of House Descriptive Representation 1971-2012, Selected Years 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year   Democrats    Republicans Independents    Vacancy        SCLBC     SCLBC %a      
                  
1971b     119    5   0     0    3           2  
1973     103             21   0     0    4            3 
1976     107  17   0     0  13          10 
1981     107  17   0     0  15          12 
1983     104  20   0     1  20          16 
1984     103  20   0     1  19          15 
1987       91  32   0     1  16          13 
1991       79  42   0     2  14          11 
1992       77  42   1     4  15          12 
1994       71  52   1     0  18          15 
1995c       57  63   4     0  22                 18 
1996       54  65   4     1  25          20 
1999d          55  66   0     3  24          19 
2000       57  67   0     0  25                 20 
2001       54  70   0     0  24          19 
2003       50  74   0     0  24          19 
2006e          49  74   0     1  25          20 
2007       51  73   0     0  27          22 
2010       52  72   0     0  29          23 
2012       48  76   0     0  27          22 
 
Source: South Carolina Legislative Manuals (1970-2012) 
 
    a     Percentages calculation (Rounded) based upon 124 member House chamber 
    b   First legislative session black legislators served in House since Reconstruction 
    c   Legislative year (in bold type) when Republicans gained control of House 
    d   Year  ( in bold-type) SCLBC member Gilda-Cobb Hunter became first black House 
         Minority Leader (1999-2001) 
    e    First year (in bold-type) SCLBC members constituted a majority of the House 
        Democrats    
 
that time, this represented the largest number of Blacks to serve in the General Assembly 
since Reconstruction. After the 1974 election, The South Carolina Legislative Black 
Caucus became formally established. Although operational since 1973, the S.C. 
Legislative Black Caucus, was formally organized in 1975. At that point in time, the 




Representatives. Throughout the years, the SCLBC has realized steady growth to the 
extent that the 2011-2013 SCLBC consisted of thirty-seven (37) members of the South 
Carolina General Assembly. During all those years, the SCLBC continual primary goal 
was “to bring together various segments of the community to inform the public of the 
need for governmental action to help solve the whole range of racial problems (Legette 
2000, 849). 
Moreover, the SCLBC views itself as the legislative voice of the black citizenry 
within the state. It tries to achieve this goal through the establishment and implementation 
of an SCLBC formal committee system based on policy areas of legislative committees 
to which its members are assigned. Each SCLBC committee is tasked with the charge 
of determining the impact of any proposed legislation upon the black community. Every 
black legislator has been a member of the SCLBC since its inception with one exception8. 
The number of black representatives in the House continued to increase up to the 
1980s, and then witnessed a slight decline from 20 members in 1983 to 15 in 1992. Until 
the mid-1990s, the South Carolina General Assembly and most statewide political offices 
were firmly under Democratic control. However, during the 1990s battles over 
redistricting, black Democrats parted ways with most of the white Democrats and aligned 
themselves with white Republicans to create 11 majority-black Senate Districts and  
31majority-black House Districts by 1994. As SCLBC member, Joseph Neal reasoned… 
“Increasing our share of black representation in South Carolina is a goal that has 
been important to our people in South Carolina since the Civil War” (Scoppe, 
2000, p. A6; Shaw and Black 2008) 
As a result of its political alliance with Republicans, the SCLBC got what it  
wanted, more black legislators but this victory came with a steep price.  By November  




Chamblee of Anderson County switched to the Republicans and put the GOP in control 
of the House for the first time since Reconstruction (Botsch, 2003)7. The Republicans 
now controlled the House and were within a few votes of controlling the Senate. Within a 
year, the Republican-controlled House adopted an agenda that The State Newspaper 
editorial writer Cindi Ross Scoppe described as the Black Caucus’ “worst nightmare”. 
The white Republicans agenda included efforts to eliminate affirmative action initiatives 
and enact welfare reform (Scoppe, 2000). All too often SCLBC members began to 
witness other occurrences of their unwise alliance with the Republican Party. Confronted 
with repeated Republican legislative actions that ran contrary to SCLBC members’ 
legislative priorities, Representative Cobb-Hunter proclaimed: 
“Five years ago, I think the House probably was made up of people 
  who, if you made some impassioned plea based on race and doing  
  the right thing…it might have swayed some people’s opinion. That     
  doesn’t work now” (Scoppe “A cautionary tale,” 2000, A6; Shaw and  
  Black, 2008). 
Despite, the legislative rancor between the SCLBC and the Republican Party, 
South Carolina witnessed an increase in the number of black legislators serving in the  
House since the parties 1990s alliance. Historically, in the 1999-2000 legislative session 
Gilda-Cobb Hunter, a female SCLBC member, became the first black House Minority 
Leader since Reconstruction.  
Also, since 2006, SCLBC members became and continue to constitute a majority 
of the House Democrats, which is now the minority party in the state’s legislature (SC  
_________________________________ 
7Today all members of the legislature are elected from single-member districts. The 





Legislative Manual). Currently, the House of Representatives has 28 black 
Representatives as of the 2011-2012 legislative sessions and 11 black state Senators. 
Near the end of the 2012 legislative year, SCLBC member Todd Rutherford became the 
second black representative elected as House Minority Leader8.   
By the same token, the Republican numbers and political power have also 
increased, but to a greater extent. As of today, the Republican Party is in complete control 
of South Carolina politics. Republicans currently hold a large majority in both chambers 
of the state legislature. They currently hold 76 seats in the House of Representatives, 
while the Democrats hold 48. Much like the Democratic Party in other states of the Old 
Confederacy, the South Carolina Democratic Party has been unable to retain 
control of the states’ legislature in the face of the South Carolina’s Republican Party’s 
growing strength. Interestingly enough, South Carolina’s legislature has been under 
Republican Party control for nearly two decades, and throughout that time, all of the 
SCLBC members have been members of the Democrat minority, though in increasing  
numbers. Thus, it is crucial to understand the impact that the change, in political party 
control of the South Carolina House of Representatives, has made upon the legislative 
behavior and successes of the SCLBC throughout this time. 
Although black descriptive representation within the South Carolina Legislature 
has increased over time, the state’s current political structure constrains political  
opportunities for greater black political power. This study will examine how, for almost  
__________________ 
8 All Democrat Legislators serving in the House have become members of the SCLBC 
with one exception; Mary Miles, a representative from Calhoun County initially refused 
to join but became a member in 1982. See Appendix A for a list of the names of all 




two decades, SCLBC House members were able to tread the legislative path of least  
resistance by strategically sponsoring certain legislation while also engaging in other 
forms of strategic legislative behavior in their attempts to acquire some measure of 
political power. They had to adopt this path because of their inability to wield 
meaningful, substantive influence in the Republican-dominated House of 
Representatives. So the question becomes are they successful in their efforts to provide 
meaningful strategic representation to their constituency given the political dominance of 
the Republican Party? We can gain an initial understanding of their efforts through an 
analysis of black South Carolinians’ voting behavior. 
Black Voters Registration and Turnout 
Regardless of conventional wisdom concerning black voter turnout, in the latest  
national election, blacks voted at a much higher rate than other minority groups in the 
2012 Presidential Election. By most measures, black voter turnout surpassed the white 
turnout for the first time in election history. During this election cycle blacks strongly 
supported President Barack Obama while many whites stayed home. The heavy black 
voter turnout came despite concerns about the effect of new voter-identification laws on 
minority voting. Apparently, the impediments imposed by the voter ID Laws were 
outweighed by black voters’ desire to re-elect the first black president. Overall, the 2012 
Election saw the emergence of black voters who all too often were disenfranchised and 
then effectively barred from voting until enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (US 
Election Project, 2012). 
In fact, today’s black South Carolinians demonstrate steady rates of registration  




registered and turned out at roughly the same rates in the highly contested 2012 
presidential election. It also shows that registration rates for whites and blacks in South 
Carolina were comparable, to their counterparts in the neighboring states of Georgia and 
North Carolina. In 2012, the registration rate for black South Carolinians stood at 75% 
percent compared to 84% of black North Carolinians, 69% of black Georgians and 56%  
Table 2.3. Rates of Registration and Turnout in South Carolina and Neighboring 
                  States, 2012 Presidential Election (Rounded) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
State and Race   Percent Registered  Total Percent Vote 
 
Georgia 
Whites      67%    57% 
Blacks      69%    62% 
Hispanics     29%    23% 
North Carolina 
Whites      71%    60% 
Blacks      84%    79% 
Hispanics     18%    15% 
Florida  
Whites      62%    56%   
Blacks      56%    49% 
Hispanics     48%    42% 
South Carolina 
Whites      70%    60% 
Blacks      75%    69% 
 
Source: The Center for Voting and Democracy 
 
of black Floridians. With regards to actual turnout, black North Carolinians turned out at 
the highest rate, 79%, followed by black South Carolinians at 75%, and black Georgians,  
at 62%. 
A comparative examination of white and black South Carolinians voting behavior 
shows that black South Carolinians registration and turnout rates were higher than whites 




and the black voters’ turnout rate was 69% compared to whites turnout rate of 60%. In 
essence, the problem is not that a disproportion number of blacks do not vote on election 
day, the quandary is that white South Carolinians disproportionately vote in larger 
numbers and racial blocs for white candidates, most often Republicans. Thus, they 
usually counter and outweigh many of the preferences blacks express at the polls (Lublin 
& Voss, 2000; Smith, 2003, Black and Shaw, 2008). 
As an illustration, observe Tables 2.4 and 2.5 in the 2010 Governor’s race 
between Republican candidate Nikki Haley and Democrat candidate Vincent Sheheen. 
To conduct this analysis, I adopt the method used by Shaw and Black (2008), in an earlier 
study. I divided all 46 South Carolina counties into two groups. The first set includes all 
counties where blacks comprised at least a third of all registered voters in 2010. There are 
23 of them, or exactly half of the total. The second set includes all counties where blacks 
were less than a third of registered voters. There are both clear differences and 
similarities in these tables.  
Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 highlight a striking similarity. It shows that the mean 
registration rate for counties where blacks comprise more than one-third of the population 
is identical (50% versus 50%) to the mean registration rates for whites. But in the set of 
counties where blacks make up less than one-third of the population, whites register at a 
much higher rate than blacks (77% versus 23%). Essentially, black South Carolinians 
failed to capitalize on their impressive numbers in those counties where their numbers 
were more than one-third of the county’s population.  
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 further amplifies black South Carolinians voters’ dilemma. In 




Table 2.4   Registration in Counties where one-third or more of the population is 




    All  White          % White           Black         % Black 
 
County Averages 32,359  16,141            50%              16,218               50% 




Colleton  24,403  13,031             53%               9,372                42% 
Chester  19,024  11,294  59%        7,730     41% 





Table 2.5   Registration in Counties where less than one-third of the population is 




      All    White       %White           Black       % Black 
 
County Averages  82,011     63,555        77%            8,456  23% 
   
(n=23) 
 
Example Counties   
Abbeville   13,931        9,637        69%   4,294  31% 
Union    16,684      11,248 67%  5,436  33% 
Chesterfield   22,421      14,351 64%  8,061  36% 
Source: South Carolina Vote Counts  
 
where blacks are more than one-third of the population, their turnout rate is  
approximately  44% versus 58% for whites. In other words, in this set of counties black 
voter turnout averages is approximately 14 percentage points lower than white voters’ 





Table 2.6 Black and White Voter Turnout where one-third or more of the 





             Total            % Total              White           % Black 
   Vote   Voting   Voting  Voting 
County Averages 




Colleton  11,624   52%   60%  40% 
Chester   9,636   51%   59%  41% 
Georgetown             19,951   59%   53%  47% 
 




Table 2.7 Black and White Voter Turnout where less than one-third of the 





       Total Vote % Total   % White     % Black 
        Vote  Voting               Voting     Voting 
County averages 




Abbeville          7,406  53%  69%        31% 
Union              9,314  56%  67%        33% 
Chesterfield        11,243  50%  65%        35% 
Source: South Carolina Vote Counts 
 
of the population, the mean average white voter turnout is a whopping 71% versus a mere 
29% for blacks. In sum, the black South Carolinian voter problem lies in both the area of 




Black voter turnout is critical in getting blacks elected to public office and cannot 
be under-estimated. More blacks must be registered, and more of the registered black 
voters must vote. However, the task of increasing the number of registered black voters 
may have become even harder than in times past. In a recent ruling in Shelby County, 
Alabama versus Holder (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Section 4, of The 
Voting Rights Act. Section 4 is the formula that Congress has used to determine which 
states were subject to the special preclearance requirement under Section 5 of the Act. 
The Court’s decision to strike Section 4 of the Voters Rights Act will have a significant 
impact on South Carolina’s voting procedure. In the absence of the federal government’s 
preclearance oversight, South Carolina’s state and local election officials are free to 
redraw district boundaries or move polling places without first having to obtain 
permission from the Department of Justice. These actions have the potential to negatively 
impact South Carolina’s black voting age populations for decades to come. 
Growing Numbers of Black Elected Officials  
This study now undertakes an analysis of the effectiveness of black voters’ efforts 
to acquire meaningful, descriptive representation. Despite their voter related problems 
throughout the years, black South Carolinians have managed to place a small but growing 
number of blacks into elective offices. Table 2.8 displays the trend in the number of black 
elected officials in South Carolina during selected years’ between1998-2008. 
During those years, the total number of elected officials in South Carolina rose 
from 3,943 to 3,953, approximately a 0.3% increase while the total number of black 
elected officials increased from 534 to 549, approximately a 2.8% increase during this 




than 14% of the total number of elected offices. For example, in 1998 blacks represented 
13.5% of the total elected officials and only increased their total to 13.7% for subsequent 
years. Although black South Carolinians still lag behind their white counter-parts in 
holding elected offices, these numbers still represent a substantial gain since the mere 
total of 102 black elected officials in 1974. Indeed, by 2001 South Carolina had 542  




Year   Total Elected      Total Black            % BEO’s        % Black            Parity Ratio 
     Officials       Elected  of Total          of Total             Voting Age %  
Official                                        Voting Age        by % Black       
 
 
1998            3943    534       13.5%   27.9%  48.4  
 
1999  3931  538    13.7%   27.8%  49.3  
 
2000  3943  540    13.7%             27.2%             50.4 
 
2001  3951  542    13.7%   27.2%  50.4 
 
2008  3953  549    13.7%   27.2%  50.4 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source:  Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, National Black Elected Official 
   Roster; US Census; BEO is Black Elected Officials 
 
black elected officials: 34 U.S. or state legislators: 333 city and county officials; 8 law 
enforcement officials; and 167 education officials (2001 State Statistical Abstract; South 
Carolina Budget and Control Board, 2001; Botsch, 2003).  
The last column in Table 2.8 presents the descriptive representation number for 




percentage blacks comprised of the voting-age population (VAP), which produces a 
“parity ratio”.If these percentages are perfectly equal, this ratio is 100, or perfect parity. If  
they are perfectly unequal, the ratio is 0 or perfect disparity (Shaw and Black, 2008).  
         
During the time frame of this study, black South Carolinians had an average 
parity ratio of 49.78%. In other words, blacks had less than half the number of offices we 
would expect if they held elected office in equal proportion to the percentage they 
comprised of all eligible voters. However, since 2000, the black South Carolinians 
average was 50.4%, which is slightly better than their average during prior years. 
Nevertheless, this modest increase represents only half the total number of elective 
offices blacks need to hold if they want to provide full descriptive representation to black 
South Carolinians. 
Arguably, this cursory review of South Carolina’s racial politics might show that 
the election of many blacks to public office denotes a genuine sign of racial progress in 
the state and the lessening of racial, political polarization. Although descriptive 
representation provided by South Carolina’s black elected officials has increased over the 
last three decades, there is still a political structure in place that constricts the political 
opportunities for greater black political power to emerge within the state. So what 
differences, if any, have increased numbers of black elected officials made in the quality 
of life and manner of representation they provide to black South Carolinians? Can black 
elected legislators provide substantive responses to their constituency through strategic 
activities when the representation occurs within the politically constrained legislative 




studies as a beginning point in seeking answers to those questions. These studies examine 
the dynamics by which descriptive representation relates to substantive representation. 
2.2: Competing Theories of Representation 
There are some observations that are either implicit or explicit in most studies of  
descriptive and substantive representation that need to be recognized. Some scholars 
argue that descriptive representation is not necessary to provide blacks with meaningful, 
substantive representation. They reason that white representatives can be responsive to all 
of their constituents regardless of race (e.g., Thernstrom, 1987). Conversely, other 
scholars suggest that white legislators are less likely than black legislators to represent 
the substantive interests of the black community (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Whitby 
1997; Tate 2003). 
Other studies seek to explain how different factors produce substantive 
representation. One stream of research along this line, suggests that the representative’s 
political party may have an effect on substantive representation, (Lublin 1997; Whitby, 
1997; Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Swain 1995). A few of these scholars 
argue that Democrats are more likely to provide blacks with substantive representation 
than are Republicans. For example, in her work entitled Black Faces, Black Interests: The 
Representation of African Americans in Congress, Swain contends that the best way to maximize 
substantive representation is to increase the number of Democrats elected to Congress (Swain, 
1995). In this respect, blacks can acquire effective representation through political parties.  
The second stream of research theorizes that the race of the legislator is the significant 
factor in substantive representation (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Guinier 1994, Mansbridge 2001, 
Whitby 1997; Tate 2003; Canon 1999; Grose, 2005; Minta, 2009; Peruh, 2005). For 




representation of black interests, even when controlling for party and region variables (Whitby 
1997, 110). He writes “All things being equal, black representatives are the most supportive of 
black interests, followed by white non-southern Democrats (Whitby 1997, 111).” Given his 
findings, Whitby (1997) reasoned it is misleading to conclude that race does not matter in  
providing blacks with substantive representation.  
The third stream of research indicates that constituency factors play a pivotal role 
with the racial composition of the district being a key determinant of substantive 
representation (Sharp and Garand 2001, Lublin 1997; Herring 1990, Whitby 1985; 
Endersby and Menifield, 2000; McKee, 2004; Grose, 2005). The underlying assumption 
behind this line of reasoning is that the higher the percentage of the black population 
within the district, then, the more likely the black voters will elect someone who will 
respond to their needs. 
Additionally, recent scholarly works by both Christian Grose and Michael Minta 
have also made outstanding contributions to the literature by looking at previously 
unexamined factors associated with substantive representation. Grose’s work titled 
Congress in Black and White: Race and Representation in Washington and at Home  
(2011), expanded the traditional definition of how substantive representation is generated 
by looking at constituent services as a form of representation. In this work, Grose argues 
that working in the “interests of black constituents” should not be limited to roll call 
votes as evidence for substantive representation but should also include the type of 
“racial electoral environment” in which the representation occurs. He examines various 
congressional districts and categorizes them as low black population (less than 25%); 
black influence (25–49%) and black majority (50%+) districts. Grose argues that 




with the types of representatives elected: black or white Democrats or white Republicans. 
He calls this interaction “racial trust” (Grose, 2011, p. 29).  
Minta’s work entitled Oversight: Representing the Interests of Blacks and Latinos  
in Congress (2011), pushes the representation literature even further through his 
examination of legislators’ advocacy efforts in oversight hearings as a measure of 
representation. In general, Minta finds that black and Latino legislators devote more time 
to speaking out for the interests of minorities and the poor and are more likely to speak 
out on these issues on committees to which they have not been assigned. He also finds 
that although Democrats were more likely than Republicans to advocate on behalf of 
minorities and the poor, even after controlling for party, black and Latino members of 
Congress were still significantly more likely to become advocates on these issues.  
Minta argues that this type advocacy is evidence of these racial minority 
legislators’ true passion and conviction to represent minority concerns beyond their 
natural constituency. He further develops this argument through the concept he calls 
“strategic group uplift.” He goes on to define this concept as "the belief that, as minority 
legislators, they have to defend the interests of the disadvantaged nationally, as well as 
the interests of their constituency" (Minta, 2011). In sum, all of these works suggest that 
all of the previously mentioned predictors will impact substantive representation 
outcomes for the black constituency. Still, each work placed its focus on congressional 
representation at the national level rather than state-level representation. However, there 
are equally valuable works that examine various components of state-level descriptive 





State Level Representation Studies 
A review of the literature reveals several full-length books that examine 
descriptive or substantive representation factors involving black state legislators. The 
early work of Hanes Walton’s (1985) entitled Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior, 
consists of a wide-ranging review of black’s socialization, attitudes, voting behavior, and 
representation in political institutions. In the chapter on black legislative representation, 
he examines black state lawmakers’ effectiveness in Georgia and three non-Southern 
states legislatures during 1969, 1971, and 1972. Walton finds that black elected officials 
in those legislatures often received assignments to minor or moderately influential 
committees rather than to the most prestigious committees. He also discovers that 
chairmanships follow the same pattern. He concludes that black lawmakers primarily 
sponsored “people-oriented legislation” (p. 216) such as health, education, welfare, 
consumer protection, and crime but had limited success in enacting their bills into law. 
A few years later, in a work entitled Emerging Influentials in State Legislatures: 
Women, Blacks, and Hispanics, Albert Nelson (1991) examines descriptive and 
substantive representation in forty-five states legislative chambers in 1982, 1984, and 
1986. According to Nelson, black legislators’ descriptive representation presence in such 
leadership positions as party leaders or committee chairs declined nationally over the 
four-year time interval he studied. However, Nelson attributes this decrease to “an 
attempt to remove blacks from visible positions of power to counter the image of a black 
Democratic Party” (p. 98). He also notes that even when black legislators occupy party or 
committee leadership positions, they were unable to influence state spending on 




suggesting the lack of evidence to support black legislative influence may be due to the 
conservative area (1983-1987) he chose to study.  
In a later work titled African American Legislators in the American States, Kerry  
L. Haynie (2001) examines descriptive and substantive representation in five states at 
ten-year intervals, from 1969 through 1989. Utilizing economic data and public opinion 
polls, Haynie examines black representation through both “black interest” legislation 
sponsored during this period and black legislators’ committee assignments. He defines 
“black interests” as legislation backing health, education, welfare, economic 
redistribution, and civil rights issues. After controlling for other significant factors, 
Haynie finds that black legislators were more likely to introduce bills that advanced black 
interests.  
He notes that although black legislators were over-represented on “black interest” 
committees, they had also increased their representation on “prestige” committees, 
thereby suggesting a broadening of their influence. He also remarks that neither black 
representation in the legislature nor representation in a party or committee leadership 
position helped black lawmakers pass the bills they introduced. However, their leadership 
positions did appear to lead to increase state health, education, and welfare expenditures. 
Haynie, therefore, concludes that overall the presence and growth of black representation 
in the legislature did produce noticeable and meaningful policy consequences (Haynie, 
2001). 
Another scholarly work involves Charles Menifield and Stephen Shaffer’s book, 
entitled Politics in the New South: Representation of African Americans in State 




representation since the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Collectively, the six 
chapters involving Arkansas (Parry and Miller 2005), Florida (Tauber 2005), Georgia 
(Wielhouwer and Middlemass 2005), Mississippi (Shaffer and Menifield), and Texas 
(Briscoe 2005) analyzed salient black representation issues germane to each state 
legislature for selected years beginning in 1972. In a concluding chapter, Menifield, 
Shaffer and Patrick (2005) briefly examines the remaining Southern states (Alabama, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) to see what 
alternatives black legislators were using to secure passage of beneficial legislation since 
black legislators did not constitute a majority of these states' legislatures. Overall, the 
scholarly works in this volume note that the increased number of blacks registering and 
voting in the South after the Civil Rights Movement did result in an increased number of 
black legislators being elected to Southern States legislatures. They ultimately questioned 
whether the increased number of representatives did produce effective black legislative 
descriptive and substantive representation in these states. In addressing that question, 
Menifield and Schaffer (2005) conclude that overall, the Black Legislative Caucuses’ 
success was dependent upon their ability to become a vital part of the governing coalition 
on those bills that impact their constituents’ quality of life.  
A final work reviewed is Sullivan and Winburn‘s book entitled The Louisiana 
Legislative Black Caucus (2011). In this volume, Sullivan and Winburn examine how 
effective the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus (LLBC) were in providing both 
descriptive and substantive representation to their black constituency. Sullivan and 
Winburn examine four sessions of the then, Democratic-controlled Louisiana Legislature. 




before Hurricane Katrina and one in 2006 after-Hurricane Katrina. They also look at two 
special sessions (in-between) that were devoted to post-Katrina issues. Their analysis 
relied on data that consisted primarily of the bills introduced and enacted as well as the 
roll call votes cast during these sessions. They conclude that the LLBC was effective 
regarding descriptive representation but less effective concerning substantive 
representation (pp. 131-132). This review now turns explicitly to scholarly research 
articles involving state-level representation.  
Scholarly Articles 
Early research such as Bullock and MacManus’ (1981) study of the Mississippi  
Legislature find that black officials support black interest legislation to a greater extent 
than whites. Two years later, Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson (1983) addresses the 
descriptive representation question by examining seniority and leadership positions in 
South Carolina’s 1977-1978 House sessions and the 1977 Texas House session. They 
find that white and black legislators with seniority and held committee chairs or party 
leaders’ positions, were more active in introducing bills or amendments. These legislators 
were also more successful in seeing their sponsored measures enacted into law than were 
those legislators lacking seniority or leadership roles. They conclude that seniority and 
leadership positions were more beneficial to a legislator than his or her race or party 
membership. 
Later, Button and Hedge’s 1996 study looks at the extent descriptive 
representation exists in the committee system. While noting black legislators’ exclusion  
from the legislature’s most powerful committees, they suggest that one way to provide 




legislative agenda through coalition building. They also examine the issue of self-
reported ideology and find that white Democrats were essentially moderate while black 
Democrats were to the left of center and Republicans to the right of center. They note that 
the group differences suggest black Democrat legislators would have more success by 
joining with white Democrats rather than crossing party lines (Button and Hedge, 1996).  
Cheryl Miller reaches a similar conclusion in her 1990 study. Her study examines  
the success of the North Carolina’s Legislative Black Caucus’s agenda in the 1987 North 
Carolina legislature by looking at what she termed “situational and political skill 
variables”. Her characterizations of situational factors were caucus cohesion, size, 
members’ seniority and committee chairmanships. She notes that the caucus key political 
skill was the ability of the black lawmakers to build successful coalitions with their white 
Democratic Party colleagues. She concludes that given the rise in the number of 
Republican lawmakers with the legislature, the caucus’ success will depend upon their 
ability to build a winning coalition with Democratic Party leaders (Miller, 1990).  
In a later study, King-Meadows and Schaller (2001) examine voting cohesion 
among black legislatures in North Carolina and Maryland using legislation from the 
1997-1998 sessions in both states. They find that not only were black legislators the most 
cohesive group in both states legislatures but also used different strategies to secure 
legislation beneficial to their black constituency.     
Further review of the literature shows various case studies that have also 
investigated the impact of descriptive representation. These studies primarily involve 
policies that were of interest to blacks. Examining the Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana 




percentage of black registered voters in a district positively influence white and black 
lawmakers’ votes on wealth redistribution, overt racial issues, civil rights, and liberties. 
Also, Bratton and Haynie (1991) examines six state legislatures and discover that black 
lawmakers differs from white lawmakers in the types of bills they introduce. Bratton and 
Haynie note that black legislators were more likely to introduce bills dealing with welfare 
and increased government spending.  
Additionally, Owens (2005) examines 48 state budgets from 1971-1995, (a 24-
year period  to determine if increased black descriptive representation in state legislatures 
has resulted in black lawmakers exerting greater influence over policy outputs. He 
compared changes in spending priorities within budgets during that 24-year time span. 
His findings demonstrate that increased black representation results in state legislatures 
giving higher priority to policy areas critical to black elected officials. He concludes, 
“When measured correctly, increased descriptive representation can result in increased 
substantive representation in large political institutions” (Owens, 2005).  
Preuhs (2006) examines state variations involving the maximum individual 
AFDC benefits allowed to individuals in 47 different states. Using states-level welfare 
data along with survey responses from black state legislators, Preuhs finds “black 
descriptive representation exerts policy influence…. but that a highly racialized political 
context and party control conditions the nature and degree of policy influence: (Preuhs, 
2006 p.597). Specifically, he finds that only in those states which the Democrat Party 
controlled both chambers of the legislature did increased black representation improve 
individual AFDC benefits. He concludes that overall black legislators held too few 




In the summer of 2000, The Journal of Black Studies released a comprehensive 
analysis consisting of several articles devoted to examining the Legislative Black Caucus 
representation among different states. The seven articles examine Virginia (Clemons and 
Jones 2000), Mississippi (Orey 2000), North Carolina (Sullivan 2000), Georgia (Holmes 
2000), Tennessee (Wright 2000), Missouri (Menifield 2000), and South Carolina (Legette 
2000). Each article discusses issues that include the elections rates of black legislators, 
committee chairmanships, and state-level black caucuses’ formation. Most importantly, 
each article also examines the caucus’ role passage of legislation.  
Using roll-call data from 1987-1988 for each state’s legislative sessions, the 
authors assess the caucus members voting behavior relative to other members of the 
legislature. They gave particular attention to legislation proposed by black legislators. 
These researchers note that overall black legislators serve as the main advocate for black 
citizens in their respective states. Moreover, the black legislators were the most likely to 
pursue legislation that would have direct benefits to these citizens. Further, they note that 
these black legislative caucuses were extremely cohesive and much more likely to secure 
passage of their legislation when they had a sizable number of caucus members or caucus 
members in influential positions.  
Legette’s (2000) study and subsequent conclusion presented in the journal is of 
keen interest to this project. His study specifically focuses on the SCLBC responsiveness 
South Carolina’s black constituency with “particular attention given to the legislative 
activities of black lawmakers during the 1987-1988” legislative year (Legette 2000, 841).  
Legette's examination includes an analysis of policy responsiveness by SCLBC members 




total bills introduced during the 107th General Assembly. He concludes his analysis by 
asserting: 
Black legislators failed to successfully sponsor downward redistributive 
legislation to address the salient problems in the black community…. 
Unfortunately, it appears that black legislators have accepted the constraints  
of conventional politics without considering alternative strategies for  
influencing the legislative process…Therefore, it can be concluded 
that black legislators will not by their own initiative, provide legislative  
remedies for the entrenched problems of the black citizens in South 
Carolina (Legette 2000, 857).  
Eight years later, Shaw and Black (2008) also analyze the SCLBC bill 
sponsorship patterns in the South Carolina House of Representatives during the 110th 
(1993-1994), 115th (2003-2004), and 116th (2005-2006) legislative sessions. These 
sessions include periods of both Democratic and Republican control of the chamber. Not 
surprisingly, their findings were similar to those obtained by Legette (2000).  In their 
study, Shaw and Black find that SCLBC members’ bill passage rate for both descriptive 
and substantive legislation was lower during the Republican-controlled era than during 
the Democratic-controlled sessions despite an increase in the number of black 
representatives. They also noted that SCLBC members sponsored substantially more 
symbolic legislation than both substantive and descriptive legislation during the 
Republican’s control of the House. They conclude: 
In sum, our examination of the content of LBC-sponsored Legislation 
within all legislative sessions of our study indicates by far, legislation 
involving symbolic responsiveness has been virtually the only LBC-
sponsored legislation passed under Republican rule. Being forced to 
assume the path of least resistance in its Legislative behavior has not 
gotten the LBC or Black South Carolina politics very far at all  
(Shaw and Black, 2008, p. 38). 
 
Overall, both studies involving the South Carolina legislature show that black legislators 




descriptive or substantive legislation or otherwise providing effective representation for 
their black constituency. 
Even though the literature reveals various scholarly research regarding state-level  
black representation effectiveness, there is a clear need for additional studies. Moreover, 
it is evident that existing state-level representation research has yielded conflicting 
images involving the adequacy of black interest representation in the American political 
system. Although all of the previously mentioned studies examine black representatives’ 
behavior and influence in shaping the legislative agenda on racial issues, collectively, 
they have produced considerable variations in their conclusions. For example, Walton 
(1985), Nelson (1991) and Legette (2000) are doubtful in regards to black legislative 
influence. They cite the black legislators limited committee assignments, little advances 
in enacting the bills they introduce, modest changes or improvements in civil rights bills, 
diminishing leadership positions and their inability to influence public policy. On the 
other hand, Haynie (2001) and Menifield (2005) offer a more optimistic view of black 
legislators’ influence. They cited black lawmakers’ accession into committee 
chairmanships, successful coalition building with white Democrats, and the increasing 
number of black legislators’ assignments to prestige committees as supporting evidence. 
This study seeks to reconcile those divergent views by not only undertaking a joint 
analysis of black legislators’ bill sponsorship patterns, committee assignments, and 
coalition formation as in these previous studies but also broaden the coalition formation 
analysis to include an examination of coalition formation for negative veto purposes. In  
doing so, this study will provide both substantive and theoretical contributions to black 




2.3: Expectations and Explanations: Bill Sponsorship, Committee 
Assignments, and Coalitions Formations 
    
At the outset, some basic observations involving black state legislators and 
descriptive representation needs to be discussed. Conventional wisdom holds that Black 
legislators tend to support a distinctive agenda and tend to work as a distinctive group to 
advance that agenda (Perry, 1976; Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson, 1983; Miller, 1990 
Nelson, 1991; Button and Hedge, 1993; Swain, 1993; Hedge, Button and Spear, 1996; 
Harmel, and Thompson, 1983). Furthermore, evidence suggests that SCLBC members 
have a commitment not only to represent their own constituents, but all blacks within the 
state. The underlying philosophy of the SCLBC is that its members represented a state-
wide black constituency. Ernest Finney, the first chairman of the SCLBC, stated his 
commitment to this broader conceptualization of their representation. At the Black 
Caucus Inaugural dinner held July 19, 1975, Chairman Earnest A. Finney, Jr., wrote: 
Individually, and as an organization, we endeavor to raise the consciousness of 
our people through avenues already open while seeking out new and untapped 
vehicles through which every man’s hopes, dreams and aspirations may be 
realized (South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus, 2011). 
This type commitment is not surprising inasmuch as previous research has also 
shown that the shared history of political marginalization, racial discrimination, and the 
struggle for equality creates a sense of linked fate among Black Americans (Dawson 
1994; Williams 1998). All SCLBC members share the experience of being a member of 
this historically marginalized group. Individual black legislators will often use the 
group’s interests as a surrogate for their own individual interests because of these shared  
occurrences and the obvious social, political and economic differences between  




that black legislators will be interested in policy areas that affect the black community. 
Accordingly, these observations lead to several expectations involving SCLBC 
members’ methods of representation. The underlying expectations of this study are that 
SCLBC members exhibit different dimensions of representation while providing 
descriptive representation. The agenda-setting behavior of these legislators manifests 
itself in their committee assignments, strategic bill sponsorship activities, along with 
strategic coalition formations. First, I expect that SCLBC members will exhibit 
distinctive policy preferences from non-members and that their agenda-setting behavior 
will be evident in the strategic types of legislation they introduce. I expect that SCLBC 
members will be more likely than white legislators to introduce legislation pertaining to 
equity in education, affirmative action, health care and Medicaid issues. These are the 
SCLBC’s core legislative priorities. Legislations involving equity in education, 
affirmative action, health care and Medicaid issues are primary legislation. Therefore, I 
expect that SCLBC members will introduce primary legislation more often during 
periods of the Democrat’s control of the legislative chamber than during periods of 
Republican control. The fact that equity in education, health care, affirmative action and 
Medicaid issues have traditionally been of lower priority for white Republican legislators, 
supports this expectation.  
In addition, I expect that SCLBC members will introduce more secondary 
legislation during periods of Republican legislative dominance. Legislation involving 
economic development, predatory lending, minimum wage increase and taxation are  
examples of  secondary legislation. Presumably SCLBC members will adopt the strategy 




The strategy of "deracialization" or deemphasizing race, should make it easier for House 
consideration and eventual passage of the SCLBC sponsored deracialized legislation 
(Baker and McCrory, 1976). 
Regarding passage rates, I expect that SCLBC members will be less likely than 
non-LBC members to achieve passage of their sponsored legislation (Shaw and Black, 
2008; Orey and Adams, 2000; Bratton and Haynie, 1999). Specifically, I expect that 
SCLBC members will experience a lower passage rate for the primary legislation they 
sponsor as compared to their sponsored secondary legislation. Prior research supports this 
expectation. Research on this issue has shown that there is a disinclination on the part of 
white legislators, to support black interest legislation introduced by black lawmakers. 
White legislators’ lack of support in these instances can be linked to their social and 
cultural differences. One difference involves the concept of “social distance” (Guinier, 
1994). This difference involves “feelings of unwillingness among members of a group to 
accept or approve a given degree of intimacy in interaction with members of an out-
group” (Bratton and Haynie, 1999, Guinier 1994, Bogardus, 1954).    
Additionally, I expect that SCLBC members will actively seek and hold 
assignments on House standing committees whose jurisdiction includes black interest 
policy areas. Therefore, I expect to find black legislators more significantly represented 
on committees whose jurisdiction includes education, affirmative action, health care and 
Medicaid issues. Previous scholarly research supports this expectation. Prior research has 
shown that because of a shared cultural background and common heritage, the black  
constituency is one of the most stable and consistent groups in terms of public policy 




such, it is possible to identify salient black constituency interests within South Carolina, 
and indeed the SCLBC has done so with the list of their legislative priorities. Thus, the 
SCLBC members’ desire to represent all black constituency interests within the state will  
govern their committee assignment requests and subsequent committee appointments.  
Finally, I expect that SCLBC members’ will strategically attempt to form negative 
veto coalitions. Their success in forming negative veto coalitions in the House chamber 
will vary according to the legislative environment in which they participate. I expect that 
SCLBC members will be more successful in their negative veto coalition efforts, during 
periods of Democratic legislative control than during periods of Republican Party 
dominance. Prior research shows that participation in a dominant coalition produces more 
substantive policy changes for minority groups than does descriptive representation alone 
(Haynie, 2001, Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1986; Nelson, 1991; Sonenshein 1993). As 
such, the SCLBC members build strategic dominant coalitions to produce meaningful 
policy changes for their minority constituents. Given the Democratic Party legislative 
history towards black legislation, SCLBC members should be successful more often in 
their coalition formations attempts with Democratic legislative control of the House than 
during Republican-controlled legislative sessions. 
Strategic Representation Hypotheses 
The principal objective of this work is to provide insight into the nature and 
consequences of SCLBC members’ efforts to provide strategic representation in the 
South Carolina House of Representatives. Expressed below are the hypotheses that form 
the basis for this study. In the succeeding chapters, I construct models to test the effects 





Bill Sponsorship and Passage  
Presumably, any member of the South Carolina House of Representatives is free  
to sponsor any bill he or she desires. However, prior research has consistently shown 
significant differences in the sponsorship behavior of legislative minorities such as black 
legislators, and women. (Bratton, 2006; Bratton, 2005; Haynie, 2000; Swers, 2002). 
Black lawmakers’ bill sponsorship patterns offer a number of insights for research 
involving black representation. For example, the black lawmakers sponsorship patterns 
illustrate their efforts to address the problems and concerns of distinct constituencies that 
establish and maintain their ‘‘electoral connections’’ with constituents based on policy 
responsiveness (Mayhew, 1974).  
Sponsorship patterns also indicate levels of interest or intensity with which 
representatives pursue certain issues (Swers, 2002; 32–33). Sponsorship efforts also 
reveal information about legislative priorities (Hall, 1996; Whitby, 2002). Thus, these 
arguments support the notion that SCLBC members’ patterns of bill sponsorship related 
to black issues and interests highlight their efforts to effectively represent the black 
constituency. Therefore, I pose the following hypotheses: 
H1: SCLBC members will be as likely as white Democrats and white 
Republicans members to sponsor legislation in equal proportion to their 
membership within the House during each legislative session. 
 
H2:   SCLBC members will be more likely to sponsor more primary black 
interest legislation as opposed to secondary legislation during periods of 
Democratic control  
 
 
H3:  SCLBC members will be more likely to sponsor more secondary 
legislation as opposed to primary black interest legislation during periods 





In addition, because I expect differences in the passage rates between black interest 
legislation and non-black interest legislation, I test the following hypothesis:  
H4:  SCLBC members will have a higher probability of getting their secondary 
sponsored legislation passed compared to primary black interest 
legislation, regardless of party control of the House. 
 
Committee Assignments  
 
Previous studies also shows that given minority legislators tendency to sponsor 
black interest legislation, this propensity may also be reflected in their committee 
assignments requests (Haynie, 2001).  Thus, it is reasonable to expect that SCLBC 
members will seek committee assignments to those committees which handle issues 
specifically relevant to their black constituency. I pose the following hypothesis to test 
this expectation: 
H5:  SCLBC members will be more likely to seek membership on committees 
that handle black interest legislation rather than non-black interest 
committees. 
 
Negative Veto Coalition  
A unique dimension of the strategic representation theory involves SCLBC members’ 
negative veto coalition formation behavior. Although some work has been done on the 
legislative success of different types of coalition formation, the literature is lacking in 
studies involving negative veto coalition formations by black legislators. I test the 
following hypotheses to begin addressing this oversight. 
H6:  SCLBC members will be more likely to form a winning coalition to defeat 
anti-black legislation during periods of Democrat control of the 
legislature. 
H7:  SCLBC members will be less likely to form a winning coalition to defeat 








Empirical analyses and tests of all hypotheses involve the use of data pertaining to 
the South Carolina House of Representatives. The data were collected from the South 
Carolina State Legislature Internet portal, www. scstatehouse.gov, administered by the 
Carolina Legislative Information Service (2011). From this database, information for all 
bills introduced in the House of Representatives during these sessions, along with 
complete bill histories, bill summaries, amendments, roll call votes and committee 
assignments were gathered.  
Data used to identify individual district characteristics for each House member 
were obtained from the United States Census Bureau Internet portal, 
http://www.census.gov and the South Carolina Office of Research and Statistics Internet 
portal, http://rfa.sc.gov/demo. House members’ personal demographics and committee 
assignments information were obtained from the South Carolina Legislative Manuals 
published for each legislative session involved in this study. Additional data involving 
SCLBC members were retrieved from the South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus’     
files.  
The data were used to examine patterns of legislative behavior of the House of 
Representatives members for the 109th, (1991-1992), 110th (1993-1994), 114th (2001-
2002), 115th (2003-2004) and the 119th (2011-2012) legislative sessions. The 109th 
Session gives the status of things during the last legislative session when Democrats were 
in full control of the House. The 110th Session gives the status of things when 
Republicans first gained control of the House of Representatives. The 114th and 115th 




up to and including a decade of Republican rule. The 119th Session provides, even more, 
insight into SCLBC members’ strategy of strategic representation as they enter into the 
early years of the second decade of Republican rule.  
Table 2.9 displays an overview of the number of bills sponsored and passed by 
the South Carolina House of Representatives during the 109th, 110th, 114th, 115th and 
the 119th legislative sessions9. Only general bills (measures designed to become a 
permanent law or act) were counted as bill introduction. Concurrent Resolutions and  
Table 2.9 Categorized Number of Bills Sponsored and Passed in the SC House for 
                 Selected Sessions 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
             
            Session Republicans White Democrats SCLBC     Total Bills Passed 
109th    
(n=1218)    385     795      38     284 
 
110th 
(n=1502)    548     833      121     275  
 
114th 
(n=1186)    862     196      128     236 
 
115th 
(n=1231)    839     244      148     183 
 
119th      764     127      212     154 
(n=1103) 
 
Source: South Carolina Legislative Sponsor Report for session 109 (1991-1992), session 
110 (1993-1994), session 114 (2001-2002), session 115 (2003-2004), and session 119 
(2011-2012). 
_________________________  
9See Appendix B for overall bill sponsorship and bill passed data by legislative 
 session and party. 
 
Non-binding Resolutions were excluded from this analysis. In the 109th Session, 




introduced, 385 were sponsored by Republicans, 795 by white Democrats and 38 by 
SCLBC members. In the 110th Session, there were a total of 1502 measures introduced 
and 275 passed into law.  
Of the total measures introduced, 548 were sponsored by Republicans, 833 by 
white Democrats and 121 by SCLBC members. In the 114th Session, there were a total of 
1186 bills introduced and 236 passed into law. Of the total bills introduced, 862 were 
introduced by Republicans, 196 by white Democrats and 128by SCLBC members. In the 
115th Session, there were a total of 1231 measures introduced and 183 passed into law. 
Of the total bills introduced, 839 were introduced by Republicans, 244 by white 
Democrats and 148 by SCLBC members. Finally, in the 119th Session, there were a total 
of 1103 bills introduced and 154 passed into law. Of the total bills introduction, 764 were 
introduced by Republicans, 127 by white Democrats and 212 by SCLBC members.  
Collectively, these bills represent the data source for this study. Each succeeding chapter 
will outline the method used to test the applicable data. 
Conclusion  
This project analyzes the SCLBC members’ efforts and the internal legislative 
methods they utilize to secure some form of strategic legislative outcomes beneficial to 
their minority constituents, particularly during the era of Republican dominance. To this 
end, the project addresses three research questions. Do SCLBC members seek to sponsor 
more secondary legislation rather than primary legislation during periods of Republican 
legislative control of the House? Do SCLBC members strategically make self-selection 
committee assignment requests? Do SCLBC members engage in strategic coalition 




legislation? Essentially, this work will use data collected by the South Carolina’s  
Legislative Information Services (2011), The South Carolina Legislative Manual and 
 other official records to investigate the SCLBC’s strategic representational behavior. The  
investigation will focus on three different legislative activities that SCLBC members 
undertake to represent their black constituency’s interests. The overall premise 
underlying this research is that SCLBC members will engage in strategic representation  
when their descriptive representation occurs within a politically constrained legislative 
environment. Their strategic behavior may prompt SCLBC members to sponsor more 
secondary rather than primary legislation during periods of Republican legislature 
dominance. Also, the black lawmakers may actively seek membership on black interest 
legislative committees so as to influence the legislative outcome or win passage of black 
interest legislation they sponsor.  
A further supposition is that as part of their strategic activities, SCLBC members 
will seek to form strategic coalitions to engender passage of their sponsored measures or 
seek to prevent passage of policies detrimental to the interest of their minority 
constituents. In building strategic intraparty (unholy) coalitions with Republicans, 
SCLBC members will engage in some form of “strange bedfellows” approaches to form 
successful negative vote coalitions. Conversely, there may be a need for SCLBC 
members to form inter-party (party) coalitions with fellow Democrat party members to  
veto anti-minority legislation. 
All of the premises as mentioned earlier are grounded in prior scholarly research. 
Prior research indicates that minority groups have different areas of legislation 




minority interest policies. There is also evidence in the literature that the race of the 
legislator has an effect on the success of the sponsored legislation. However, existing 
literature also holds that once minority groups achieve a viable level of presence in the  
legislative body they behave in a cohesive manner, and this unity enhances the minority 
groups’ success level. By analyzing the body of SCLBC members' sponsored legislation, 
the number of SCLBC sponsored legislation enacted, standing committee assignments, 






BILL SPONSORSHIP BEHAVIOR: A MEASURE OF STRATEGIC 
REPRESENTATION 
“They go to the little meetings, get the little legislative template, 
come back to South Carolina-boom!-It passes. I really am so 
concern with the effect and impact of that organization.”  
(Rep. Cobb-Hunter quoted in Free Times April 2012) 
 
The above cited quote by Rep. Cobb-Hunter expresses her concern that both 
Republican and Democratic legislators had delegated their legislation drafting authority 
to a national corporate interest group, The American Legislative Exchange Council 
(ALEC). Although only elected legislators, (not interest groups) can introduce a bill in 
the South Carolina General Assembly, a reading of Representative Cobb-Hunter’s 
assertion appears to negate long-held beliefs that any member of a legislative body is free 
to sponsor any bill he or she desires. The belief that individual legislators can and will 
freely sponsor their desired legislation undergirds any in-depth legislative bill 
sponsorship analysis. Bill sponsorship is a significant legislative activity because a policy 
is first proposed and then legislatively enacted (Haynie, 2006).  
Clearly, decisions concerning bill introduction and bill content are of particular 
importance in the representation process. Accordingly, this research theoretically posits 
that SCLBC members engage in strategic bill sponsorship and bill content selection as 
part of their overall desire to provide strategic representation to their black constituents.  




behavior, bill content choice, and bill passage success are dependent upon partisan  
legislative control. Simply put, I review SCLBC lawmakers’ bill introduction patterns 
and their bill passage success for categorized legislation introduced during all legislative 
sessions involved in this study. 
This chapter examines SCLBC members’ strategic agenda-setting behavior to test 
these assertions and consists of five sections. The first section explains and justifies bill 
sponsorship and bill passage as a measure of strategic representation. The second section 
explicitly restates the first four hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 regarding: (1) the overall 
bill sponsorship efforts of SCLBC members versus Non-SCLBC members, (2) SCLBC 
members strategic bill sponsorship choices as being dependent upon partisan legislative 
chamber control (3) bill passage success of SCLBC legislators’  strategically sponsored 
legislation.  
The third part of the chapter presents the data and methods used to test the 
hypotheses involving bill sponsorship, and the overall bill passage success of all SCLBC 
lawmakers’ sponsored legislation. This section also contains all of the models used to 
analyze SCLBC members’ strategic bill sponsorship behavior and bill passage outcomes. 
In the fourth section, both the results and the relative importance of the hypothesized 
factors are discussed. The fifth section concludes the chapter by providing an explanation 
of how these results are an integral part of SCLBC members’ strategic representation 
behavior. 
Bill Sponsorship Behavior and Strategic Descriptive Representation 
Early empirical research shows that expectations of voter reactions in the electoral 




(Mayhew 1974). Alternatively, a legislator may sponsor a bill and seek to achieve the 
bill’s passage, perhaps to acquire better committee assignments (Wawro 2000). On the 
other hand, some legislators may pursue multiple goals by simultaneously pursuing both 
electoral and legislative rewards (Fenno 1973; Hall 1996) even though these objectives 
might conflict (Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985; Rothenberg and Sanders (2000a, 
2000b). Perhaps, it may be simply because the legislator is policy motivated. In either 
case, it implies that strategic calculation occurs when the legislator decides which goal to 
emphasize over others. Whether or not those bills help to accomplish the legislators’ 
goals depends on the future decisions of others, either inside or outside the legislature 
(Woon, 2008).  
Scholars such as Adams (2003), Bratton & Haynie (1999), Bratton (2002), Haynie 
(2001), and Canon (1999), have debated the link between bill introduction and 
descriptive representation. For example, Bratton and Haynie’s (1999) analysis of bill 
sponsorship in six states during the 1979 and 1989 legislative sessions, indicates that 
black lawmakers are more likely than white legislators to introduce legislation focusing 
on black and women issues. Later, based on an analysis of five state legislatures, Haynie 
(2001) finds that black legislators disproportionately introduce more black interest bills 
than white lawmakers. Adams’ (2003) multi-state study on the bill sponsorship patterns 
of state legislators also indicates that black legislators are substantially more likely to 
introduce minority-interest legislation than white legislators.  
Likewise, Orey et al. (2006) analysis of bill introductions within the Mississippi 
House of Representatives finds that black state legislators are more inclined to introduce 





suggest that black legislators propose measures that reflect their group interests. 
Similarly, other studies have used bill sponsorship as a means to measure minority 
representation (Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Whitby 2002).  
The scholarly literature on other minority groups’ bill introduction behavior 
provides comparable findings. Existing research indicates that Latino legislators represent 
Latinos substantively through their bill sponsorship behavior (Grose 2005; Preuhs and 
Hero 2009; Minta 2009, Wilson, 2010). In other words, ethnic minority representatives 
propose more policies involving social issues and minority interest more often than their 
white counterparts (Button and Hedge 1999; Rocca et al. 2008). Clearly the literature 
suggests that decisions concerning bill sponsorship are a strategic legislative choice. 
Following existing literature, this research utilizes SCLBC members’ bill introduction 
patterns and bill passage success as a measure of one part of their strategic representation 
behavior. 
3.1: Hypotheses: Strategic Bill Sponsorship and Effect of Party Control 
on Sponsorship and Passage 
 
Four hypotheses related to strategic representation were presented in Chapter 2.  
The first hypothesis involves a comparison of bill sponsorship behavior between SCLBC 
members and Non-SCLBC members. It postulates 
(H1)  SCLBC Sponsorship Hypothesis:  SCLBC members will be less 
likely than white Democrats and white Republicans to sponsor legislation 
in equal proportion to their membership within the House during each  
legislative session 
Existing literature shows that the electorate’s interests and behavior of the legislator will 
converge particularly on representing significant constituency issues (Erikson, 1978; 





actively sponsoring bills tailored to address those constituency issues. It is reasonable to 
expect each legislator to sponsor as many bills as is necessary to address his or her 
voters’ concerns. With that in mind, the black lawmakers should be just as active in the 
bill sponsorship arena as the other legislators. Thus, hypothesis 1, involving all 
legislators’ bill sponsorship activity is tested as the first step in this study's strategic bill 
sponsorship examination. 
Hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 address two related statements that deal with party 
control upon the SCLBC members strategic bill sponsorship behavior. Hypothesis 2 
propose that SCLBC members will engage in strategic representation behavior by 
introducing more salient black interest legislation as opposed to non-black interest bills 
during periods of Democratic legislative control. Hypothesis 3 examines party control 
effects on SCLBC members’ bill sponsorship behavior as it relates to the Republican 
Party legislative dominance:  
(H2)  Effect of Party Control and Black Interest legislation Hypothesis: SCLBC 
members will be more likely to sponsor more primary black interest legislation as 
opposed to secondary legislation during periods of Democratic control than under 
Republican control 
 
(H3)  Effect of Party Control and Secondary Legislation Hypothesis:  SCLBC 
members will be more likely to sponsor more secondary legislation as opposed to 
primary black interest legislation during periods of Republican control than under  
Democratic control 
Party control of the legislative chamber has been shown to have an impact on the overall 
bill sponsorship behavior of black legislators. Some scholars have argued that at the 
congressional level, Democratic- controlled Congresses encourage minorities’ bill 




2008). Thus, both hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested to determine the effect that a party’s 
control of the House has on SCLBC member’s strategic bill choice. 
Additionally, previous studies have shown that blacks identify overwhelmingly as 
Democrats with liberal socioeconomic preferences (Tate 1994). Moreover, that in 
addition to being liberal on a variety of domestic policy issues, "blacks have strong 
preferences on discrimination and class related issues" (Dawson 1994; Dawson 2001). 
However, where racial cleavages do dominate the political context Southern Democratic 
Parties historically have not represented black interests well (Preuhs, 2006). Not 
surprisingly, Grose, 2011 study finds that at the congressional level, “Republican 
members of Congress tend not to vote in the interests of African Americans” (Grose, 
2011, 79). 
Presumably, SCLBC members are aware of the disinclination and reluctance of 
Non-Black Legislators of both parties in the House to propose or overwhelmingly support 
black interest legislation. Nevertheless, much like other lawmakers, SCLBC members’ 
primary goals are to seek passage of their sponsored legislation (Franzitch 1979). It 
would, therefore, be reasonable for them to craft and introduce legislation that has some 
chance of achieving passage depending upon which party is in control of the legislative 
chamber. Hence, the fourth hypothesis is tested to determine the effect of party control 
upon strategic representation through bill passage:    
(H4)  Effect of Party Control and Bill Passage Hypothesis: SCLBC 
members will have a higher probability of getting their secondary 
sponsored legislation passed than their primary black interest legislation, 
regardless of party control of the House. 
Data, Methods, Measurements and Models 




representation theory is measured by SCLBC members’ strategic bill introduction choices  
and bill passage efforts. An overview of all data used in this study was presented in the previous 
chapter. The data that are used to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3 (bill sponsorship hypotheses) and 
hypothesis 4 (the bill passage hypothesis) consist of various general bills introduced in the House 
of Representatives during the 109th, 110th, 114th, 115th, and 119th legislative sessions.   
Specifically, the data used to test hypothesis 1 consisted of the general population 
of bills collected for all House legislative sessions involved in this study. The data used to test 
hypotheses 2 and 3 consisted of all bills identified as having the characteristic of being a primary 
or secondary bill gleaned from the population of sponsored bills. The data used to test hypothesis 
4 consisted of all bills introduced and passed during the legislative sessions involved in this 
study.  
All of the above-referenced data was obtained by electronic means from the South 
Carolina Legislative Internet Portal, http://www.scstatehouse.gov, and various South 
Carolina legislative manuals published for each legislative year of this study. Information 
was also gathered from these sources regarding each bill sponsors’ race, gender, party, 
committee membership, and the number of bills introduced. These sources also provided 
information for each bill’s characteristic such as the type of legislation and final 
legislative disposition. Information involving each House member's district 
characteristics, (percentage for black, median income) was gathered from data housed in 
the US Census Bureau Internet portal, http://www.census.gov, and the South Carolina 
Office of Research and Statistics Internet portal, http://rfa.sc.gov/demo10. 
____________________ 
10 The South Carolina General Assembly adopted and the Governor approved Act 121 of 
2014 which restructured the offices of the Budget and Control Board. Effective July 1, 2014 The 
Office of Research and Statistics became part of an independent agency operating as the Revenue 




Various models are used to test SCLBC members’ agenda -setting behavior 
predicted by hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4. The initial test of hypothesis 1 involves the use of 
percentages. Percentages are calculated for membership within each sponsorship category 
to compare the legislative behavior of the SCLBC group versus the Non-SCLBC groups. 
Although an analysis that involves the use of percentages is not an extremely 
sophisticated measure to determine agenda-setting legislative behavior, it does provide 
certain useful information. Percentages convey an easily understood calculation of how 
the legislative interests of these two groups vary. Thus, each group's calculated 
percentage should provide some insight into SCLBC members’ strategic descriptive 
representation versus the substantive representation patterns of other House of 
Representative members.  
To get the SCLBC and Non-SCLBC groups House membership percentages, first, 
the number of legislators in each group were counted. Each group's total was then divided 
by 124, the total number of South Carolina House of Representatives members. This 
procedure yielded the legislative membership percentages for each group. Percentages for 
group bill sponsorship were calculated in a similar fashion. All bills sponsored by each 
legislator within each group were added together to obtain the groups bill introduction 
total. Each group bill introduction total was then divided by the total number of bills 
introduced by all legislators in the House during that particular legislative session. This 
procedure yielded the legislation sponsorship percentages for each group. Both of the 
procedures outlined above were conducted for each legislative session involved in this 
study. This measure defines one aspect of each group’s legislative behavior during each 





Hypothesis 1 is further tested using negative binomial regression. Negative 
binomial regression can be used for modeling count variables, usually for over-dispersed 
(skewed) count outcome variables. King, 1998, noted, “An event count model is 
appropriate where the dependent variable is a count and the likelihood of an additional 
event happening decreases as the number of event increases. It is also appropriate when 
the probability of a single event happening is not independent of the likelihood of another 
event happening" (King, 1988).  
Also, prior research involving bill sponsorship has shown that legislators tend to 
specialize in certain areas of policy sponsorship. As Bratton (2005), notes "a legislator 
who is likely to introduce a measure in a particular subject category is more likely than 
other legislators to introduce additional measures in that category" (Bratton, 2005). The 
SCLBC members’ bill sponsorship behavior produces over-dispersion of the data. Thus, 
negative binomial regression analysis is appropriate for this examination since the 
dependent variable in this analysis is a count, and the data is over-dispersed.  
In the negative binomial review, the unit of analysis is the legislator. The number 
of bills sponsored by the legislators during each legislative session is the dependent 
variable. I do not differentiate between racial and non-racial bills in this analysis. Rather, 
this study is interested in SCLBC members’ legislation sponsorship activity as an 
indicator of their participation in the overall agenda setting process. All general bills 
introduced in each legislative session were used to test Hypothesis 1. Each bill was 
identified by its primary sponsor and coded based on one of three sponsorship categories: 
(1) SCLBC General Bills (SCLBC), which are general bills introduced by members of 




(W/Dems), identified as general bills introduced by white Democrats11; (3) Republican 
General Bills (Rep. GB) classified as general bills introduced by Republican legislative 
members. These three categories capture all of the bills introduced in the House during 
each legislative session of interest. Once identified, each bill was placed in the in the 
appropriate legislation sponsorship category. 
Several legislator and district-level factors are included in this model. The model 
includes the racial composition of the legislator’s district, measured as the percentage 
black in the district (logged). To determine the effect of race, I use a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the legislator is black (SCLBC member), 0 if a non-black legislator. The 
inclusion of these variables underscores the descriptive representation nature of this 
model (Haynie, 2006). Individual institutional level controls that could influence 
sponsorship behavior is also included. Partisanship has been shown to affect the 
likelihood that a legislator will focus on particular issues (Bratton, 2002; Bratton, 2006 
Swers, 2002). Control for party affiliation is, therefore, included. The party affiliation 
variable is coded 1 if the legislator is a Democrat, 0 if the legislator is a Republican. 
Since all SCLBC members are Democrats, my models also account for the fact that the 
House overall legislative agenda may not be supportive of minority interests during 
Republican-controlled sessions and may suppress SCLBC members’ bill sponsorship 
behavior and bill passage success.  
Adopting Rocca and Sanchez, (2014) methods, I interact my key independent  
_________________ 
 
11 The White Democrat category contains only white legislators. According to the  
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials’ directory, there were 
no Latinos serving in the South Carolina House of Representatives during the 




variable, SCLBC member, with a variable to control for Republican majority sessions 
 (1=Republican majority, 0 otherwise). This procedure allows the model to capture the 
effects of the three Republican-controlled House sessions (114th, 115th, and 119th) in my 
dataset. I also account for the legislator's gender coded 0 = female and 1= male, since 
previous research has shown that women tend to introduce both black interest and social 
and economic-based legislation. Finally, because seniority has been shown to enhance a 
representative’s expertise, in particular policy areas (Hibbing, 1991, 1993, Bratton and 
Haynie, 1999), this variable is also controlled in the model. Seniority is measured as the 
number of consecutive years a legislator served in the House.  
Strategic Bill Choice Model 
Examination of SCLBC members representation behavior also extends to their 
strategic bill sponsorship during each legislative session involved in this study. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are interrelated since both hypotheses predict that SCLBC members’ 
strategic decision to either introduce primary or secondary legislation is influenced by 
political party control of the legislative chamber. The dependent variable in both 
hypotheses 2 and 3 is the number of bills sponsored during each legislative session. I 
employ one negative binomial regression model to address the two related questions 
concerning SCLBC members’ strategic bill sponsorship behavior stated in these two 
hypotheses. I construct a model to estimate the number of primary and secondary 
sponsored by SCLBC members during all of the legislative sessions of interest. The 
model includes various control variables. These control variables were previously 
introduced and defined in the bill sponsorship model. Additionally, I employ an 




majority of the House chamber for each legislative session; 1= Republican Party 
majority, 0=Democrat Party majority. 
The bills involve in testing hypotheses 2 and 3 were selected in the following 
manner. First, all bills were content coded for bill categorization. Two bill categories 
were considered: primary bill and secondary bill. Placement of a measure within a 
particular group was based on a reading of the printed bill summary for that bill. Two 
coders independently analyzed all of the bills using the same procedures and definitions. 
A third coder using identical procedures and definitions was subsequently included to 
check for reliability.  A recoding of 12 percent of the bills achieved an inter-coder 
reliability score of 97 percent, meaning that all coders agreed on 97 percent of the bills.  
Each bill was placed in either the primary or secondary bill category based on its 
content. Bills that dealt with Education, Elections, Affirmative Action/Discrimination, 
Health and Welfare, Economic Empowerment and Development or Criminal Justice, are 
examples of the type bills placed in the primary legislation category. These policy areas 
are the SCLBC core priorities. Examples of education-related bills included measures 
that might decrease the education funding disparity within certain school districts, or 
measures that attempt to close the Achievement Gap or referred to any education-related 
issue. House Bill H 3312, would be an example. This bill sought to make spending 
priorities under the Education Finance Act more equitable. 
Examples of affirmative action bills included measures designed to ensure that the 
states’ racial or gender diversity is equitably reflected in those who occupy positions in 
government, increase minority representation in the judiciary, provide minorities fair and 




system. For instance, House Bill H 3004 was included in the affirmative action primary 
bill category because it sought to enhance the authority of the State Commission for  
Minority Affairs to provide additional services for African Americans, Native Americans, 
Hispanics and others within the minority community.  
Healthcare related bills included measures designed to provide an opportunity for 
blacks to obtain affordable, accessible and quality healthcare. An example is House Bill 
H 3310. This bill prohibited Medical and Health Care providers from issuing policies that 
would exclude or restrict benefits for federally approved contraceptives. A final example 
of measures placed in the primary bill category is a bill involving Economic 
Empowerment and Development measures. This category includes measures designed to 
provide blacks with the opportunity for economic self-sufficiency and upward economic 
mobility. House Bill HR 3049 is an example of the type of bill placed in this category. 
This bill provided an economic development tax incentive.  
Bills that dealt with Business Regulations, Transportation, Taxation or Highway 
related matters are examples of bills placed in the secondary legislation category. For 
example, HR 4847 involving restrictions on the number of retail liquor stores in which a 
person may have an economic interest is a case of a measure placed in the secondary bill 
category. General Bill HR 3255, relating to wearing safety yellow reflective vests while 
operating a moped is an example of a transportation-related legislation placed in the 
secondary bill category. Each bill was identified by the principle sponsor and coded 
based upon one of the three sponsorship category namely, SCLBC members, White 
Democrats, and Republicans. Each measure within the appropriate sponsorship group 




secondary). Each bill was subsequently placed in the assigned category and sub-category. 
For example, an SCLBC sponsored bill that dealt with affirmative action would be coded 
as an SCLBC primary measure.  All previously discussed control variables used to test 
the overall bill introduction hypothesis were utilized to test both the primary and 
secondary bill introduction hypotheses.  
SCLBC Bill Passage Model  
To test SCLBC members’ bill passage success outlined in hypothesis 4, a set of 5 
logistic regression analyses (one for each legislative session) are conducted. Logistic 
regression models are frequently used to determine the association between a set of 
explanatory variables and a binary or dichotomous outcome variable. I use logistic 
regression in this analysis, as the dichotomous nature of the dependent variables renders 
ordinary least squares regression inappropriate. Because I am interested in the likelihood 
that a particular bill will be passed (primary, secondary), the unit of analysis is the bill. 
The dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the policy area of interest passed during a 
legislative session and 0 otherwise. White Republicans is the referent group. The model 
also controls for other factors related to the dynamics of a particular session’s effect on 
the bills’ passage into law.  In addition to factors involving the race and gender of the 
bill’s sponsor, I control for some other likely influences on bill passage. Previous studies 
show that bills sponsored by majority party legislators are almost certain to enjoy more 
favorable consideration than other measures. I control for whether the sponsor of the 
measure was in the majority party.  
Moreover, Harmel, Hamm, and Thompson (1983) conclude that legislators who  




Therefore, committee chairs are included in the model because they are perceived by 
their peers as having legislative influence (Meyer 1980; Best 1971; Bell and Price 1975). 
Indeed, they introduce more legislation and are more likely to see that measure pass 
(Frantzich 1979; 1980). Committee chair takes on a value of 1 if the legislator served as a 
committee chair during the legislative session of interest and 0 otherwise. Also, control 
for whether the bill’s sponsor is in a leadership position is included in each model since 
legislation sponsored by members in leadership positions are relatively likely to have a 
positive outcome (Bratton, 2006). Legislative leadership takes on a value of 1 if the 
legislator served in a leadership position during the legislative session of interest and 0 
otherwise. 
3.2: Results: SCLBC Strategic Representation through Bill 
Sponsorship, Strategic Bill Choice and Bill Passage Success 
 
SCLBC Overall Bill Sponsorship  
 
The analysis results of the bill sponsorship model provide partial support for what 
we might expect based on previous research. Table 3.1 displays bill sponsorship data (in 
percent) for each legislative session under examination. It shows that for each legislative 
session involved in this study, SCLBC members sponsored fewer bills than their 
percentages in the legislature. During the 109th Legislative Session, SCLBC membership 
within the House comprised over 14%, yet they sponsored less than 4% of all general 
bills. Also, during the 114th Session, SCLBC members sponsored 12% of all general bills 
during that session but comprised over 19% of the House membership.  
The pattern of SCLBC members, low sponsorship percentages versus House 
membership percentages, continued throughout the other years of this study. The pattern 







Table. 3.1 Percentage for Bill Sponsorship Activity in the House for Selected Sessions 
            ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Session        White      White           White             White           SCLBC             SCLBC   
               Republicans Republicans       Democrats          Democrats            Members  Members 
          % Sponsored % in House            % Sponsored          % in House             % Sponsored  % in House  
 
(n=1218)  31.6  32.1   65.3       51.4   3.1         14.5   
 
110th** 
(n=1502)  36.5              41.1   55.4        43.5   8.1   13.7  
 
114th 
(n=1186)  72.7      56.5   16.5         24.2   10.8                         19.4               
 
115th                         
(n=1231)          68.2  58.8   19.8         21.8   12.9                         19.4                        
  
 
119th                          
(n=1103)  69.3               61.3   11.5            16.1   19.2                             22.6 
         _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: South Carolina Legislative Sponsor Report for session 109 (1991-1992), session 110 (1993-1994), session 114 (2001-
2002), session 115 (2003-2004), session 119 (2011-2012) 
N=Total Number of bills sponsored during the particular session 
* Percentages for membership in 109th Session does not equal 100% because 1 Independent and vacancy not included  




Legislative Session (22.6% membership versus 19.2% sponsorship). Most noticeably, 
however, the majority party of each legislative session (whether Democrat or Republican) 
sponsored legislation at a higher percentage than their House membership percentage. 
Also, during the Republican-controlled 119th Session, SCLBC legislators’ sponsorship 
percentage was greater than white Democrats percentage, even though both failed to 
introduce their proportional share of legislation. 
Table 3.2 displays the negative binomial regression results obtained for overall 
bill sponsorship during each legislative session. In hypothesis 1, I predicted that SCLBC 
legislators would be less likely to introduce legislation as white Democrats and 
Republican legislators during each legislative session of interest. This result partially 
supports the hypothesis since SCLBC legislators did introduce significantly less 
legislation proportionally than did the other two groups of legislators during the 115th 
legislative session. It is also important to note that the negative signs for SCLBC bill 
sponsorship coefficients for the 109th, 110th, 114th, and 115th House sessions are 
contrary to expectations.  
One possible explanation for this finding is that initially SCLBC members lacked a level 
of seniority within the House chambers during the early legislative sessions of this study. 
Prior studies show that seniority plays a significant role in a legislator’s sponsorship 
behavior and that seniority is likely to contribute to and enhance expertise in particular 
policy areas. More experienced lawmakers file more bills than non-experienced 
lawmakers. The lack of seniority undoubtedly initially led SCLBC members to delegate  








            Table 3.2   Negative Binominal Regression Analysis of Number of Bills Sponsored During Selected Sessions 
               ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                      
       109th Session       110th Session    114th Session   115th Session 119th Session  
            ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SCLBC Member  -0.266   -0.461   -0.378   -0.719***        0.252 
     (0.314)      (0.257)  (0.263)  (0.214)        (0.581) 
 
White Democrat  0.630***  -0.578   -0.629   -0.444         -0.293  
     (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.211)  (0.200)                   (0.547) 
 
Female Legislator       -0.242   -0.418   (0.153)  (0.455)                   (0.264) 
     (0.263)  (0.124)                        (0.230)                         (0.138)                   (0.065) 
 
Percent Black in District -0.008   -0.008   -0.006   -0.004         -0.008 
     (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.012)        (0.010) 
 
Average income  -0.002   0.001   0.002   0.006         0.004 
  in district   (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.010)        (0.009) 
  
Seniority   0.056**  0.051**  0.059**              0.066*        0.032** 
     (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.019)        (0.015) 
 
Majority Party   0.466***  0.458***  0.434***  0.368***                0.333*** 
 Member   (0.080)  (0.098)  (0.086)  (0.083)                   (0.112)  
 
Constant   0.517***  2.201***  .892***  1.749**        1.774*** 








Inapha    0.006   -0.529   -2.467   -0.473   -0.283 
     (0.143)  (0.139)  (0.308)  (0.149)  (0.150)     
 
alpha    1.006   0.589   0.085   0.623   0.753 
     (0.144)  (0.082)  (0.026)  (0.093)  (0.113) 
Wald 
   Chi-square (12)  792.77   730.05   683.20   506.17   456.73 
 
Probability > 
   chi-square   0   0   0   0   0 
 
Log-pseudo- 
likelihood               -400.255          -425.647                        -405.291          -397.984                      -394.372 
 
Bills Sponsored (N)  1218                1502                                    1186          1231                      1103        
 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < 0.10, one-tailed test; **p <0.05, one-tailed test; ***p<0 .01, one-tailed test. (Robust standard Errors in parentheses). 




Support for this argument becomes more apparent when we consider that 119th 
legislative session is the only session whereby the SCLBC members have a positive bill 
introduction coefficient result. Put simply, if SCLBC members were merely more active 
bill sponsors across earlier legislative sessions, then the positive effect found in the 119th 
legislative session would have been observed. Even though the SCLBC members 
expected bill counts coefficients were negative for four of the five House sessions, they 
were not significant, thereby indicating that the SCLBC legislators’ overall lack of 
proportional bill introductions had a minimal effect.  
More importantly, though, is to look at the magnitude of the impact of 
partisanship in regards to the overall bill sponsorship process. Majority party effects on 
bill sponsorship are statistically significant across all legislative sessions. The pattern of 
significance across the majority partisan parameter estimates suggest that being a 
member of the majority party plays a vital role in a legislator’s bill sponsorship behavior. 
During all House legislative sessions, all else equal, members of the majority party filed 
more bills than the minority party members.  
Also, the political party variable effect clearly has an impact on the question of 
whether the legislator’s race or party affiliation is a better predictor of descriptive 
representation as measured by black interest sponsored legislation. In this model, effects 
of the black SCLBC members’ bill introduction variable is overshadowed by the impact 
of the majority party variable. The conventional portrayal found in existing partisanship 
and bill introduction literature is that majority party members within a legislative 
chamber introduce more legislation than the chambers’ minority party members. Previous 




interest bills and that overall, black legislators sponsor more minority interest legislation 
than their white colleagues.  
However, the majority party variable's dominance in this model may be the result 
of several underlying factors. First since the 2006 House Session, SCLBC members have 
constituted a majority of the House Democratic Party, the minority party in the 
Republican- controlled House chamber. In this study, the black SCLBC members sponsor 
the bulk of the minority interest legislation while being, the majority of the minority 
Democratic Party House membership. Also, their white Democratic colleagues did 
introduce a minimal amount black interest bills during each session. Collectively, the 
presence of these two factors leads to a weakening of the overall effect of SCLBC 
members' black interest bill introduction efforts.   
Moreover, the Republican legislators did introduce a large number of non-black 
interest bills during each legislative session under their control. All of these factors 
combine to minimize the effect of the SCLBC black interest bill sponsorship efforts. The 
aggregate implications of this analysis are that when legislative bill introduction occurs 
within a politically constrained context, there are stages in the representation process 
when the descriptive characteristics of the legislator become less of a factor than 
partisanship.  
Also, as expected, the seniority variable in this model has a significant impact on 
the number of bills House members introduced throughout all legislative sessions. This 
effect may help explain why SCLBC members’ bill sponsorship activity did increase as 




Democrats. By contrast, the district’s racial and median income variables do not have a 
statistically significant impact on SCLBC members’ bill sponsorship activity    
Table 3.3 presents the bill sponsorship incidence rate ratios. The estimated rate 
ratio for SCLBC sponsored bills during the 109th Session shows that if the bill 
introduction variable increases by one bill, their overall bill introduction rate would be 
expected to decrease by a factor of 0.965 while holding all other variables in the model 
constant. However, white Democratic Representatives bill introduction rates would be 
expected to increase by a factor of 1.310 units for a one unit change in the bill 
introduction variable. Also during the 110th Session (the last Democratic Party-
controlled session), and the 114th and 115th sessions (Republican Party-controlled), the 
SCLBC bill introduction incidence ratios were expected to decrease by a factor of 0.220, 





      
 109th               110th   114th   115th              119th  
  
SCLBC Members   0.965         0.220  0.423    0.488  1.288 
 (0.777)     (0.067) (0.096) (0.105)            (0.747) 
         
White Democrats      1.310  1.155      0.517    0.642      0.746 
            (1.019)            (0.225)             (0.109)            (0.128)            (0.408) 
 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses 
 
0.423 and 0.488 units, respectively, for a one bill increase in the bill sponsorship variable.  
The SCLBC members’ introduction incidence rate ratio for the 119th House  




overall bill introduction rate would be expected to increase by a factor of 1.288 units 
while holding all other variables in the model constant. These incidence rate ratio results 
underscore the negative binomial regression findings. 
Strategic Bill Choice Selection 
The analysis of SCLBC members’ strategic representational behavior now turns 
to their bill introduction choice. Hypotheses 2 and 3 predict that SCLBC members’ bill 
selection is dependent upon party control of the House chamber.  Specifically, hypothesis 
2 states that SCLBC members would introduce more black interest legislation during 
periods of Democratic Party control of the House, and hypothesis 3 states SCLBC 
members would introduce more secondary legislation during Republican -controlled 
House sessions. Table 3.4 depicts the results of the negative binomial regression analysis 
of SCLBC member’s strategic bill introduction choices during both Democratic and 
Republican control of the House chamber. Based on expectations that SCLBC members’ 
primary and secondary bill introduction are positively related to party control of the 
House, coefficients for these variables are presented using a one-tailed significance test.  
The Democratic Party controlled the House during the 109th, and 110th Legislative 
Sessions and the Republican Party controlled the House during the remaining three 
sessions of this study, namely, the 114th, 115th, and 119th Legislative Sessions.   The 
first two columns of the table show the results of SCLBC members’ primary bill 
introduction versus their secondary bill introduction efforts during the 109th and 110th 
sessions. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the Black Caucus members’ primary bill introduction 
activity would be higher than their secondary bill introduction activity during both 








           Table 3.4   Likelihood of SCLBC Primary and Secondary Bills Sponsorship during Selected Sessions 
           __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                    
  Independent               109th Session  110th Session   114th Session  115th Session     119th Session 
 Variables  
            _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                             
SCLBC Primary  0.125*  0.022   0.075   0.063*   0.172*** 
    (0.078)  (0.072)  (0.057)    (0.049)    (0.034) 
 
SCLBC Secondary 0.081   0.072   0.083**  0.096***  0.069*** 
    (0.104)  (0.064)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.011) 
White Democrat   
Primary  0.188***  0.158***  0.155**  0.059   0.101  
    (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.083) 
White Democrat  
Secondary  0.057***  0.042***  0.053***  0.060***  0.089**  
    (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007)  0.014 
 
Republican Primary 0.012   0.504*   0.088**   0.076**  0.073* 
    (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.037) 
 
Republican    0.099   0.060**  0.061***  0.066***  0.077*** 
 Secondary   (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
 
Majority Party  -0.041   -0.017   -0.096   -0.156   0.064 
 Member  (0.180)   (0.171)  (0.142)  (0.121)  0.135 
 
            Seniority   0.016   0.025*   0.003   -0.004   0.003 









Female Legislator 0.131   -0.067   0.139     0.117               0.202 
    (0.230)    0.244    (0.175)   (0.157)             (0.132)   
 
Percent Black            -0.003   -0.002   0.001   -0.002   -0.006 
 in district  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
 
Average income 0.003   -0.005   0.007   0.005   0.006  
in district           (0.004)   (0.005)                         (0.004)                        (0.004)                        (0.004) 
 
Constant  1.004***  1.482***  0.943***   1.281***                   0.946***  
    (0.383)             (0.384)  (0.329)  (0.284)            (0.305) 
 
Inapha   -1.666   -1.502   -2.441   -3.207   -3.804 
    (0.237)  (0.223)  (0.318)  (0.522)  (0.770) 
 
alpha   0.189   0.223   0.087   0.040   0.022 
    (0.045)  (0.450)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.017) 
Wald 
   Chi-square (11) 157.11   135.37   185.23   197.80   209.77 
 
Probability > 
  chi-square  0   0   0   0   0 
 
Log likelihood -330.515       -356.661     -325.112      -313.287  -295.666 
 
Bills Sponsored (N)  1181                          1455   1150   1498                 1065 
          ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




It is possible to use the value and the sign of the coefficients to make inferences 
about the effect of party control upon SCLBC members’ bill introduction behavior. 
Essentially, the coefficient for a bill category during a particular legislative session 
indicates that for a one unit change in the predictor variable, the difference in the logs of 
expected counts of the response variable is expected to change by the respective 
regression coefficient, given the other predictor variables in the model are held 
constant12. The statistically significant coefficient (0.125) for the 109th Legislative 
Session’s primary bill category is higher than that session’s secondary bill category 
coefficient (0.081). This result indicates that the logged odds for the number of SCLBC 
members’ primary bill introduction would be higher than the logged odds of the expected 
counts for their secondary bills introduction during the 109th Session. This result lends 
support to the second hypothesis. 
  However, the results contain in the 110th House session negative binomial 
analysis runs counter to the 109th Session results. The 110th Session results show that the 
logged odds associated with the primary bill category coefficient (0.022) are lower than 
the logged odds of the secondary bill group coefficient (0.072) even though the House 
was under the Democratic Party control. The statistically insignificant black lawmakers’ 
bill sponsorship decision-making result during this session is contrary to expectations. 
Taken together, the overall results from both legislative sessions provide partial support 
for the hypothesis involving the black lawmakers’ strategic bill sponsorship behavior 
during the Democratic-controlled House Sessions.  
___________________ 
12 For more detail explanation see “Annotated Stata Output: Negative Binomial 




 In hypothesis 3, it was predicted the black caucus members’ secondary bill  
introduction activity would be higher than their primary bill introduction activity during 
the 114th, 115th, and 119th Republican-controlled House Sessions. The statistically 
significant coefficients for the SCLBC secondary bill category were higher than the 
coefficients for their primary bill type during the 114th and 115th Sessions. Arguably, 
SCLBC members strategically chose to introduce more secondary measures during those 
sessions because the likelihood of secondary bill passage were higher than the probability 
of primary bill passage.   
However, unexpectedly, the SCLBC members’ primary bill introduction activity 
was greater than their secondary bill introduction during the 119th Session. Going further 
in this analysis, the model shows that SCLBC members’ strategic bill sponsorship choice 
for both primary and secondary legislation has a significant effect during the 119th 
Session. It is significant (p<.01) and positive for both the primary bill introduction 
variable and the secondary bill introduction variable when all other variables are held 
constant.  This result may be indicative of SCLBC members’ inclination to 
utilize their majority-minority party status to increase their strategic bill selection 
numbers in both categories. 
Also, taken together, the results from the 114th, 115th, and 119th sessions become  
even more noteworthy.  A comparison between the three groups primary measures 
introduction pattern, provides support for the SCLBC strategic bill sponsorship assertion.  
During the 109th, 110th, and 114th Sessions, when the SCLB lawmakers held minority 
membership status with the Democratic Party, they relied on the white Democrats to 




Democratic lawmakers seems to lessen with each subsequent legislative session. For 
example, the 115th Session marked the last session of SCLBC minority membership 
within the Democratic Party. It was during this session that the SCLBC member’s 
primary bill introduction became statistically significant within the Republican-
dominated House even though it did not surpass their secondary bill introduction. 
Further examination of the data also shows that after having acquired and subsequently 
expanding their majority membership numbers within the Democratic Party, SCLBC 
members became, even more, aggressive in their strategic bill introduction behavior 
during the 119th Session.  
The 119th Session is the only session involved in this study, in which the SCLBC 
members’ bill introduction activity for both bills sponsorship categories were statistically 
significant (p<0.01).   Unexpectedly, the coefficient for primary bill introduction (0.0172) 
was higher than the secondary bill group coefficient (0.069) during this Republican-led 
House Session. Nevertheless, it appears that after assuming the majority members status 
within the House Democratic Party, the black lawmakers began to sponsor the majority 
of the black interest legislation in the House strategically. Not surprisingly, in no 
legislative session did the Republican House members introduce more primary legislation 
than the SCLBC members. Finally, the effect of seniority is significant in regards primary 
bills introduction but only for the 110th Session.  
Strategic Bill Passage Success  
At the beginning of this chapter, I cited a quote uttered by SCLBC Representative 
Cobb-Hunter. Did she have a valid concern regarding the South Carolina House of 




success enjoyed by SCLBC members as a result of their strategic bill sponsorship efforts?  
It was predicted in hypothesis 4 that SCLBC members would have a higher 
probability of getting their sponsored secondary bills passed than they would have to get 
their primary bills passed. That hypothesis is partially supported.  
The logistic passage analysis presented in Table 3.5 indicates that the SCLBC 
members’ bill passage success varies significantly across the sessions studies. The 
SCLBC members’ secondary measures were significantly more likely to pass during both 
the 109th and 110th sessions but were significantly less likely to pass during the 119th 
session.  Conversely, SCLBC sponsored bills were significantly less likely to pass during 
115th Republican Party- controlled session. No significant difference emerged in SCLBC 
members’ primary bill passage rate across any legislative sessions.  
However, their primary measure coefficients for the 115th (-0.346) and 119th (-0.410) 
Sessions were negative. These coefficients indicate that for a one unit increase in the bill 
passage variable, there would be a   (-0.346) and (-0.410) decrease in the SCLBC primary 
bill passage variable during these respective sessions, holding all other categories 
independent variables constant. Not surprisingly, measures sponsored by white 
Democrats in both categories were significantly likely to pass during the 109th Session, 
the last House session firmly under Democratic control. Also, measures sponsored by the 
majority party members were significantly likely to pass during the109th, 115th and 
119th Sessions. These results lend further support for prior research that finds legislation 
sponsored by majority party members receives favorable outcomes.  
The effect of a sponsor’s seniority was significant in the bill's passage during the 








Table 3.5    Logistic Regression Analysis: Effect of Bill Type and Sponsor on Bill Passage by Session  
(Bill is Unit of Analysis) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________  
  
      
109th Session      110th Session      114th Session      115th Session      119th Session 
 
          Intercept   0.318      0.576         0.128             -1.865**   -1.754**   
     (0.746)                (0.642)         (1.034)             (1.158)              (0.742)  
          SCLBC Primary  0.232      0.044         0.022  -0.346               -0.410  
          Bill    (0.024)     (0.318)         (0.014)  (0.296)              (0.278) 
 
          SCLBC Secondary  0.318**     0.290*          -0.170  -0.189               -0.828* 
          Bill        (0.130)     (0.158)           (0.25)                 (0.253)              (0.489) 
 
          Female Sponsor  -0.050             -0.063         -0.212  -0.312               -0.545 
     (0.240)                (0.346)         (0.150)  (0.280)              (0.210)  
 
          White Democrat  1.761**     0.464         -0. 856  -1.228                -1.784 
          Primary   (0.830)     (0.350)         (0.846)  (0.436)              (0.724) 
 
           White Democrat  1.342**     0.524*        -0.879  -0.899     -0.435 
          Secondary   (0.653)         (0.238)          (0.263)  (0.321)    (0.321) 
 
         Majority Party   1.624**     0.032         0.336  1.542**             1.214** 
          Sponsor   (0.725)     (0.354)         (0.482)  (0.725)              (0.468) 
 
Sponsor in   0.864      0.084         0.960  0.878***   2.606*** 
 Leadership   (0.662)     (0.320)         (0.452)  (0.326)              (0.712)  
 








 Chair    (0.387)     (0.175)         (0.322)  (0.210)              (0.161) 
 
Sponsor’s Seniority  0.148*      0.076         0.203  0.010               0.024  
     (0.081)     (0.069)         (0.016)                (0.006)               (0.015) 
 
% Black in District  0.044**     0.032*         -0.022  -0.653               -0.037 
     (0.020)     (0.018)         (0.10)             (0.056)              (0.046) 
 
Average income in.  0.024**     0.033         0.026  0.031***   0.023 
                  District a      (0.010)     (0.020)         (0.009)             (0.014)              (0.016)  
 
 
Number of Bills  1181                 1455           1150   1498                 1065 
 
Pseudo R2   0.04        0.06                  0.08                     0.10                 0.10 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
a in thousands.  












the 110th and 115th sessions. The percentage of blacks within a district was significant in 
both the 109th and 110th sessions. It should be noted that these were the last two sessions 
the Democrats controlled the House. The effect of leadership on bill passage varies across 
sessions and becomes highly significant during the 114th and 115th sessions. Perhaps this 
can be attributed to the Republican Party complete dominance of the House since 1995. 
Also, despite the fact that SCLBC members were the majority of House Democrats since 
2005, until recently, all influential minority leadership positions were held by white 
Democrats.  
This analysis now turns to the odd ratios of each variable of interest previously 
examined. Table 3.6 presents the odd ratio passage results for the SCLBC primary and 
secondary measures. An odds ratio tells you how much the odds of the dependent 
variable change for each unit change in the independent variable. An odds ratio of less 
than one says that the odds decrease as the independent variable increases (a negative 
relationship). An odds ratio equal to one means that the odds do not change as the   
independent variable increases (no relationship). Also, the odds ratio of greater 1 than 
means that the odds of the dependent variable increase as the independent variable 
increases (a positive relationship).  
As Table 3.6 reflects, there is a slight difference in the odds-ratio of the passage 
rates for both categories of SCLBC sponsored measures during the Democratic Party–
controlled 109th and 110th House Sessions. For the 109th Session, the odds-ratio passage 
rate results, shows that the SCLBC secondary measures were 1.374 times more likely to 
pass (approximately 37.4 percent), and their primary measures were 1.261 times more 









          Table 3.6    Logistic Regression Analysis: Effect of Party Control on Bill Passage (Bill is Unit of Analysis) 
           ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Odds   Rations 
      109th Session      110th Session      114th Session      115th Session   19th Session 
           _______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SCLBC Primary Bill   1.261      1.045         1.022  0.708    0.664   
 
SCLBC Secondary Bill      1.374**     1.336*         0.844  0.828    0.436*   
 
Female Sponsor   0.951      0.938         0.809  0.732    0.580   
 
White Democrat Sponsor  5.818**     1.590         0.425  0.293    0.168   
   
Majority Party Sponsor  5.073**     1. 033         1.399  4.674**   3.367**  
  
Sponsor in Leadership  2.373      1.088         2.612  2.406***   13.545***  
  
 Sponsor is Committee Chair  1.195      1.061         1.623  1.236    1.572  
   
Sponsor’s Seniority   1.160*      1.079         1.225  1.014    1.024   
   
% Black in District   1.045**     1.045         0.803  0.521    0.964  
   
Average income in District a   . 1.024**     1.034         1.026             1.032***   1.023   
   
Number of Bills (N)   1021      1377          1265  1218    1098  
Pseudo R2  
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




110th Session produced comparable results. The SCLBC secondary measures were 1.335 
times more likely to pass, and their primary measures were 1.045 times more likely to 
pass. The secondary bills’ passage odds ratio rate were higher than the primary bills odds 
ratio rates and also significant for both sessions. The white Democrats odds ratio rates 
were higher than the SCLBC lawmakers for both sessions. 
On the other hand, the three Republican-controlled sessions produce dissimilar 
passage rate results for the black legislators’ sponsored measures. During the 114th 
Session (approximately five years after the Republican Party take-over) the SCLBC 
primary legislation odds ratio passage rate outpaced their secondary legislation odds ratio 
passage rate. The black lawmakers’ primary sponsored measures were 1.02 times more 
likely than their secondary measures to pass during this session. Surprisingly, their 
secondary legislation results show that a one unit change in the introduction bill variable 
decreases the odds of their secondary bill passage rate by approximately 16 percent. 
However, the 115th and 119th Sessions clearly illustrates the black lawmakers’ 
strategic representation dilemma through calculated bill sponsorship. In both sessions, the 
Republican Party dominance in the agenda setting process thwarted the caucus members 
calculated efforts. There is a negative relationship between the independent variable and 
the probability of the dependent variable.  The percentage change in the odds for primary 
bill passage is (-.30) for the 115th Session and (-.34) for the 119th Session. These 
decimals indicate that a one unit change in the introduction bill variable decreases the 
odds of SCLBC members’ primary bill passage by approximately 30% and 34% for the 
respective session. 




lawmakers’ secondary measures stood a better chance of passage than their primary  
measures during the 115th Session (approximately a 17% versus 30% decrease in the 
odds). 
However, the passage of their secondary measures was considerably diminished 
during the 119th Session. In the 119th session, the SCLBC secondary measures showed 
approximately a 56% reduction in the odds for passage for a one unit change in the bill 
introduction variable. More importantly, this secondary bill passage result is statistically 
significant. In sum, during the latter Republican-controlled legislative sessions, SCLBC 
members were not able to achieve passage of any strategically measurable amount of 
either category of sponsored legislation.  
Also, the majority party variable shows that being a member of the majority party 
increases the likelihood of favorable outcomes for sponsored legislation. The leadership 
variable lends itself to the same conclusion. In all sessions, being in a leadership position 
enhances a legislators chances of obtaining passage of sponsored legislation. This 
significant result is more pronounced during the Republican-dominated 119th House 
session. In this session, House leaders sponsored legislation were 13.55 times more likely 
to pass than measures sponsored by legislators, not in leadership positions.  
Conclusion 
Are SCLBC members strategic in the bill introduction behavior? If so, does this 
behavior lead to successful black interest policy implementation? My overall argument is 
that SCLBC members strategic representational behavior is the link between descriptive 
and substantive representation. One specific dimension of strategic representation lies 




success. Arguably bill introduction is a strategic decision on their part. Prior research 
shows that because blacks and other minority legislators encounter obstacles in getting 
policy proposals on the agenda, they have to decide whether the cost associated with 
sponsorship of certain bills outweigh the benefits they receive (Rocca and Sanchez, 
2008). Presumably, in most of the legislative sessions, SCLBC members’ actions 
reflected their belief that they have the responsibility to introduce both primary and 
secondary bills in a strategic fashion to achieve positive outcomes. 
However, the evidence presented regarding the success of their efforts is mixed. 
Overall these findings run counter to Hamm, Harmel, and Thompson (1983) study which 
found no significant differences between white and black legislators in the number of 
bills introduced or in success in enacting bills. But, the result of this analysis does lend 
support to Legette’s (2000) and Shaw and Black (2008) studies which suggest that when 
contrasted with a white comparison group, South Carolina’s black lawmakers were found 
to introduce fewer bills and to enjoy less success in enacting them into law. Simply put, 
on one hand, SCLBC members appear to have engaged in strategic bill introduction 
behavior but, on the contrary, their sponsored legislation mostly have not received 
favorable outcomes. 
A look at the magnitude of the effects of partisanship along with other significant 
institutional level variables appears to have a negative impact on SCLBC members’ bill 
sponsorship and bill passage success. These results underscore the black lawmakers’ 
strategic representation dilemma. In this instance, SCLBC members’ strategic 
representation efforts through selective bill sponsorship and eventual passage of these 




members are Democrats and have constituted the majority within the House Democratic 
Party since 2006, the Republican Party has maintained (and has continually strengthened) 
its dominance of the House since assuming control during the 1995 legislative session. 
Despite their majority-minority party status, SCLBC members have been disadvantaged 
in both their primary and secondary bill sponsorship efforts during Republican Party 
control of the House. 
The overall findings of the bill sponsorship, and bill passage analyses highlight 
the SCLBC lawmakers’ predicament in their agenda-setting facet involving strategic 
representation. Their historical status as members of the minority party in the House has 
certainly negatively impacted their ability to obtain meaningful success in achieving 
passage of their sponsored legislation.  Perhaps that is about to change. Given their 
majority-minority status within the Democratic Party, SCLBC members should be able to 
gain more meaningful minority party leadership and committee chairs positions.  Once 
this is done, they should have extra motivation and additional opportunities to achieve 
higher passage rates for their strategically sponsored legislation.  
This analysis will now be used as the foundation for further examination of 
SCLBC members’ strategic representational activities in the other chapters of this study. 
In the remaining chapters, I analyze SCLBC members’ committee assignment preference 
to engender passage of their sponsored bills. I also analyze their coalition formation 
efforts to secure passage of their sponsored legislation and also for negative veto 
purposes. Once these examinations are done, a fuller picture of SCLBC members’ 





HOUSE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS: 
SCLBC STRATEGIC SELF-SELECTION 
 
“If they have one Black on Ways and Means or two Blacks, they 
feel that is enough, they feel they have fulfilled their obligation” 
(Representative Julius Murray, voicing his complain about the 
poor committee assignments SCLBC members traditionally 
received.(Personal communication, November 8, 1982; cited in 
The Journal of Black Studies / JULY 2000 
 
Chapter 3 focused on the impact that SCLBC members strategic representation 
behavior has on the House legislative process by examining their bill introduction choice 
and bill passage success. In this chapter, the focus moves to another dimension involving 
SCLBC members’ strategic representation.  Previously, this researcher argued that an 
additional component of SCLBC members’ strategic representation behavior involve 
requesting assignments to a committee whose jurisdictions covers policy areas germane 
to SCLBC members’ minority constituents.  Consistent with this theory, this chapter 
raises two important questions concerning SCLBC members’ strategic committee 
assignment. First, do SCLBC members make strategic requests for appointments to 
committees that have jurisdiction over policy areas relevant to their black constituency? 
Second, is SCLBC legislators’ membership on the selected committees proportionally 
higher than white Democrats and Republicans thereby allowing the black lawmakers to 
maximize their ability to influence committee deliberations? In answering these 




This chapter is organized as follows. First, an overview of the relevant literature 
involving legislative committees’ requests and assignment process is discussed. Second, I 
put forth the hypothesis that SCLBC members strategically make committee assignment 
requests. Third, I give a detailed description of the data and methods used to test this 
hypothesis. Fourth, I present a model that measures the relative importance of SCLBC 
member’s committee assignments and a model that measures the potential influence of 
those assignments. Fifth, I construct a statistical model that measures the likelihood of 
SCLBC members making strategic requests for committee assignments. Sixth, I explain 
the results focusing mainly on the importance of SCLBC members’ assignment to black 
interest committees. Seventh, I raise further questions and discuss conclusions regarding 
SCLBC members’ strategic committee assignments and place the committee assignment 
analysis within the context of the bill sponsorship and bill passage results from the 
previous chapter.  
4.1: SCLBC Legislators Committee Assignments: Another Measure of 
Strategic Representation 
 
This chapter addresses the SCLBC members’ committee assignments issue. Since 
this research is interested in seeking answers to questions regarding SCLBC members’ 
strategic legislative behavior, it is important to examine their committee assignments. 
There is no denial of committees’ importance within legislative bodies. Early literature 
on the subject shows that all legislatures make use of a committee system as the most 
efficient means to discharge their legislative responsibilities. Prior research shows that an 
effective committee system enables an assembly to perform its role as the people’s 




Oleszek 2004; Fenno 1973; Ogle, 2004; Deering and Deering and Smith 1997; Francis 
1989, Shepsle and Weingast 1987; Rosenthal 1974). Committees enable policymaking 
not only through control of a bill’s substantive contents but also determine if and when a 
piece of legislation will reach the full legislature (Smith and Ogle, 2004). Also, 
committees can prevent legislation, even that which might enjoy the support of the 
majority of the legislature, from ever being considered. Thus, committees can 
substantially control the set of issues and policy initiatives debated and decided in 
legislatures (Hall 1987; Rosenthal 1974; Smith and Deering 1984).   
Moreover, committees are not only necessary for the policy-making process but 
also for the career paths of legislators (Haynie, 2005). They provide a system of 
specialization that allows legislators to develop policy expertise and satisfy the demands 
of their constituencies (Shepsle 1975, 1988; Stewart 1992).  Not surprisingly, legislators 
tend to seek membership on committees that are relevant to their districts’ interests. 
Such assignments allow representatives to act or appear to act in a manner that is 
responsive to his or her constituents needs. Relevant committee assignments, in turn, can 
significantly influence that legislative member’s reelection chances. Because legislative 
committees have varying jurisdictions and unique responsibilities, legislators are better 
able to have their policy agendas advanced if they receive a particular committee 
assignments rather than others (Bratton and Haynie 1999b; Francis 1989; Rhode and 
Shepsle 1973; Stewart 1992).  In sum, committee assignments not only enable legislators 
to pursue their personal and their constituents’ interests, but can also help enhance a 





Prior Research on Legislative Committee Request and Assignment Process  
Scholars have conducted numerous studies examining committee requests, the  
assignment process and the behavior of individual legislators associated with it. Research 
at the national level finds that committee assignments are key to House members’ ability 
to pursue their goal of reelection. Relevant committee assignments also allow the 
legislator to engage in sound policymaking and acquire legislative influence (Hedlund, 
Larson, DeLeo and Hedlund 2012; Shepsle 1978; Westerfield 1974).  
For instance, David Canon’s (1999) study reports that one of the Congressional 
Black Caucus goals was to have at least one of its members on each of the most 
important standing committees.  Additionally, a 2004 study by Frisch and Kelly adds to 
the scholarly literature through their use of the Committee Distributive Theory. They use 
this theory to examine whether U.S. House members committee assignment requests 
were empirically related to district-level characteristics. The central tenant of this 
argument is the assertion that members will self-select committees based on constituency 
related concerns. While there was some support for the self-selection hypothesis, their 
overall finding suggests that members’ requests for committee assignments were often 
not related to district-level characteristics (Frisch and Kelly, 2004). 
Again in 2006, Frisch and Kelly present another comprehensive study on the U. S. 
House of Representatives Committee assignment process. They use committee request 
data from both Democratic and Republican members of Congress to revisit the question 
of whether committee requests are empirically related to district-level characteristics. 
They analyze a total of 2,117 committee preference listings. Their data for the 




92nd through the 103rd Congress. The data for Republican members include the 86th 
through the 101st Congress. Frisch and Kelly then offer a committee assignment politics  
framework, which integrates interviews and content analysis along with other factors they 
felt influence the committee assignment process.  
They note that earlier committee assignment models held that constituency 
concerns and leadership preferences are the dominant factors in legislative members’ 
committee assignment requests. However, in this study they expand the list of influential 
factors to include the legislators’ desire to make good public policy, accumulate internal 
clout among fellow members and accrual of power to their constituency interests. These 
additional influencing factors "differed according to a member’s party affiliation. 
Inclusion of these additional influencing factors in their model, Frisch and Kelly 
conclude that both the Democrats and Republicans lawmakers exhibit noticeably distinct 
request strategies” (Frisch and Kelly 2006).  
Other existing studies concerning committee assignments focus primarily on the 
legislative leaders motives for granting individual committee assignment requests. 
Scholars such as Shepsle and others posit an accommodation theory of committee 
assignments which is somewhat in line with the members’ self-selection thesis. Mostly 
these theories primarily hold that the chamber leaders, in response to members’ 
advertisement, strive to advance party harmony by accommodating, to the extent 
possible, individual member’s requests (Hedlund 1989; Bullock 1985; Smith and Ray 
1983; Shepsle 1987).  
However, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1990) take an opposite view. They argue that the 




formation to a committee that systematically distorted policy from the chamber’s wishes 
unless such distortions were in the chamber’s interests. Similarly, Cox and McCubbins 
(1993), contend that the focus should be on the match between party contingents on 
committees and the party as a whole. In particular, they argue that parties may allow 
committee self-selection but will also pay extremely close attention to committees whose 
jurisdictions affect large numbers of voters before awarding committee appointments. 
Clearly, the congressional committee assignment process literature shows mixed results. 
State Level Committee Studies   
While these previously mentioned studies have made substantial contributions to 
the scholarship of congressional committee assignment behavior, they have limited utility 
in explaining the committee assignment process in state legislative settings. Hedlund 
(1992) notes this research limitation and outlines three areas to highlight the limited 
applicability of congressional committee request behavior to state legislatures. First, he 
notes that state legislative committee assignment processes differ from the congressional 
committee assignment process because committee appointment powers are more 
concentrated in most states legislatures. In the state's lower legislative chamber, the 
Speaker, the majority leader, or minority leader, have broad discretion over committee 
appointments.  
Second, he notes that unlike within the U. S. House, formal representation by 
geographic area in the committee appointment process does not frequently occur at the 
state level. Third, he argues that seniority plays a far less official role in state legislatures 
when compared to Congress (Hedlund, 1992). Thus, given the limitations in the 




committees, it would be useful to discuss relevant studies surrounding the state-level 
committees’ assignment process. 
The early research considers state legislatures to be less independent than 
congressional committees because party leaders determined their compositions. Indeed, 
studies such as Jewell (1969) gives the impression of firm partisan control of state 
legislative committee and the likelihood that some committees would become “powerful 
lobbies” (Jewell 1969, 56).  Later studies such as Francis (1985,1989), Hedlund (1989), 
Ham and Hedlund (1990) argue that even though state party leaders often have power 
over committee composition, they go to considerable lengths to accommodate members 
individual committee requests. Studies conducted by Adler and Lapinski (1997), Shepsle, 
(1978), Bullock, (1985), and Hedlund (1989, 1992) provide additional evidence for the 
committee assignment accommodation argument. Similarly, Francis (1989) contends: 
             Accommodation of members’ committee interests in the  
assignment phase has a number of important implications. 
First, members can sort themselves out according to their 
natural diversities of interest. A second implication is that  
members are more likely to be in a position to promote  
important parts of their agenda (Francis, 1989). 
Likewise, Hedlund and Patterson 1992 find that even though, a degree of 
variation does exist to which members acquire the committee appointments they request, 
legislative leaders typically grant their request. This norm of accommodation is in part a 
consequence party leaders attempts to achieve and maintain party unity by creating a 
satisfying work environment for their members (Hedlund 1989).  Other scholars suggest 
that the lack of a strong and entrenched seniority system in state legislatures also 




flexibility in meeting members' request (Francis 1989; Hayne 2001, Rosenthal1981,).  
More recently, in a previous examination of committee requests and assignment behavior 
in Iowa, Hedlund and Deleon (2010) find accommodation of members’ preferences at 
“extraordinarily high rates. In one session, “members received 100% of their first choice 
requests” (Hedlund and Deleo 2010).  
Of particular interest to this project are scholarly works that involve black interest 
committee assignments. Several studies show that if the committee system includes a 
committee explicitly charged with addressing salient minority issues, members of that 
minority group receive assignments to that committee and are less liable to sit on 
powerful committees (Haynie, 2006). Relatedly, Cheryl Miller’s 1990 study involving 
the North Carolina Legislative Black Caucus finds that black legislators strategically use 
their membership and leadership on various committees to improve the chances for 
passage of their priority legislation. This literature suggests that there is some strategic 
consultation among black legislators in regards to their committee assignment requests.  
Here, the examination now turns to the SCLBC members standing committee 
assignments to evaluate their strategic committee request behavior. If SCLBC legislators 
are making strategic committee assignments demands as the literature suggests, then one 
could expect that a significant number of their assignments would be to committees that 
handle black interest legislation.  
Moreover, if SCLBC legislators receive assignments in sufficient numbers to 
black interest committees, they would have the potential to influence the legislative 




analysis of SCLBC members’ committee assignments will provide invaluable insight into 
their overall strategic representation behavior.  
House Committee Assignment Process 
The committee assignment process differs between the two chambers of the South 
Carolina General Assembly. Individual rules utilized by each chamber governs conferral 
of committee assignments. In the Senate, Senators select their committee assignments, 
with seniority the determining factor in the event of a conflict. The senior member of the 
majority automatically becomes the committee chair.  
However, the committee assignment procedure is different in the House. House 
Rule 1.9 sets forth the House committee assignments system. It states: 
All committees shall be appointed by the Speaker unless 
Otherwise provided for by law, except for Senatorial and 
Gubernatorial appointees and ex officio members of the  
House. The Speaker shall name the members constituting  
each committee in alphabetical order, and the Chairman  
shall be elected by the several committees. The committee,  
may at its discretion elect a Vice-Chairman and such other 
officers as it may choose. 
 
Traditionally, at the beginning of each legislative session, the Speaker asks new and 
returning members their committee preferences and makes assignments accordingly, or at 
his will. The Speaker then notifies each House member of his or her committee 
assignment(s) during the first days of the House organizational session.  Since most 
House assignments are made in agreement with each member’s request, committee 
assignments accorded to House SCLBC members can thus be considered a valid indicator 
of their stated committee preference. Simply put, if SCLBC members utilize a decision 
calculus in their committee assignment requests, it is reasonable to assume that they will 




their legislative priorities.  In other words, SCLBC legislators should have a higher 
proportionality on those committees when compared to their other committee 
assignments. Also, as members of those key committees, SCLBC members should be  
positioned to promote their overall legislative agenda. Therefore, an examination of 
SCLBC legislators standing committee assignments will provide a rich explanatory 
framework to aid in our understanding of their strategic representation behavior.   
Committee Assignments Data and Methods 
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the standing committee 
assignment patterns of SCLBC members.  This analysis is intended to provide further 
insight into SCLBC members’ strategic representation behavior and to gauge the impact 
their behavior has upon the overall legislative process within the House.  In conducting 
this examination, the fifth hypothesis offered in Chapter 2, which relates to the likelihood 
of SCLBC members seeking membership on committees that handle black interest 
legislation rather than non-black interest committees, will be tested. This study treats 
SCLBC members commit assignments as revealed preferences. As such, the use of 
assignments data to test this hypothesis is appropriate.  
The data analyzed here consists of all standing committee assignments of the 
South Carolina House of Representatives for the 109th, 110th, 114th, 115th, and 119th 
Legislative Sessions. These data were collected from the South Carolina Legislative 
Manual, The South Carolina Legislative Journal and the South Carolina Legislature 
Internet Portal for each of the legislative sessions covered in this analysis. The South 
Carolina House of Representatives has 11 standing committees with a range from 5 to 25 




members served for all selected legislative sessions. One committee, The Operations and 
Management Committee was omitted from the logistic regression analysis due to lack of 
SCLBC membership on this committee during three of the five sessions analyzed. 
I use Smith and Deering (1990, 87) committees type classification scheme along 
with Haynie’s 2001 black interest committees classification 13. Following their theoretical 
line of classification, committees were categorized as being either a Black-Interest 
Committee, Constituency Committee, Policy Committee, Prestige Committee or 
Miscellaneous Committee based upon the committee’s stated policy subject matter 
jurisdiction. I categorized the Judiciary Committee, Education and Public Works 
Committee, and Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs Committee as Black 
Interest Committees. Collectively their jurisdictions include policy areas involving 
education, affirmative action, Health Care and Medicaid, civil rights, public assistance, 
voting procedures, individual rights protection, criminal justice, and election of members 
of the judiciary14.  
I also categorized the Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee, Ethics 
Committee, and Interstate Cooperation Committee as Policy Committees because their 
jurisdictional area is policy oriented. I classified the Rules Committee and Ways And 
Means Committee as Prestige Committees because these are the committees House 
___________________ 
13 See Appendix C for complete listing of committees, the number of members per 
    committee and each committee policy subject matter jurisdiction. Admittedly, given 
    their broad policy areas some House Standing Committees could conceivably be 
    placed in more than one category. 
 
14 The use of Haynie’s committee classification scheme for committees whose 
     jurisdiction includes black interest policy is in keeping with the SCLBC publicly 





members usually view as being influential and prestigious. I also categorized the 
Invitations and Memorial Resolutions Committee, and Agriculture, Natural Resources 
and Environmental Affairs Committee as Constituency Committees because their 
jurisdictional areas are constituency service oriented. The single remaining committee, 
the House Operations and Management Committee, was classified as a Miscellaneous 
Committee because of its limited jurisdictional area and thus not a very desirable 
committee. 
To analyze the significance and importance of SCLBC committee assignments, I 
use Haynie’s (2001) measures of saliency and influence potential to examine SCLBC 
committee assignments. The measure of saliency is operationalized as the percentage of 
the total number of all black legislative members committee assignments devoted to a 
particular committee (Haynie 2001). I computed the total number of black legislators’ 
committee assignments by aggregating all of the committee assignments each SCLBC 
member held during the second year of each legislative session involved in this study15.  
For example, during the 109th House Session, SCLBC members held a total of 17 
committee appointments. One member was appointed to the Judiciary Committee (5.9%), 
four members received assignments to the Education and Public Works Committee  
(23.5%) and four members were assigned to the Medical, Military, Public and Municipal 
Affairs Committee (23.5%)14.  Given their subject matter jurisdiction, these three 
___________________________________________________________ 
15 South Carolina’s general Assembly have biennial legislative sessions. There were two 
legislative sessions where a difference in the total number of SCLBC committee 
membership between the first year and the second year of the legislative session. There 
was a decrease from 17 appointments to 16 appointments between the first and second 
year of the 109th Legislative Session. They was an increase from 31 appointments to 33 
appointments between the first and second year of the 119th Legislative Session. In both 




committees were considered to be black interest committees and the SCLBC membership 
percentages for the three committees were aggregated. Thus, based on the SCLBC 
committee service on these committees, the black interest committee saliency score is 
52.9%. Presumably, based on their committee service, black interest issues resonated 
more with SCLBC members than all other matters.  
The second measure used is influence potential. I measured influence potential as 
the percentage of the committee members who are black (Haynie 2001). To get a much 
truer picture of black legislators’ influence potential on a particular committee, I also 
include Haynie’s 2001 equity ratio measure for each committee. This measure assesses 
the proportionality of SCLBC members’ representation on the committee and is 
operationalized as the percentage of SCLBC members on the committee minus the 
percentage of black members in the House of Representatives. An equity ratio of 0 equals 
“perfect proportional committee representation” (Haynie, 2001). A positive equity ratio 
indicates committee overrepresentation by SCLBC members and conversely a negative 
equity ratio indicates committee underrepresentation.  For instance, if SCLBC members 
constituted 10 percent of the Judiciary Committee and they are 20 percent of the entire  
House members, then the equity ratio for the Judiciary Committee would be -10, which  
points to SCLBC members’ underrepresentation on this committee.  
Additionally, I use logistic regression analysis as a more robust means to predict 
SCLBC membership on an individual committee in each of these four categories. The use 
of logistic regression analysis to examine hypothesis 5 is appropriate because the 




dichotomous. The dependent variable, committee assignment, is a dichotomous indicator 
of whether the SCLBC member receives an appointment to a particular committee  
(1=yes, 0 =no). The unit of analysis is the individual legislator.   
In this examination, the standing committees were placed in the categories as 
previously discussed. I examined SCLBC membership on Prestige, Policy, Constituency 
and Black Interest Committees. Also, based on prior research demonstrating racial and 
gender differences in policy interests and committee assignments, I control for the race 
and gender of the legislator. Previous research also shows that a legislator’s constituency 
can encourage him or her to seek particular committee assignments. Thus, I control for 
the percentage of the black population in the district and the average income in the 
district. I also control for majority party status and the legislator's seniority.  
A final examination of SCLBC committee assignment request behavior involves 
the use of odds ratio to discuss the logistic regression parameters contained in the 
findings.  In this odds ratio analysis, when the probability of a 1 (being appointed to a 
particular committee) is less than the probability of a 0 (not being appointed) then the 
odds ratio will be less than 1. When the probability of a 1 (being appointed) is greater 
than the probability of a 0 (not being appointed), the odds ratio will be greater than 1. 
When the odds ratio is precisely 1, this means that the odds of being appointed to a 
respective committee and the odds of not being appointed to the committee are even.  
4.2: Results: Are SCLBC Legislators Making Strategic Committee 
Assignments Requests? 
 
Table 4.1 provides information on how salient SCLBC members found the 
various types of Standing Committees in each of the house sessions included in this 




prominent assignments for SCLBC members, particularly during the House Sessions 
under the Republican Party’s rule. The SCLBC members black interest committees  
Table 4.1 Saliency and SCLBC Representation on House Standing Committees by 
Committee Type and House Sessions  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sessions  Black Interest     Prestige Policy      Constituency    Miscellaneous 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
109th  52.9      29.4   5.9       11.8   0.0 
 
110th  52.0      16.0  12.0       16.0              4.0 
 
114th      64.2      14.4  14.3         7.1   0.0 
 
115th  62.2      17.2             13.7         6.9    0.0 
 
119th                60.5      18.2               9.1          6.1               6.1 
  
saliency ranged from 52.9 percent during the 109th Democratic-led House session to 64.2 
percent for the 114th Republican–controlled House Session. In all sessions involved in 
this study, SCLBC members’ black interest committees’ saliency score was over 50 
percent. The saliency score suggests that the black legislators’ committee assignments 
requests were strategic in nature and geared to address the particular concerns of their 
black constituents.   
Not surprisingly, SCLBC members’ assignments on black interest committees 
were more salient during the years the Republican Party controlled the House16. During 
the two sessions in which the Democrats controlled the House chamber, SCLBC 
members’ black interest committees’ salience hovered around 52 percent or 
approximately one-half of their possible committee assignments. However, during the  
three Republican-controlled sessions, SCLBC members’ black interest saliency scores 




Two plausible explanations for SCLBC lawmakers decision to allocate more of 
their committee memberships to black interest committees during the Republican era 
comes readily to mind. One possibility is that during the years when the Democrats 
controlled the House, there were fewer black legislators than during the Republican-
controlled era. Given their low numbers SCLBC legislators strategically made fewer 
requests for appointment per committee in order for them to have broader overall 
committee membership participation. Also, perhaps SCLBC members’ firmly believe 
that as members of the Democratic Party, the white Democrats would use their majority 
party status also to sponsor and support policies germane to minority constituents. Hence, 
they may have made the strategic decision to not increase their saliency on black interest 
committees during those sessions.   
Conversely, the rise in the saliency of black interest committees during the 
Republican era might signal SCLBC members’ adoption of an opposite position. They 
might have acquired a complete distrust of the Republican Party to sponsor or even 
support black interest policies and were compelled to take on this task themselves.  
Also, only during the 110th Session and the 119th Session were SCLBC members 
assigned to a Miscellaneous Committee (Operations and Management Committee). The 
SCLBC members’ 5 percent average saliency for this committee reflects the black caucus 
members' conscious efforts to not request an assignment to this committee. This action 
lends more support to the hypothesis that black legislators are strategic in the committee 
assignment requests.  
__________________________ 
16 A Standing Committee is not included in the analysis if no SCLBC member received 




SCLBC members standing committee assignments were also compared to gauge 
their potential to influence black interest legislative outcomes. SCLBC legislators have 
served on all House standing committees at some point in time during different 
legislative sessions involved in the present study. However, in all sessions, the black 
lawmakers were represented on all existing black interest committees. 
Table 4.2 displays the SCLBC influence potential through representation on various 
House Standing Committees during each legislative session. Interestingly enough, during 
the Democratic-controlled sessions, the Education and Public Works Committee, was one 
of the black interest committee on which SCLBC members had the most potential 
influence. However, during the Republican legislative controlled sessions, given their 
increased membership numbers, SCLBC potential influence shows a dramatic increase 
for the Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs Committee. They also show 
strong potential on the Judiciary Committee. With this influence potential shift, SCLBC 
legislators were better positioned to have an effect on social welfare policies and judicial 
appointment decisions. 
Moreover, the equity ratios show that during each session of this study, SCLBC 
representation on the Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs Committee, a black 
interest committee, exceeded their representation in the House. Also, in every session, 
excluding the 119th Session, SCLBC legislators’ representation on the Education and 
Public Works Committee exceeded their House representation as well. 
Additionally, for the period studied, the Judiciary Committee, is the only black 
interest committee on which SCLBC members’ numbers showed underrepresentation. 









   Table 4.2 SCLBC Influence Potential on House Standing Committees by Legislative Sessions 
    ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
109th   (N=15)            110th   (N=18)         114 th (N=24)    115th   (N=24)           119th   (N=28)  
   Committee        %         Equity            %          Equity         %          Equity    %         Equity       %          Equity           
   Name                             Black   Ratio            Black    Ratio           Black    Ratio        Black    Ratio             Black    Ratio 
   ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Ways and Means  8.0        -4.1             8.0   -6.5             12.0       -7.4     12.0        -7.4    16.0         -6.6 
 
   Judiciary   8.0        -4.1           12.0         -2.5           16.0       -3.4          24.0         4.6              20.0         -2.6 
 
   Agriculture,                         5.6        -6.5           11.1         -1.4           11.1       -8.3          11.1        -8.3                5.0       -17.0 
   Natural Resources  
   and Environmental  
   Affairs 
 
   Education and   27.8      15.7              27.8        13.3              22.2        2.8           22.2          2.8         16.7        -5.9 
   Public Works 
 
   Medical, Military,              1.7       4.6                27.8        13.3              55.6       36.2           44.4         25.0             72.2        49.6 
   Public and Municipal 
   Affairs 
 
   Labor, Commerce                 5.6       -6.5                5.6         -8.9               5.6        -13.8            5.6        -13.8               5.6       -17.0  
   and Industry 
 
   Rules                                     0.0      -12.1              13.3        -1.2                6.7       -12.7          13.3          -6.1              13.3        -9.3 
 









     Ethics                  0.0        -12.1    16.7       2.2              16.7         -2.7            16.7           -2.7                0.0     -22.6 
 
     Invitations and              40.0         27.9    40.0      25.5               0.0        -19.4             0.0          -19.4              20.0      -2.6   
     Memorial Resolutions 
 
     Operations and                   0.0         -12.9                1 4.3     -0.2                0.0        -19.4             0.0          -19.4                0.0    -22.6 
     Management   




influence on public policy came from the Labor, Commerce, and Industry Committee.  
They always were underrepresented on the Ways and Means Committee, and the Rules 
Committee, both traditional prestige committees.   
Overall, during the Republican-led legislative sessions (114th, 115th and 119th), 
SCLBC members were able to maintain a significant presence on black interest 
committees. They also expanded the number of committees over which they had 
influence. An increase in the number of elected black members was an important factor 
driving this expanded committee influence potential. 
Making a determination as to which committees resonate the most with SCLBC 
members and which issues or jurisdictions they have the most influence are necessary 
preliminary analyses involving SCLBC legislator’s strategic committee assignment 
request behavior. Undoubtedly, SCLBC membership on an appropriate committee is a 
powerful influence on their strategic representation efforts. However, do SCLBC 
legislators express strategic representational behavior as expected in Hypothesis 5? Thus, 
logistic regression analysis is used to provide a more rigorous test of the committee 
appointment hypothesis. 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 provide estimates of the relevant effects on the likelihood 
of a House member receiving an appointment to a particular committee during legislative 
sessions under both the Democratic Party and Republican Party control. Of specific 
interest to this study.is the impact of the SCLBC membership variable upon black interest 
committee assignments. 
Table 4.3 details coefficients and standard errors for the logistic regression 
analyses of SCLBC legislators’ committee assignments during the Democratic-controlled 




Table 4.3    Logistic Regression Model Analysis of Appointments to Selected 
                    Committees, Democrat-Controlled 109th and 110th Sessions  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Black Interest     Prestige  Policy    Constituency 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept       0.475      -2.045  -0.783        0.333    
                (0 .921)        (1.136)             (1.126)                (1.403) 
 
Seniority       -0 .073**      0.122***                  0.065*       -0.001 
                  (0.025)    (0.080)  (0.028)     (0.041) 
 
SCLBC       -0.762*    0.945*      0.165        0.174 
Legislator              (0.378)    (0.474)  (0.455)                0.527 
 
White                    -0.274    1.037**  0.045        -0.613 
Democrat              (0.304)    (0.389)  (0.369)                (0.487) 
 
Majority Party       0.136    -0.795  -0.584                  -0.621 
Member       (0.426)    (0.502)  (0.513)                (0.692) 
 
Female          -0.473      _____  _____                  2.445***   
Legislator              (0.543)             (0.614) 
 
Percent                  -0.001      -0.008     -0.002         -0.613 
Blacka        (0.012)        (0.014)  (0.014)                (0.018) 
in District 
Average       0.010       0.001     -0.009        -0.036  
Income       (0.013)    (0.016)  (0.016)                (0.021) 
in District 
 
Pseudo R2         0.042    0.101              0.043                 0.113 
 
Observations        (248)    (232)              (232)      (248) 
aIncome in thousands 
*significant at the .05 level;**significant at the .01 level;***significant at the .001 level 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. 






variable SCLBC Legislator (-0.762) shows that during the Democratic-controlled House 
sessions, there were significant differences between black legislators and non-black 
legislators appointments to the black interest committee.  In other words for each 
appointment made to the Black Interest Committee, we could expect a 0.762 decrease in 
the log-odds of an SCLBC legislator receiving an appointment to this committee, while 
holding all of the other independent variables constant.  
The magnitude of the effects of SCLBC members’ appointments to other 
committees are positive and varies by committee. For example, the statistically 
significant coefficient (0.945) for the SCLBC legislator variable, shows the likelihood of 
SCLBC legislators being assigned to a Prestige Committee, in the absence of other 
influences, is very high. The likelihood of SCLBC members receiving an assignment to a 
black interest committee is much lower than their probability of being assigned to a 
prestige committee. This finding is contrary to initial expectations but strengthens the 
previous argument made involving SCLBC members’ early strategic decision to look to 
their Democratic allies to help protect the minority constituents’ interests. 
The results of the committee assignments pattern for the 114th, 115th and 119th 
Republican-controlled House sessions are presented in Table 4.4. These findings show 
that SCLBC members are significantly more likely to receive Black Interest Committees 
assignments as opposed to being assigned to other committees during the 114th, 115th, 
and 119th legislative sessions17.  
These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 5. Clearly SCLBC members  
______________________ 
 
17 The Miscellaneous Committee (Operations and Management Committee) was omitted from 





Table 4.4    Logistic Regression Model Analysis of Appointments to Selected 
                    Committees, Republican-Controlled 114th, 115th, and 119th Sessions  
________________________________________________________________________ 
     Black Interest   Prestige       Policy   Constituency 
________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Intercept             5.326   - 4.392***          -1.341              -3.914 
     
                       (1.215)  1.204          (1.534)                1.391 
 
Seniority                     -0.140***                    0.203***                 0.067**               0.073* 
     
                                    (.032)              (0.341)                    (0.025)                (0.035) 
 
SCLBC             1.554***     -0.638            -0.556                 -0.526 
Legislator             (0.444)             (0.431)                    (0.454)                (0.596) 
 
White                         0.199              -1.475**         -0.528                 0.965*         
Democrat              (0.373)   (0.494)           (0.413)            (0.423) 
 
Majority Party  0.709   0.196          -0.482  0.493 
Member             (0.077)             (0.422)         (0.411)            (0.446) 
 
Female Legislator       -0.009              0.433            1.148*                0.343      
(0.629)             (0.620)         (0.561)                0.645)    
  
 
Percent Blacka             -0.044**                      0.023           0.004                  0.023      
  
in District  (0.014)             (0.014)                    (0.014)                (0.016) 
 
Average Income          -0.080***  0.026           (0.001)                0.038*         
in District  (0.016)             (0.015)                    (0.016)            (0.017) 
 
Pseudo R2   0.126     0.206          0.037                   0.047 
 
Observations   (370)   (370)          (370)  (370) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
aIncome in thousands 
*significant at the .05 level;**significant at the .01 level;***significant at the .001 level  




made wholesale strategic requests for assignment to black interest committees when 
compared to their requests for assignment to other committees.  There is also a pattern of 
significance across all of the parameter estimates for the seniority variable. This pattern 
suggests that a legislators’ years of service plays a dominant role in the House committee 
assignment process even when House leadership grants a members’ request for 
assignments to black interest committees. In sum, it appears that SCLBC members did 
engage in strategic committee assignment preference during the latter legislative sessions 
of this study. 
 A supplementary odds ratio analysis amplifies the logistic regression finding for 
all legislative sessions studied. Table 4.5 and 4.6 presents the odd ratio analyses results. 
The findings in Table 4.5 tells us that the odds of SCLBC member receiving appointment 
to a Black Interest Committee during both the 109th and 110th Legislative Sessions are 
0.468 to1. In other words, the SCLBC legislators had less than a 50-50 chance of being 
placed on black interest committees when compared to Non-Black Caucus legislators.  
Now consider their assignments to other committees during this same time frame. The 
odds ratio SCLBC members receiving appointment to non-blacks interest committee 
show that they were more likely to be assigned to either a prestige or policy committee as 
opposed to black interest committees. In fact, the odds ratio demonstrates that the 
SCLBC lawmakers’ assignment to prestige committees were over 2.5 times more likely 
to occur than an assignment to other committees.  
Nonetheless, as Table 4.6 illustrates the SCLBC legislators’ requests for 
assignment to black interest committees appears to have taken on a more strategic focus 




Table 4.5 Odds Ratio of Appointments to Selected Committees, Democrat 
                 Controlled 109th and 110th Sessions (Robust Standard Errors  
                 in parentheses) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Black Interest   Prestige    Policy        Constituency 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept            1.607     0.129       0.456               1.396    
                     (1.481)              (0.147)      (0.515)                  (1.957) 
 
Seniority            0.930**    1.129***           1.067*    0.999 
                                   (0.023)              (0.032)      (0.030)  (0.042) 
 
SCLBC                      0.468*   2.573*          1.179     1.190 
Legislator                   (0.176)   (1.220)      (0.537)  0.628 
 
White                   0.760   2.821**      1.046     0.542 
Democrat                   (0.231)   (1.097)      (0.386)  (0.264) 
 
Majority Party            1.218   0.552       0.457  0.714 
Member            (0.499)   (0.265)                 (0.221)  (0.470) 
 
Female                        0.623     _____                  _____                11.534***   
Legislator                   (0.338)           (7.083) 
 
Percent Blacka            0.999     0.999         0.998                  0.979 
in District            (0.012)      (0.014)      (0.014)  (0.018) 
  
 
Average Income        1.010      1.010         0.991                0.965 
In District            (0.013)   (0.016)      (0.016)  (0.020) 
 
Pseudo R2            0.042   0.101       0.043  0.113 
 
Observations             (248)   (232)       (232)  (248) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
aIncome in thousands 
*significant at the .05 level;**significant at the .01 level;***significant at the .001 level 







Table 4.6    Odds Ratio of Appointments to Selected Committees, Republican 
                    Controlled 114th, 115th, and 119th Sessions (Robust Standard Errors  




                           Black Interest   Prestige             Policy              Constituency 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept            4.214   0.086**       0.259                0.197     
             (3.583)   0.083       (0.251)                   (0.205) 
 
Seniority            0.884***   1.216***              1.047*                    0.925*      
             (0.019)              (0.030)      (0.021)                   (0.025) 
 
SCLBC                      5.235***     0.300**      0.330                      0.653 
Legislator            (1.735)              (0.112)      (0.136)                   (0.277) 
 
White Democrat         1.886              1.255**      0.620                      1.814*         
           (0.589)              (0.101)        (0.219)             (0.651) 
 
Majority Party            1.316   1.205       0.650  1.099 
Member            (0.483)   (0.507)                 (0.266)  (0.487) 
 
Female               1.142   1.386         1.823*                    0.852      
Legislator             (0.535)              (0.710)                 (0.446)                   (0.501)   
    
Percent Blacka  0.990**                       1.008        1.003                      1.012   
  
In District  (0.010)             (0.012)                 (0.012)                    (0.013) 
 
Average Income         0.981***  0.999                   1.002                      1.005*         
In District            (0.011)              (0.013)                 (0.013)  (0.014) 
 
Pseudo R2  0.126     0.206                  0.037                      0.047 
 
Observations   (370)   (370)       (370)  (370) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
aIncome in thousands 
*significant at the .05 level;**significant at the .01 level;***significant at the .001 level 





115th, and 119Legislative Sessions, the odds for SCLBC members receiving Black 
Interest Committee assignments were 5.235 times higher than their odds of appointment 
to other committees.  Also, for the SCLBC variable all of the regression parameters for 
each committee assignment, excluding black interest committee assignments, are 
negative.   
This result indicates that the corresponding odd ratios for SCLBC legislators’ 
assignments to non-black interest committee would decrease as a function of the black 
interest committee variable. For example, the significant odds ratio of 0.3000 (-0.638, the 
corresponding regression parameter estimate), indicates that SCLBC members have 
approximately a 70% chance of not receiving an assignment to a Prestige committee 
when compared to their chances of assignment to a black interest committee. Thus, these 
overall findings provide partial support for the strategic committee assignment request 
hypothesis. It appears that the SCLBC members’ strategic black interest committee 
assignments requests emerge primarily during the Republican House leadership era.  
Conclusion: SCLBC Legislators and Black Interest Committees Requests 
In conclusion, I would like to synthesize and summarize the findings as they 
relate to SCLBC members’ strategic committee assignment requests. First, objective  
shows SCLBC members' overrepresentation on black interest committees, particularly 
during Republican-controlled sessions. The evidence seems to suggest that the black 
interest committee overrepresentation is the result of the strategic committee requests 
calculations by SCLBC members. Also, the SCLBC members’ strategic committee 
request argument is further strengthened by their total absence of membership on The 




three of the five legislative sessions involved in this study.  
In the Republican-dominated House sessions, the black lawmakers seemingly 
pooled their committee assignment requests toward committees that had jurisdiction over 
policy areas that are of relative importance to the Black Caucus. Presumably, as black 
interest committee members, the SCLBC lawmakers could position themselves to acquire 
power and influence in the policy areas within the committee’s jurisdiction. The SCLBC 
members’ saliency scores and equity ratios for the 114th, 115th, and 119th House 
sessions provides consistent evidence of this observation. The saliency score results for 
these legislative sessions is consistent with Cheryl Miller’s (1990) findings that “African 
American legislators strategically use their dispersion and leadership on committees to 
improve the probability of passage of their priority legislation” (Miller, 1990: 12).   
Second, the most robust findings regarding committee assignment requests 
centered on the probability of SCLBC members committee requests during the 
Republican-led legislative sessions. The results obtained from the logistic regression 
analysis provides partial support for hypothesis 5. The evidence demonstrates that there 
was a broad variation regarding the probability of SCLBC members committee 
assignment requests based on policy area jurisdiction during the early legislative sessions 
when compared to the later legislative sessions. Overall, these findings reflect a 
willingness by SCLBC members, particularly during the Republican era, to concentrate 
their efforts primarily to gain seats on black interest committees.   
Moreover,  contrary to the hypothesized expectation, during the Democratic-led 
109th and 110th sessions, the Black Caucus members appears to have not utilized 




their overall House membership numbers were low might have been a factor in their 
reluctance to make strategic committee requests during these legislative sessions.  They 
might have also expected to receive legislative support for their agenda from the 
Democratic Party majority. Hence, the black caucus members could have factored the 
Democratic support expectation, into their committee request equation. This belief would 
be consistent with Rocca and Sanchez, (2008) findings that Democratic-controlled 
legislatures provide more support for black interest legislation than Republican-led 
legislatures. 
 Finally, in this analysis, the political party variable did not appear to play a 
meaningful role in the committee selection process. Conversely, the seniority covariate 
seems to exert some influence on the House committee assignment process. The seniority 
variable was consistently significant for most of the legislative sessions studied, and for 
all type of committees involved, regardless of party control. This finding involving 
seniority is consistent with previous research that finds a legislator’s seniority within a 
legislative chamber to be a very influential factor in the committee assignment process.   
In sum, the evidence shows overrepresentation by SCLBC members on black 
interest committees, particularly during the Republican-led House sessions. This finding  
provides partial support for the committee self-selection hypothesis. Presumably, SCLBC 
members’ black committees’ overrepresentation was done to place themselves in 
strategic positions to exert sufficient influence to produce positive outcomes for some of 
their black interest legislation. However, given their strategic bill sponsorship behavior 
and bill passage results, it seems that their strategic committee self-selection behavior has 




Recall from Chapter 1, I theorize that SCLBC members do behave in this manner. 
However, in Chapter 3, I demonstrate that while SCLBC members appear to engage in a 
strategic bill introduction behavior, overall, their sponsored legislation mostly have not 
received favorable outcomes. Although these results raise serious questions about the 
current effectiveness of SCLBC members’ strategic representation efforts, a pattern is 
beginning to emerge. In contrast to the Democratic Party era, evidence shows SCLBC 
members’ expanse in both their saliency and influence potential on black interest 
committees during the Republican Party control of the House.  
Currently, SCLBC members, comprise two-thirds membership on the Medical 
Military Public and Municipal Affairs Committee, a black interest committee. Black 
Caucus member Representative Leon Howard, serves as Chairman of the committee, 
along with two other SCLBC members who serve as Second and Third Vice-Chair. The 
Black Caucus also shows increased membership numbers on the Judiciary Committee, a 
highly desirable black interest committee. Nonetheless, the Caucus members black 
interest committee leadership positions, along with their calculated request for black 
interest committee assignments, thus far, have not led to meaningful gains in the overall 
passage rates for their sponsored legislation. Perhaps that will change as the Caucus  
members acquire more influential legislative leadership positions. 
In the following chapter, I turn next to an examination of SCLBC members 
legislative coalition efforts. How successful are they in creating voting coalitions aimed 
at moving their strategic measures, further along, the legislative path?  What types of 
alliances are they successfully able to build to block advancement of anti-minority 




coalitions? Are they making strategic choices in each instance of voting coalition 
formation? As we will see, an examination of their coalition formation decisions should 
provide answers to these questions involving the final link of the SCLBC members’ 






THROUGH COALITION FORMATION 
“I vehemently object to H.3003. It suppresses the votes of the disabled, the handicapped, 
and those voters without transportation, making the system more complicated and 
confusing to cast a vote, and therefore, disfranchising many registered voters” 
(Representative Robert L. Brown’s statement entered in the 2011 House Journal)  
South Carolina Legislative Black Caucus member, Robert L. Brown entered the 
above-cited statement into the 2011 House Journal Records before casting his vote 
against House General Bill, H.3003 (2011), the Voter ID Law.  Despite Representative 
Brown and the other Black Caucus members’ similar objections, the bill passed. Still, the 
above-cited quote highlights the continuing level of legislative frustration Black Caucus 
members feel while attempting to promote their pro-black agenda or in certain instances, 
attempt to stifle anti-minority legislation proposed by non-caucus legislators. Although 
Black Caucus lawmakers now constitute the majority legislative membership of the 
minority Democratic Party in the Republican-controlled House, they are still racial 
minority legislators. Given their double minority status, it is, therefore, reasonable to 
expect that SCLBC members will seek to form coalitions with white lawmakers to 
achieve some measure of legislative success. This examination now focuses on coalition 
formation, the final measure of SCLBC legislators’ strategic representation effectiveness.  
Specifically, this project will analyze the different type of voting coalitions 




analysis is how often have the SCLBC House members forged winning coalitions to 
advance their salient measures, or defeat anti-minority interest legislation? When 
examining SCLBC members’ strategic behavior, the traditional expectation is that they 
will more readily form coalitions with white Democrats rather than with the House 
Republicans.  This expectation should hold, particularly, since SCLBC members are 
serving as legislative members in a politically constrained partisan environment.   
In this project, I contend that the SCLBC legislators’ strategic coalition formation 
objectives are two-fold.  First, they may seek to form voting coalitions with white 
Democrats and strategically coalesce with white Republicans to gain passage of favorable 
salient minority interest legislation.  Second, the black lawmakers may seek negative veto 
voting coalitions with white Democrats and white Republican, to prohibit passage of 
undesirable anti-minority legislation. However, in the end, how successful is their overall 
coalition strategy? This chapter will provide answers to these questions 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I explain how coalition formation is yet 
another measure of strategic representation.  Second, I briefly state how the two 
hypotheses tested in this chapter relate to the overall theory of strategic representation. 
Third, I present data and methods used to test these hypotheses. In this section, I focus 
mainly on the House roll-call votes taken on each selected measure, during the legislative 
process. Fourth, I point out the analyses of the effects of majoritarian party control on 
SCLBC members’ coalition efforts and the outcomes. Finally, I conclude this chapter by 
offering a synthesis of the findings and conjecturing on the impact these coalition 





5.1:Examining SCLBC Coalition Formation Strategy 
 
At the beginning of this work, I maintained that SCLBC members overall 
strategic representation behavior include calculated efforts geared towards promoting 
their minority constituents legislative interests. However, can their strategic coalition 
formations efforts help attain that goal? Recall in Chapter 2, I presented evidence that the 
SCLBC views itself as the voice of black citizens in the state of South Carolina. In some 
instances, SCLBC members may be able to exert their voice by forming successful 
negative veto coalitions to derail anti-minority legislation. Other times, they can 
personify their voice by seizing those rare opportunities to be a part of winning coalitions 
that enact legislation beneficial to the black citizenry.  The Legislative Black Caucus 
members might also be able to make their voice heard by exerting independent legislative 
leverage. Their independent leverage occurs when they, as a minority voting bloc 
strategically cast the deciding votes in a balance of power struggle between competing 
white Democrats and white Republican Party members (Walters, 1988; Shaw and Black 
2008) in exchange for consideration of favorable black interest legislation advancement. 
In fact, in their 2008 work, Shaw and Black suggested as much by stating: 
Therefore, we recommend that the LBC as well as other Black elected officials 
pursue (or continue to pursue) a strategy of independent leverage where they seek 
out and cultivate unique opportunities for policy coalitions that benefit African 
Americans and the poor while actively supporting a process of community policy 
engagement and political mobilization, (Shaw and Black, 2008). 
Thus, there may be instances in which the Caucus may exert their voice on behalf of their 
black constituents, through strategic coalition formations geared towards passage of 





Coalition Formation Literature Overview  
At the heart of this analysis lies the following two questions. Can SCLBC 
members act as a cohesive group and form successful voting coalitions during roll call 
voting in the House?  Is their ability to build successful coalitions dependent upon 
political party control of the legislative chamber?  
Coalition formation among lawmakers is a central element of the decision-making 
process. It allows the bargaining parties to reach collective decisions. There is a vast 
amount of literature on the importance of coalition formation during political bargaining 
in legislative institutions. Implicit in coalition formation is the idea that members of the 
coalition will receive some form of payment in exchange for their agreement for 
inclusion in the coalition.  
Classic works such as Black (1958), Riker (1962), and Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962), have recognized the importance of side payments in legislatures. Some early 
works in formal models of politics have suggested that optimal strategies of favor trading 
within legislatures involve minimal winning coalitions. For example, Riker’s “size 
principle” for coalition building states that “in social situations similar to n-person, zero-
sum gains with side payments, participants create coalitions as large as they believe will 
ensure winning and no larger” (Riker, 1962). 
Additional theoretical scholarly works on bargaining have generated further 
insights into the dynamics of coalition formation in legislative bargaining (Aksoy, 2010; 
Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Diermeir et. al. 2008; Jackson and Moselle, 2002, Norman, 
2002). This theoretical literature primarily focus on how institutional features, such as 




formed by the bargaining parties. For example, Baron and Ferejohn (1989a) developed a 
model of the legislative process to show that in a purely distributive divide-the-dollar 
environment, the proposal maker forms minimal winning coalitions. Extensions of the 
model demonstrates how changes in different aspects of the institutional environment, 
such as the role of committees (Baron and Ferejohn 1989b), unlimited access to the 
policy agenda, (Shepsle and Weingast, 1981), and the existence of veto players (McCarty 
2000; Winter 1999) can influence coalition formations. 
Also, two different strands of legislative research involving coalition formation 
shed some light on the effect political party control has on coalition formation success. 
Some existing Congressional studies attempt to determine what factors guide legislators’ 
preferences within the legislative chamber to ascertain the connection between 
legislators’ decisions and their constituency based legislative vote. For instance, the 
resurgence of cohesive voting among legislators with the same party identification and 
the increasing division in voting between political parties (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; 
Snyder and Groseclose 2000) has led to a series of arguments centered around the extent 
to which political parties and party leaders, are the main elements structuring voting 
within the US House of Representatives.  
On one side, Krehbiel (1998; 2000) suggests parties do not structure legislative  
vote conflict as measured by the division of roll call votes within a legislature. He argues 
that the preferences of each legislator could merely accumulate into two different 
coalitions in a conflict, where the sides are divided by the “pivotal” legislator who stands 
between the status quo and the change in policy given in the legislation. He concludes 




from a political party causes what appears to be cohesion in preferences in the legislature 
(Krehbiel 1998; 2000).  
On the other hand, Cox and Poole (2002), believe that parties do precipitate 
voting cohesion among members. They find that in the US House of Representatives, 
organizational changes in decision-making in the 1970s have led the parties to pressure 
members more, because these organizational changes gave the parties more influence 
over legislative procedure. To support this claim, they show in their model, that members 
vote with the party more than would be expected when the type of vote changes to a 
procedural vote from a “less pressure” substantive vote. They argue that as the vote 
proceeds along this continuum, one can see increased party pressure on certain types of 
votes, in that party voting coalitions become tighter. In this way, they posit, parties are 
“procedural cartels (489)” for the legislative organization (see also Cox and 
McCubbins,1993).  
In a similar vein, Aldrich and Rohde (2001) also argue that political parties are 
crucial in understanding members’ preferences in particular circumstances. They contend 
that the strength of the party’s influence on members’ preference rest on how much party 
members agree with each other and how far apart one political party’s beliefs are from 
the other party. While these notions of parties as legislative cartels or conditional political 
players do not see parties as necessarily playing the same roles within a legislature, both 
strands of scholarly work view parties as the main elements that structure’s member 
behavior, given situations in which the parties can thrive. The two sides of the argument 
about the validity of political parties as being essential to the legislative organization 




must understand the larger political environment of the legislature.  
Whereas these studies give some variation to developed theories of coalition 
voting and party organization in Congress (e.g.Askoy, 2010; Krehbiel, 1998, 2000; 
Finocchiaro and Rohde 2001; Cox and Poole 2002; Baron and Ferejohn, 1988)), their 
application to state legislatures may not be straightforward (Wright and Schaffner 2002; 
Aldrich and Battista 2002; Hamm and Squire 2001). In an earlier work involving the 
Texas State Legislature, Lutz, and Murray (1975) test Riker’s coalition hypothesis by 
collecting data from five regular sessions of the Texas House and Senate. They find in 
looking at Texas legislative decisions, in terms of Riker’s Coalition Theory, some were 
minimal coalition decisions, but many more were not. They also note that the tendency 
towards minimal coalition formation was most pronounce when legislators dealt with 
issues that feature intangible and diffuse payoffs. More importantly, they note that not 
much stability exist in coalition patterns from one session to the next. 
Also, several comparative studies indicate that parties may not always be 
organizational voting coalition tools in state legislatures. For instance, Wright and 
Schaffner (2002) find that in the unicameral Nebraska legislature, where legislators are 
(logically) elected in nonpartisan elections, parties do not structure coalitions in the 
legislature, despite members’ ideological divisions along a liberal/conservative spectrum.  
However, even in some states where different political parties do exist, they do 
not appear to structure roll call voting patterns in the legislature. In the Idaho Legislature, 
the Republican Party is so dominant the roll call voting patterns indicate the large 
numbers of Republican representatives divide into smaller groups within their political 




controlled Rhode Island legislature.  
Likewise, in Illinois the division between rural and urban areas within the state, 
divides the Democratic Party into three separate factions. These factions include a more 
conservative suburban Chicago group, a south central Chicago group, and a larger group 
of the remaining representatives from Chicago and the rest of the state (Wright and 
Osborn 2002). These findings suggest that political parties do not appear to structure roll 
call coalition voting in most states. This outcome is true even in those states with 
relatively even numbers of representatives from both parties, as several previous studies 
suggest will be the case (i.e. Wright and Osborn 2002; A. Rosenthal 1998; Francis 1989). 
Thus, these results suggest the possibility exists for SCLBC members to build successful 
voting coalitions with lawmakers opposite their political party.  
Coalitions Formations in the SC House 
In this project, I argue that a particular political party’s control of the legislature, 
along with the substantive nature of the legislation, are the factors that influence the 
SCLBC members’ margin of coalition formation success. Current research lends support 
to this contention. For example, Wielhouwer and Middlemass (2002) in-depth 
examination of the connection between descriptive representation and substantive 
representation in the Georgia Legislature from 1992 through 1999 supports this 
contention. Though it was not the centerpiece of their study, they did analyze the roll-call 
votes that occurred during their study’s timeframe to determine the Georgia Legislative 
Black Caucus coalition formation success with white Democrats and Republicans. Their 
findings suggest that intra-party coalitions with white Democrats were most likely to 




as economic development. On the other hand, while inter-party coalitions with the 
Republicans were rare, one did form around redistricting (Wielhouwer and Middlemass, 
2002).  
Earlier, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 1997) demonstrate that to be 
effective minority representatives must coalesce with progressive white legislators. Other 
research shows that an inherent requirement of a successful voting coalition creation is 
the requirement that the appeal of the coalition proposal outweighs any predisposed 
opposition by potential coalition members. It also requires the coalition advocate to 
communicate policy intent. These requirements are of the utmost importance, particularly 
when members of a racial minority group seek to coalesce with white members of the 
legislative majority (Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Jones, 1994; Krehbiel, 1991; Arnold, 
1990).  In sum, collectively, these previous studies leave us with the idea that the SCLBC 
members’ coalition formation success is dependent upon the legislative issue involved in 
conjunction with their ability to elicit cooperation from members of both parties despite 
the legislative political environment. In other words, the nature of the legislation in some 
instances may affect the SCLBC members’ ability to structure successful voting 
coalitions to advance salient black interest legislations.  
In this chapter, I further expand the line of coalition formation research. I not only 
examine the Black Caucus members’ constituency responsiveness as measured through 
their salient minority interest legislation progression but also conduct an analysis of their 
negative veto coalition formation created to derail anti-minority measures. Political 
institutions vary in the manner that some individuals or groups are disproportionately 




may have the ability to block proposals resulting from either institutional rules or norms 
(Winter, 1996). Existing scholarly research shows that Latino legislators’ coalesce with 
non-Latino lawmakers to form veto coalitions (negative veto) to block specific legislation 
adverse to Latino interests, such as the passage of Official English laws (Preuhs, 2005; 
Santoro 1999; Tatalovich,1995). These studies lend support to the assertion that 
legislatures often exercise some form of inter-chamber veto power to express their 
negative preferences.  
Negative preferences are preferences against something, and it may be obvious 
during voting. Essentially, the avoidance of the voters’ least preferred alternative is an 
indication of their negative preferences (Kang, 2010, Ferguson & Lowi, 2001, 
Poundstone 2001, Kernell 1977). Along these lines, I argue that the SCLBC members 
exhibit their negative preferences when they strategically form negative veto alliances to 
block anti-minority measures which they oppose.  
In the South Carolina House of Representatives, a simple majority vote on a bill is  
needed to kill or prevent passage of a piece of legislation. To be successful in their 
negative veto alliance efforts, the SCLBC members need to form a “minimal winning 
coalition” of at least 63 members out of the 124 member House (see Rikers 1962).  
Reaching the minimal vote threshold may be problematic for the black lawmakers 
particularly during Republican-led legislative sessions. However, even in those instances, 
their legislation blocking power may be much easier to exert than their ability to 
successfully maneuver their sponsored proposals through the legislative process.   
In conducting this analysis, I examine the SCLBC Caucus legislative 




increasing the likelihood for passage of their sponsored black interest legislation. As I 
demonstrate in the previous chapters, the precarious minority legislative positions of both 
the SCLBC and white Democrats create difficulties for either group to gain passage of 
their sponsored legislation during the Republican-controlled legislative sessions. Thus, to 
move their minority interest measures, further along the legislative path, SCLBC 
members would need to coalesce with both Democrats and Republicans in the House 
chamber. 
I also examine their negative veto coalition strategy for blocking anti-minority 
measures. Recall in Chapter 2, I presented then-Representative Kay Patterson’s colorful 
characterization of the important and often overlooked role that he as a legislator 
frequently undertook beyond bill sponsorship. He noted that “killing a bill ” or otherwise 
stopping unwanted legislation from advancing further along the legislative path, is 
perhaps more important than legislation sponsorship.  
Without a doubt, an examination of the Caucus effectiveness as a representative 
of minority interests should extend beyond measurements devoted solely to bill 
sponsorship, and bill passage. It also requires an analysis of their strategic negative veto 
coalitions’ effectiveness, particularly during the Republican-led sessions. Both black 
interest legislation progression and legislative derailment of anti-minority interest 
measures are integral components of the SCLBC members overall strategic 
representation response on behalf of their minority constituents. 
As such, assessment of their strategic coalitions created to advance black interest 
bills, in addition to their strategic alliances built to block anti-minority measures, will 




advocates for South Carolina’s minority citizens. In other words, by connecting the 
results obtained from both analyses in this chapter to the conclusions reached in the 
earlier chapters, a fuller picture of the SCLBC members’ strategic representation 
effectiveness will emerge. 
Hypotheses: Roll Call Voting and Coalitions Formation 
As detailed in the previous chapters, I am interested in testing two different 
hypotheses around SCLBC coalition formations as part of their overall strategic 
representation behavior. The two hypotheses are specified below. 
H6:  SCLBC members will be more likely to form a winning coalition to advance 
salient minority issue legislation or utilize negative veto coalitions to defeat anti-
black legislation during periods of Democratic control of the legislature. 
 
H7:  SCLBC members will be less likely to form a winning coalition to advance salient 
minority issue legislation or utilize negative veto coalitions to defeat anti-black 
legislation during periods of Republican control. 
 
Consistent with the theory presented in Chapter 1, I expect that the SCLBC members will 
strategically attempt to engage in bi-racial coalition formations with both white 
Democrats and Republicans, whenever necessary, as part of their overall strategic 
representation behavior. However, they will be less successful in creating interparty 
coalitions with Republicans than they would be in building intraparty coalitions with 
white Democrats. 
Existing literature shows that as a rule Democrats and black lawmakers sponsor 
more favorable minority issue legislation than Republicans. Conversely, Republicans are 
more likely to sponsor more anti-minority legislation. Thus, given the differences in the 
minority legislation sponsorship behavior between the two groups, I expect that the black 




advance salient black issue measures or to defeat anti-minority sponsored legislation 
during Democratic- controlled House sessions. On the other hand, due to Republican 
lawmakers’ historical unwillingness to coalesce with black lawmakers, SCLBC members 
will be less likely to form winning coalitions in either instance during legislative sessions 
under Republican control. 
 Data 
 
The data used in this analysis consist of the House roll call votes on selected 
primary bills during the legislative years of this study. Previous scholars such as Eulau 
and Karps, 1977, have questioned the validity of roll call voting data as an indicator of 
substantive representation. Also, the majority of roll-call analyses that examine 
legislators’ votes on the final passage of bills usually requires a minimum of 10% 
variation in votes (Herring, 1990). 
 However, to overcome these hurdles, this analysis goes beyond merely looking at 
individual legislator’s final roll call vote on a particular measure that meets the bill 
variation vote threshold. To capture the true extent of SCLBC members’ strategic 
representation efforts, rather than to look at the individual legislators’ roll call vote, I 
analyze the various legislative coalitions formed during the roll call vote. 
Moreover, I cast my net rather broadly to include roll call votes involving both 
procedural and substantive votes at different points in the legislative process according to 
the primary bills’ particular legislative path. For example, in education bills, various 
education groups often work with legislators and members of the House Education 
Committee to amend the sponsored education bill to ensure that the final measure meets 




vote. In that instance, I include the roll call votes that occur during the bill's amendment 
process within the Education Committee along with any subsequent roll call vote on the 
bill that takes place on the House floor.  Thus, the data set for this chapter consists of 638 
roll call votes on primary bills culled from a total of 1574 roll call votes taken on all 
measures in the House during the legislative sessions under examination.   
In this analysis, I am specifically interested in SCLBC voting coalitions’ 
formations that includes black interest measures and negative veto coalitions that 
involves anti-minority legislation. I augmented this examination with a pre-selection of 
the 113th and 121st Sessions Confederate Flag roll call votes. I preselect the 113th, and 
121st Sessions flag vote for the following reason. On its face, the legislature’s vote on the 
Confederate Flag’s removal from the statehouse dome in the113th Legislative Session 
(2000), and eventual banishment from the capitol grounds during the sine die portion of 
the 121st Legislative Session (2015),  appears to be symbolic in nature.  
However, there is also a substantive dimension to this issue as well.  The 
Confederate Flag’s statehouse presence had an adverse impact on the state’s economic 
development sector, one of the SCLBC members’ core priorities. Thus, given the SCLBC 
members keen interest in this issue, any coalition formed around this vote should be 
included in this analysis as well.  
I also preselect all House legislative apportionment and redistricting roll call votes 
that occurred between the years of 1999-2012.  Redistricting is crucial for both 
descriptive and strategic representation of black citizens’ interests in the state’s 
legislature.  Simply put, redistricting measures lies at the heart of SCLBC members’ 




the apportionment process occurs every ten years, the inclusion of redistricting legislation 
in this analysis provides invaluable insight into the SCLBC members’ strategic coalition  
behavior during this time-frame. 
Methods 
Several methods used in this study represent an advancement over various  
methods used in prior legislative representation studies. To test the two coalition 
formation hypotheses, I look at roll call votes that occurs on legislation involving the 
following categories: Education, Elections, Affirmative Action/Discrimination, Health 
and Welfare, Economic Empowerment and Development and Criminal Justice.  These 
are the same bill categories previously selected for Chapter 3’s primary bill analysis and  
represent the substantive sub-grouping of bills used in this analysis18.  
First I analyze the roll call votes on each measure within each of the selected bill 
categories to determine the total number of white Democrats, white Republicans, and 
black SCLBC members that cast a vote during each roll call vote on the bill. I also looked 
to see whether the individual legislator voted for or against the bill. I next created 
coalition formation categories to determine the different voting coalition on each measure 
within each of the legislation groups.  
I looked to Alexander Lamis’ (1990, 1999) studies along with Menifield and Schaffer  
(2005) coalition formation categorizations in labeling the various alliances formed during 
roll call votes on each of the black issue legislation.  
______________________ 
18 The bills selection and categorization criterion were outlined in Chapter 3. A second 
coder was used to obtained inter-coder reliability. An agreement was reached in 97% of 





Adopting and building upon these studies, I classify a roll-call vote where a 
majority of white Democrats votes the same way as a majority of the SCLBC, with both  
groups in in opposition to a majority of the Republican Party, as a Democratic coalition 
vote. For example, a roll call vote was taken during the 110th Legislative Session on 
General Bill (H 4285), a bill to create a Registration and Elections Commission for 
Orangeburg County. A review of the roll call vote shows that a majority of the white 
Democrats coalesce with the black legislators to create a Democratic coalition vote19. The  
coalition vote on this election measure met the condition of a Democratic coalition vote 
and was placed in the elections measure category under the Democratic coalition group. 
Thus, all measures that met this coalition’s roll call vote requirement were put in the 
appropriate issue category under the Democratic coalition vote grouping. 
I classify those roll-call votes in which a majority of the SCLBC members and a 
majority of the Republican legislators vote in the same direction, with both groups in 
opposition to a majority of white Democrats as an unholy coalition vote. For instance, H 
4349 (S*059-1994) is an example of a salient issue measure placed in the unholy alliance 
coalition group. This bill involves the reapportionment of South Carolina’s election 
districts after the 1991 census. Redistricting is an important issue for SCLBC members. 
A review of the roll call vote on this measure reveals that a majority of black 
SCLBC Democrats and the House Republicans vote in the same direction in opposition 
to a majority of the white Democrats. The roll-call vote met the requirement of an unholy 
____________________________________________ 
19 Lamis (1990, 1999) and Menifield and Schaffer (2005) label this coalition as a party 
coalition. However, the Democratic Party label is more appropriate for this analysis, 
since this study involve a comparative analysis involving the Republican Party as well. I 
used Lamis’ (1990, 1999) and Menifield and Schaffer (2005) classification scheme for all 




coalition vote and placed in the elections bill category within the unholy coalition vote  
grouping. I classify those roll-call votes where a majority of SCLBC members, white  
Democrats and Republicans vote in the same direction as a consensus coalition vote. The 
2015 Confederate Flag roll call vote (S 0897) is a classic example of a roll call vote  
placed in the consensus coalition vote group. A review of the roll call votes shows that a  
majority of all three groups-SCLBC members, white Democrats, and Republicans- voted 
for this measure. Since a majority of all three factions cast their votes in the same  
direction, the voting outcome met the requirement of a consensus coalition vote.   
I further classify those roll-call votes where a majority of the white Democrats 
votes in the same direction as a majority of the Republicans, with both groups voting in 
opposition to the SCLBC members as a race coalition vote. I classify those roll-call 
votes, which produce an even split within any of these three groups, as being an 
individualistic coalition vote on the part of the legislators.  Finally, I classify those roll-
call votes in which a majority of the white Republicans voted in opposition to the roll call 
votes of a majority of white Democrats and a majority of SCLBC members as a 
Republican Coalition vote. In sum, all roll call votes that were taken to advance salient 
minority measures were placed in the appropriate legislation category within the 
applicable coalition vote grouping20.  
I created a coalition category (negative veto) for Non-SCLBC legislators’ sponsored 
measures to which the SCLBC expressed their negative preferences. Generally, in their 
role as minority interests’ representatives, the SCLBC members will express their  
____________________________ 
20 The Republican Coalition vote category provides a full comparative analysis of the 
Republican Party’s coalition voting behavior before and after their legislative dominance 




negative preferences towards anti-minority sponsored measures and also  
express their desire to block these bills.  To capture the SCLBC members’ ability to  
effectuate their expressed negative preferences, I construct a negative veto coalition  
category for placement of each roll call vote taken to block any anti-minority legislation 
within each of the selected primary legislation category.  
The roll call vote is considered a negative veto roll call vote if it met the following 
criteria. If during the roll call vote, at least, fifty percent of the SCLBC members cast a 
roll call vote against the bill in question, the vote would be deemed a negative veto roll 
call vote. For example, House Bill H 3003 (2011), The Voter ID Bill is an example of a 
measure placed in the elections legislation category within the negative veto coalition 
grouping. House Bill 3003(2001) requires a voter to present a photograph identification 
to vote. The bill is considered to be an anti-minority measure because of its adverse 
impact upon minority citizens’ right to vote.  
In addition, at least fifty percent of the SCLBC members objected to the bill. 
Thus, the black legislators’ roll call vote on this bill is a negative veto roll call vote. Also, 
any non-black legislator that votes against this bill is deemed to be a member of the 
SCLBC members’ negative veto coalition. Any bill that met the negative veto threshold 
requirement was placed in the appropriate legislation category within the negative veto 
coalition grouping.  
This study’s use of a negative veto coalition category is the first time black 
lawmakers’ legislative representation behavior have been analyzed through the lens of 
negative veto coalition formed to prohibit enactment of objectionable anti-minority 




passage of these measures gives rise to the same outcome of affording meaningful  
descriptive representation to their minority constituents, even if the bill sponsors  
underlying motivation and substantive preferences are juxtapose to this result. 
Measurement of Success 
I look to the roll call vote outcome on the legislation to determine the success  
rate for each SCLBC coalition group. Building upon Menifield and Schaffer (2005) 
definition, I define success in the following manner. For the SCLBC coalitions created to 
advance significant minority issue legislation, success is defined as the roll call vote that 
pushes the measure forward. Defeat is defined as an SCLBC coalition roll call vote’s 
failure to advance the legislation. I considered all legislators that voted “Yea” for the 
advancement of salient black issue legislation during roll-call voting to be members of 
the SCLBC roll call coalition. I consider all members that vote “Nay” during roll-call 
voting to be non- members of the SCLBC’s coalition for minority interest legislation 
advancement.   
For the negative veto coalition, success is defined as the SCLBC coalition’s 
opposition to an anti-black interest bill that failed to advance or fail to pass in the 
chamber or their opposition to an anti-black interest bill that died. Defeat is defined as 
SCLBC opposition to an anti-black bill that advances or pass. I considered all legislators 
that vote “nay” on anti-black legislation during roll-call voting to be members of the 
SCLBC negative veto roll call coalition. Alternatively, I consider all members that vote 
“Yea” on anti-black legislation during roll-call voting to be non-members of the negative  
veto roll call coalition. I ignored all absences.  




legislation categories in each of the coalition formations.  I also computed percentages for 
each coalition overall success rate.  I then analyze the results to determine SCLBC 
members’ effectiveness in their intraparty (Democratic coalition) and interparty (Unholy 
Coalition) efforts to advance successfully, salient measures. I also analyze the results to 
determine the extent of SCLBC members’ successful engagement in negative veto 
tactics. I then analyze these findings to compare the success of SCLBC members’ 
strategic coalitions created during the Democratic majoritarian and the Republican-
controlled sessions.                                                                                                                                          
I further test the Black Caucus’ coalition formation success using logistic 
regression analysis. In the logistic analysis, I am interested in the likelihood that SCLBC 
members will create a successful coalition to advance salient minority legislation or build 
a successful coalition to defeat anti-minority measures. The unit of analysis is the 
coalition formation vote.  The dependent variable, coalition vote success, takes on a value 
of 1 if the coalition’s member’s vote on the measure is successful and 0 otherwise. Given 
the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable (whether or not the coalition member 
roll call vote was a success), logistic regression is the most suitable method of analysis. 
To test the SCLBC coalition formation success, a set of seven logistic regression 
analyses (one for each coalition category already identified) are conducted. Additionally, 
as previously discussed, prior research shows that white Democratic representatives are 
more likely than Republicans to coalesce with black legislators. Therefore, I control for 
partisanship of the coalition voting member; 1 if the voting member is Republican, 0 if  
Democrat. I also control for race of the legislator, 0 = black; 1 = non-black. I exclude  





Table 5.1 and 5.2 summarizes the coalitions' frequency results. The empirical  
findings displayed fit the theoretical expectations. For many issues, the Democratic 
coalition consisting of white Democrats and black lawmakers dominates the Republican 
coalition during the 109th and 110th sessions. As Table 5.1 shows, the most frequently 
emerging coalition under the Democratic-controlled House sessions is the Democratic 
coalition, which occurs on 52% of the roll-call votes. Simply put, SCLBC members and 
white Democrats coalesce on average over 50 percent of the time on all roll call votes 
involving salient minority issue legislation.  Also, being part of the dominant party was a 
critical factor in producing the Caucus’ victories. The party coalition results show the 
Democratic coalition was victorious 89% of the time it formed on roll call votes.  As a 
consequence, the caucus benefited from membership in the majority Democratic Party. 
The second most common coalition during the Democratic-controlled era is the 
consensus vote. The consensus coalition vote emerges 17% of the time during the 109th 
and 110th Sessions.  As expected, given the definition of the consensus coalition voting 
pattern, the coalition position prevailed 100% of the time.  Not surprisingly, the race 
coalitions emerges only 15% of the time. The low frequency for the race coalition 
variable suggests that when white Democrats were forced to choose between voting with 
conservative white Republicans or Legislative Black Caucus members on divisive issues,  
they were nearly five times as likely to stay with their party colleagues over their race 
affinity. Despite the differences in their racial identity with SCLBC members, white 
Democrats did not choose race over party loyalty. The unholy alliance between black 









       Table 5.1   Coalitions Formation in Democratic-Controlled 109th and 110th House Sessions 
         ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coalition Type  
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
        Democratic   Race     Consensus     Unholy   Individualistic      Republican         Negative  
                                                         Veto    
      Issue 
       ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       All Bills    52    15      17      2    3          3                         8    
 
       Education   44    22      18      3    3          2             8    
 
       Affirmative  58      8      14      0    2          3           15 
       Action/ 
       Discrimination,   
 
       Elections   47    20      16      5    2          2             8    
    
       Health/ Welfare              57    11          19      4    3          3                         3 
       Economic   49      9      27      2    4          2             7   
       Empowerment 
 
       Criminal Justice  55    20      10      0    3          5             7   
        Frequency of  
        Coalition Success            88    15     100                 11                 22          2                        38 
      _________________________________________________________________________________________________________               




A review of the data shows that the unholy alliance between black lawmakers and 
white Republicans occurs only during roll call votes for issues involving elections more 
than on any other substantive measure studied. In fact, the unholy coalition formed 
primarily during redistricting roll call votes. The emergence of an unholy alliance 
between black lawmakers and white Republicans to shape redistricting so that both 
groups gain members in the legislature at the expense of white Democrats has been 
previously observed by legislative scholars. Most noteworthy, however, is the fact that 
SCLBC members and white Republicans never formed an unholy alliance on affirmative 
action/discrimination or criminal justice issues. Presumably, the absence of an unholy 
alliance on these issue may be an artifact of white Republicans unwillingness to side with 
black lawmakers on any substantive affirmative action or discrimination measure.   
Turning explicitly to coalition votes that include negative veto of an issue, overall, 
only 8% of the total negative veto roll call votes involve anti-minority legislation. 
However, 38% of the time SCLBC members successfully formed negative veto coalitions 
to derail the sponsored anti-minority legislation. In the affirmative action and 
discrimination legislation category, SCLBC members were forced to create negative veto 
coalitions 15% of the time to combat anti- minority measures proposed in this substantive 
area. Affirmative action issues constitute the highest percentage of any measures within  
the negative veto category.  
Undoubtedly, the absence of an unholy alliance coalition and the frequency of the 
negative veto coalition involving affirmative action issues suggests that during the 109th 
and 110 House sessions, the Republican lawmakers were the legislators pushing anti-




colleagues to help thwart the Republican efforts. In sum, as expected, the SCLBC 
members were very successful in utilizing Democratic coalition to help pass their salient 
black issue measures. They were also marginally successful in forming negative veto 
coalitions to reject the bulk of anti-minority legislation introduced during the 
Democratic-controlled sessions.  
Table 5.2 depicts the coalition formations frequency, and the success results from 
the sessions under the Republican Party's control. In the coalitions analyses that emerge 
during the roll-call votes in the 114th, 115th, and 119th, Republican-dominated House 
Sessions, intriguing differences appear in the various coalitions formation frequency 
when compared to the Democratic majority House Sessions.  
The Republican coalition frequency average of 40% is greater than the mean of 
any other coalition formed during all roll call votes. On the other hand, the Democratic 
coalition formation average is a mere 14% of all roll call votes studied.  The Republican 
coalition is also the dominant coalition formed on each group of black interest measures 
that involve roll call votes. Its’ frequency ranges from a low of 22% for roll call votes on 
affirmative action legislation to a high of 52% for education related bills. Clearly, the  
Republican Party’s translated its legislative dominance into repeated coalition success 
during roll call votes. Once the Republican Party acquired a majority status in the House, 
the Republican coalition consistently prevailed on most legislative issues. Given their 
majority party status, the Republican majority coalition was victorious 86% of the time  
for all roll call votes taken.  
Not surprisingly, SCLBC members’ attempts to derail anti-minority measures 









  Table 5.2   Coalitions Formation in Republican-Controlled 114th, 115th and 119th House Sessions 
  ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Coalition Type 
   _______________________________________________________________________ 
         Democratic    Race    Consensus       Unholy    Individualistic      Republican       Negative  
                                                                 Veto    
           Issue 
         _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
        All Billsa              14             5         10                 2      3                      40                    26                        
   
        Education  14      3         10       0      5           52           16    
 
        Affirmative    9      2           6         0      2           22           59 
        Action/Disc. 
 
        Elections    17      6            8         2      2           43           22    
    
        Health/Welfare    16      3          11       0      3           42                     25 
        Economic   15      5          15       2      4           45           14   
        Empowerment 
 
        Criminal Justice   13      7            12       0      3           41           21      
        Frequency of  
        Coalition Success 28     15          100              75                  22           86                     13           
        __________________________________________________________________________________________________      




led sessions. The black lawmakers’ negative veto coalition alliances average on all bills 
saw an increase from 8% during the Democratic Party led House Sessions to 26% during 
the Republican majority House Sessions. The sharp rise in the black lawmakers’ negative 
veto alliance frequency is indicative of the level of anti-minority legislation that the 
Republican legislators introduced. Yet, despite a three-fold increase in their negative veto 
coalition building frequency, the SCLBC members’  overall success percentage was a 
mere 13%.  
A look at each substantive issue group shows that it is on the potentially divisive 
issues of affirmative action and discrimination, elections, and health and welfare 
measures, where the negative veto coalition are particularly likely to form. For example, 
SCLBC members were forced to build strategic negative veto coalitions on 59% of all 
roll call votes involving affirmative action measures. They also formed negative veto 
coalitions 22% of the time during roll call votes on elections bills and 25% of the time on 
Health and Welfare measures. 
However, given the Republicans' dominance in the House, these negative veto  
coalitions very often failed to block these anti-minority measures. Not surprisingly, the  
consensus coalition rate is a mere 6% on affirmative action measures. The small 
consensus coalition frequency in contrast to the overwhelmingly high negative veto 
coalition percentages clearly expresses the Republicans reluctance to advance any 
meaningful black interest legislation coupled with their willingness to place more anti-  
minority legislation on the legislative agenda.  
No unholy coalitions occurred between the black lawmakers and the Republican 




Republican   majority House sessions. The absence of an unholy coalition suggests that 
the bulk of the sponsored minority interest legislation were Republican-sponsored 
measures, and the black lawmakers considered those measures to be anti-minority 
legislation.  They were thus, required more often during roll call votes to form 
strategically negative veto coalitions to derail these Republican sponsored minority 
interest measures.  
In sum, overall as expected, the level of the Black Caucus success is much lower 
during the Republican-controlled House sessions when compared to their Democratic 
House success. The SCLBC members’ inability to acquire the white Republican 
legislators’ support is evidently instrumental in accounting for their Democratic coalition 
low success rate to advance salient black interest measures. Moreover, despite an increase 
in the frequency of SCLBC members’ negative veto coalition formations during the 
Republican majority House, as compared to the Democratic-controlled House, the black 
lawmakers were unable to achieve a higher level of success in blocking anti-minority 
interest legislation.  
Additionally, this research employs logistic regression analysis to test the extent  
that SCLBC members strategically utilize roll call voting coalitions to advance salient 
minority interest measures or attempt to derail anti-minority bills. A total of 14 logistic 
regression models were run; seven for the coalitions formed during the Democratic-led 
sessions and seven for the majoritarian Republican-led sessions. Table 5.3 reports the 
results for the logistic regression models for the 109th and 110th Democratic-led House  
Sessions. Table 5.4 contains the 114th, 115th, and 119th Republican majoritarian House 




for my two hypotheses. A comparative reading of the findings show that SCLBC 
members’ coalition formations success varies significantly across the substantive issues 
and sessions studied. As expected, SCLBC members Democratic coalitions formed to 
advance significant minority legislation were highly successful during the Democratic-
controlled 109th and 110th sessions  but were less successful during the Republican-
controlled 114th, 115th, and 119th Legislative Sessions.  
For example, successful Democratic coalitions were significantly formed to 
advance affirmative action measures (coefficient 0.169, significant at the 0.10 alpha 
level) during the 109th and 110th Sessions but were less successful on these same issues 
(coefficient -0.297) during the Republican-dominated 114th, 115th, and 119th Sessions. 
Similarly, Democratic coalitions formed in roll call voting around measures involving 
South Carolina elections  (coefficient 0.046, significant .05 alpha level) were more 
successful during the Democratic-controlled sessions in comparison to the same 
coalitions formed during the Republican-led sessions (coefficient -0.603).   
Moreover, SCLBC members were minimally successful in forming unholy  
coalitions with Republicans involving election measures during the Democratic-
controlled sessions as shown by the log odds coefficient (-2.945) but were marginally 
more successful in their unholy coalitions with Republicans during the Republican-led 
sessions (-0.695). A review of the data shows, as the literature suggests, that the unholy 
coalitions that occur between Republicans and the SCLBC members were on election 
measures that centered on redistricting issues. 
Also, looking at the SCLBC members’ negative veto coalition success rate during 









             Table 5.3   Logistic Regression Analysis of Coalitions Formations -Democratic-Controlled House                         
             Sessions (109th-110th) (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses) (N= 112) 
               _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                                                                                
                                        Democratic       Race Unholy         Individualistic      Republican       Negative Veto 
               _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant        1.252      -0.693  -2.723             0.237     -0.223              1.253***      
          (0.567)      (1.225).  0.471)             (0.679)               (0.671)             (0.402) 
                 
Education               0.827             0.196          0.118  0.187                -1.030              -2.639**  
          (1.203)          (0.986)         (0.406) (0.521)               (0.845)             (0.376)                                  
 
Affirm/ Act.           0.169*           0.693           ____             0.252     -0.757               _____ 
Discrim.                 (0.994)          (0.897)                            (0.368)    (0.953) 
 
Elections                0.046**         0.559  -2.945             0.490                -0.470              -1.253               
                                           (0.863)          (1.546)        (0.697)           (0.723)                (0.908)     (0.844) 
     
Health/.                  0.072             0.289           -3.177             0.233                0.446                -2.169*       
 Welfare        (0.857)           (0.944)        (0.532)           (0.326)               (0.449)              (0.859) 
 
Economic        -0.154      0.786  -2.945   0.550                  -0.875               -1.253  
 Empower        (1.286)          (0.592)         (0.694)           (0.047)               (0.957)              (0.782) 
 
Criminal        0.133        0.529  0.588             0.411                  _______           _____   
 Justice         (1.252)          (0.156)         (0.655)           (0.230) 
  
Parti-ship         0.685**         0.277           -0.102  0.828***    0.545*     0.236        









Race                    0.785     ______           -0.82  0.414      ______            0.256            
       (.363)                   (0.210)         (0.282)                  (0.251) 
 
Pseudo R2                0.109     0.032              0.117             0.225                   0.044               0.143  
         ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 









Table 5.4   Logistic Regression Analysis of Coalitions Formations-Republican-Controlled House Sessions  
(114th,115th, and119th) (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses) (N=526) 
             ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                      
                                        Democratic        Race    Unholy           Individualistic     Republican         Negative Veto     
              __________________________________________________________________________________________________________   
 
Constant                   -1.649*** -0.148          -1.248        -1.649***   1.440***            -0.981*   
                                             (0.604)      (0.488)   (0.613)    0.488)                (0.370)               (0.479)              
 
Education          0.495*       -1.208    -0.405     1.495*               -1.389***           0.312                           
            (0.749)        (0.572)   (0.011)    (0.740)         (0.490)                (0.804)                         
 
Affirm. Act.          -0.297       -1.516             _____     -0.297                0.282                   -0.088**                                        
Discrim.              (0.899)               (0.679)               (0.899)            (0.611)                 (0.549) 
 
Elections          -0.603        -2.079      -0.695        -0.602              0.529                    -0.244*      
            (0.879)               (0.353)             (0.415)       (0.859)              (0.572)                 (0.651)      
 
Health/          1.699 **             -2.015              -0.511          1.699***           0.264                    -0.337                          
 Welfare          (0.584)               (0.489)             (0.335) (0.584)              (0.578)                 (0.430)      
 
Economic          1.361*               1.322          -1.098        1.361**   -0.342                   2.158        
Empower          (0.658)  (0.732)            (0.046)       (0.658)     (0.551)                  (0.746)                                 
 
Criminal          0.998                  0.234           -0.286        0.998                  ______                -1.540** 
Justice           (0.604)  (0.531)            (0.126)       (0.604)          (0.518) 
 
Parti-ship          0.348  0.255             ________        0.524    0.834***         0.585 









Race          .586     1.568**       _______        0.445        _______              1.568**   
           (0.332)     (0.352)                                     (0.220)                                            (0.584) 
 
Pseudo R2         0.0992      0.242         0.352     0.214         0.075  0.078 
         __________________________________________________________________________________________________ 




negative veto coalition success to derail affirmative action/discrimination measures 
during the Democratic-led 109th and 110th sessions. Perhaps the lack of measurable 
negative veto coalitions’ created during these sessions can be attributed to the Democratic 
lawmakers’ disinclination to place anti-minority legislation on the legislative agenda21. 
Additionally, the logistic regression coefficient (-1.253) involving negative veto 
coalitions formed around election issues indicate a negative relationship between the log 
odds and the success of the coalition formation involving roll call vote on election issues. 
In other words, as the log odds of the number of roll call vote to advance election issues 
increase, the log odds of a successful negative veto coalition occurrence decrease. The 
results indicate that SCLBC members were in agreement with the substantive nature of 
most election measures proposed during these House sessions. The statistically 
significant coefficient for the negative veto coalition involving education issues -2.639, 
(significant at the .01, alpha level) also shows SCLBC members’ strong satisfaction with 
most of the roll call votes on this issue category during Democratic-led sessions, hence 
their need to infrequently create negative veto coalitions in this issue area.  
However, during the Republican-controlled sessions, SCLBC members’ negative 
veto coalition for the affirmative action variable has a coefficient of -0.188 (significant at 
the .05 alpha level). In this instance, the affirmative action variable coefficient also 
indicates that a negative relationship exists between the Republican-led House 
lawmakers’ attempts to advance affirmative action/discrimination measures and the 
success of increased strategic efforts by black lawmakers to derail these measures. 
______________________________________ 
21 The affirmative action variable in the Negative Veto Category was dropped by Stata for 





Overall, the coefficient shows that SCLBC members enjoyed very minimal negative veto 
success in this issue category.  
The negative veto coalition involving the election variable during roll call voting 
follows a similar pattern. The logistic coefficient for elections measures (coefficient of -
0.244 significant at the 0.05 alpha level) shows that as the Republicans attempt to push 
anti-minority legislation increased, the SCLBC members’ efforts to successfully thwart 
these measures decrease.   
Generaly, the parameter estimates of the SCLBC members’ negative veto 
coalition variable during the Republican-led sessions is a reflection of the Republican’s 
tendency to repel the vast majority of SCLBC- led negative veto coalitions. Although the 
increased number of anti-minority measures forced SCLBC members to escalate their 
efforts to block these sponsored bills, their overall success rate is much less when 
compared to the Democratically-controlled sessions.  
This analysis now turns to the odd ratios of each variable of interest previously 
examined in the logistic regression analysis. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 presents the odds 
ratio results for the log odds analyses. As earlier stated in Chapter 4, an odds ratio 
indicates the amount the odds of the dependent variable change for each unit change in 
the independent variable. An odds ratio of less than one means that the odds of the 
dependent variable decrease as the independent variable increases (a negative 
relationship). An odds ratio equal to one means that the odds do not change as the 
independent variable increases (no relationship). Also, an odds ratio greater than 1 means 
that the odds of the dependent variable increase as the independent variable increases. 




the odds-ratio of the SCLBC members’ coalition formation efforts during the 
Democratic– Controlled 109th and 110th House Sessions and the Republican-led 114th, 
115th and 119th House Sessions. To begin with, the results in Table 5.5 shows that in the 
Democratic-led 109th  and 110th Sessions, the Democratic coalition odds-ratio results for 
affirmative action, were 1.184 times significantly more likely to successfully form 
(approximately 18.4 percent higher ) than any other coalitions formed around this issue. 
In other words, the odds for a successful Democratic alliance around roll call votes on 
affirmative action issues was 18% greater than other coalitions’ odds ratios on this 
Subject. 
The odds ratio also shows that Democratic coalitions were 1.047 times 
significantly more likely to be successful around election issues and approximately 2.286 
times significantly more likely to be successfully formed around education matters than 
any other alliance formed on these subjects during roll call votes in the Democratic- led 
House.  
However, the results in Table 5.6 show that SCLBC members Democratic 
coalition efforts were less successful during the Republican-led sessions. The odds of 
Democratic coalition success on affirmative action roll call votes during the Republican-
led sessions are .743 to 1 and.547 to 1 for roll call votes on election measures. These odd 
ratios mean that there is only approximately a 25% chance of a Democratic coalition 
being successful on roll call votes involving affirmative action measures and a little less 
than a 50-50 chance of this coalition being successful on roll call votes comprising 
election measures. Conversely, the Republican coalitions are 1.326 times more likely to 








Table 5.5   Odds Ratio Analysis of Coalition Type Formation Success: (N= 112) 
              ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                  Democratic-Controlled House Sessions (109th -110th)       
                            
                      Democratic   Race         Unholy       Individualistic  Republican       Negative Veto             
           ________________________________________________________________________________________________    
 
Constant 3.497          0.500 0.066        1.267    0.800              3.500          
                 
Education  2.286                  1.217         1.125        1.206               0.357              0.071**  
     
Affirm Act./        1.184*                0.797             ____        1.287               0.468                ______  
Discrim.            
 
Elections                      0.047**    1.75             0.053          1.632    0.625              0.286  
 
Health/ Welf.  1.075                  1.335            0.042        1.264               1.563              0.114*        
 
Economic             0.857                2.195 -2.945         1.733               0.416              0.286  
 Empower   
 
Crim./Just.  1.142       1.697 1.800        1.508    _____              _____ 
    
Partisanship  1.984**    1.319 0.903        2.289***               1.725*  1.266 
 
Coalition Member’ 2.192      ______             0.440        1.513                     ______  1.292 
 Race 
Pseudo R2                             0.109      0.032                      0.117          0.225                        0.044            0.143 
                 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 








Table 5.6   Odds ratio Analysis of Coalition Type Formation Success (N=526) 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                         Republican-Controlled House Sessions (114th, 115th and 119th)           
                          
                                                       Democratic     Race               Unholy              Individualistic        Republican       Negative Veto 
              ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Constant 0.192***       0.862        0.287          0.192***     4.222***        0.375*            
 
Education         4.457*            0.298                0.667          4.457*                 0.249***        1.366 
 
Affirm. Act./         0.743              0.220                 ____          0.743                 1.326        0.828**  
Discrim..      
 
Elections         0.547       0.125         0.499                0.547                 1.697        0.783*        
     
Health/Welf.         5.474**          0.133                 0.601          5.473***     1.303                  0.713            
     
Economic                3.901*       3.750         0.333           3.900**      0.711         8.667 
Empower. 
     
Crim. Just.         2.713          1.264         0.751          2.713                  ______          0.214**  
 
Partisanship         1.416       1.291         _______          1.689      2.303***          1.795  
 
Coalition Member’s        1.797       4.797**              _______          1.561                      _______          4.797 
Race 
Pseudo R2                                        0.0992       0.242                 0.352                0.214      0.075          0.078 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________  




successful on roll call votes on elections bills.  
But, surprisingly, the Democratic coalition during roll call voting, were also 4.45 
times more likely to develop successfully around education issues and approximately 
5.50 times more likely on Health and Welfare issues.  These results may be artifacts of 
SCLBC members constituting the majority numbers within the chamber’s minority   
Democratic Party coupled with their strategically planned majority membership numbers 
on the House Education and Public Works Committee. It may also be the result of their 
large membership numbers on the Health and Welfare Committee as well. 
It is important to keep in mind that a negative veto coalition odds ratio result   
shows the success ratio of SCLBC members’ efforts to derail anti-minority legislation 
sponsored in that substantive area. In Table 5.5 the odds ratio results show that overall 
approximately 71.4% of the time, SCLBC members formed a successful negative veto 
coalition to derail anti-minority election measures during the Democratic-led House 
sessions.  On the other hand, the results in Table 5.6 indicate that they were significantly 
successful only 21.7% of the time to form negative veto coalitions to block anti-minority 
related bills in the same substantive area during roll call votes in the Republican-led 
sessions.  
Also, approximately only 17.2% of the time were SCLBC members more likely to 
build a successful negative veto coalition to derail anti-affirmative action bills. Their 
overall negative veto efforts were slightly higher in regards to education-related bills 
where they were more likely to be successful 1.366 of the time to negatively veto 
measures involving education issues.  Clearly, their negative veto coalition efforts were 




the period under Democratic control. In sum, the overall logistic and odds ratio results, 
lend support to both coalition hypotheses.  
Conclusion 
Recall that in Chapter 2, I articulated the theory that SCLBC members will seek 
strategic coalitions to either advance significant minority issue legislation or attempt to 
derail anti-minority bills. The analysis conducted in this chapter presents much evidence 
to address my theoretical expectations. First, the findings show that which political party 
controls the House clearly affects SCLBC members’ coalition success efforts. In most 
instances, during the Republican majoritarian control sessions, the white Republicans did 
not frequently coalesce with black lawmakers to either help pass pro-minority legislation 
or block anti-minority bills, as measured by unholy alliances or negative veto coalition 
success results.  
Contrary to Swain and other scholars that view white legislators as working to 
provide meaningful representation to black constituents at a comparable level as black 
lawmakers, the evidence suggests otherwise. In fact, the evidence suggests that white 
Republican legislators were continually working to diminish the black lawmakers’ 
legislative efforts to provide meaningful representation through successful coalitions 
created to push salient black interest legislation forward or to derail anti-minority 
measures. As a consequence of the white Republican’s reluctance or unwillingness to 
coalesce, SCLBC members were less effective in their alliance formation efforts to 
represent their black constituents’ interests during the politically constrained Republican 





Second, consistent with existing literature, the black lawmakers, and white 
Republicans were only able to coalesce successfully around redistricting issues. As 
detailed earlier, these two legislative groups agreed to form negative veto coalitions 
during the 110th Legislative Session to thwart the white Democrats efforts to maintain 
their legislative majority. This unholy coalition subsequently led to an increase in the 
number of black-majority districts, along with the Republican Party assuming eventual 
control of the South Carolina General Assembly.  
Perhaps, once the white Republicans became the majority party in the House, they 
no longer felt the need to coalesce with the black lawmakers. The Republicans’ behavior 
in this instance confirms the minimum winning coalition idea because they primarily 
form instrumental alliances with the SCLBC until a Republican Party majority gained 
control of the House. Once the Republicans achieve majoritarian party status, there is no 
more evidence of unholy coalition formations between the two groups. Also, the lack of 
unholy coalition formations during Republican majoritarian is in keeping with extant 
research on coalition formation which indicates that a significant factor in the decision of 
whether or not to form an alliance is the extent of the groups’ identity differences (Bell 
and Delaney 2001).  
Finally, there was a variation regarding the coalition success frequency. This 
variation can be attributed to the substantive issue of the legislation involved in the roll 
call vote.  The black lawmakers were more successful in organizing successful coalitions 
on non-controversial matters of substance such as education and economic 





Also, consensus coalitions, whereby the majority members of all three factions 
vote in the same direction, were formed at a much higher rate during the Democratically-
controlled House as opposed to those legislative sessions led by the Republican Party. In 
sum, the objective evidence shows that although the SCLBC members’ coalition success 
results varies  during both the Democratically-controlled and Republican-controlled 
House, their chances of success for either advancement of meaningful black interest 
legislation or derailment of anti-minority legislation is markedly less during the 
Republican majoritarian sessions. 
In the concluding chapter, I would like to synthesize and summarize the overall 
findings presented in this project. In addition to the summary, I would also like to suggest 
a few implications related to the SCLBC members’ strategic representation behavior that 






CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the finding and explores the implications of the findings 
contained in this work. Essentially, this research was initiated to determine whether 
SCLBC members provide effective descriptive representation in a politically constrained 
legislative environment by strategically engaging in three specific legislative activities.  
At the outset of this research, questions were raised regarding the existence of strategic 
representation among SCLBC members as they carry out their legislative agenda in the 
South Carolina House of Representatives. This research sought to explore three specific 
questions. First do SCLBC members engage in strategic sponsorship of black interest 
legislation? Second, do SCLBC members make strategic requests for committee 
assignments? Third, do SCLBC members strategically form coalitions to advance salient 
black issue measures or block anti-minority legislation?  
To seek answers to these questions, I first examine the black lawmakers’ strategic 
bill introduction choice and subsequent passage of those measures in Chapter 3. I also 
examine their strategic committee assignment requests in Chapter 4 and next analyze 
their strategic coalition formations and negative veto alliances in Chapter 5. 
In this chapter, I briefly summarize the results of this dissertation, focusing on the 
three legislative activities that were hypothesized to impact the black lawmaker’s  




passage, strategic committee assignments requests, and strategic coalition formations. 
Overall, the findings show that black lawmakers do engage in strategic representation in 
the South Carolina House of Representatives. Also, in some instances, their strategic 
representation behavior does lead to substantive legislative outcomes favoring their black 
constituents’ interests. 
Chapter 3’s findings involving SCLBC members’ bill introductions and 
subsequent passage of those measures show that the black lawmakers overall bill 
introduction effort is only occasionally significant. It was statistically significant only 
during the 115th, Republican-led session.  This chapter also discussed the results obtained 
in the examination involving SCLBC member’s strategic bill introduction choice. I find 
that the racial background of the black lawmakers is a significant predictor of bill 
introduction involving primary (black interest) legislation regardless of party control.  
This finding is consistent with existing scholarly black legislative representation research. 
As the literature suggest (Swain1991; Whitby, 1997), all things being equal, black 
lawmakers are more likely to introduce more pro-black legislation than white lawmakers. 
However, only when non-minority based legislation (secondary measures) is involved, 
the caucus member’s race is a robust significant predictor of bill sponsorship but only 
during the Republican-led sessions.  
With regards to the bill passage models, this examination finds that the black 
legislator’s race alone is not a significant predictor for passage of SCLBC sponsored 
black interest measures irrespective of which political party controls the legislative 
chamber. But, the SCLBC bill passage model involving the 109th and 110th Sessions 




House sessions is a significant predictor of passage for SCLBC sponsored non-black 
measures. 
The instances in which strategic representation occurs, though are not restricted to 
bill sponsorship and bill passage, the typical legislative activities examined by empirical 
scholars of black descriptive legislative representation. The outcomes involving SCLBC 
members’ committee appointment requests and coalition formations show that both 
legislative activities sometimes provide the opportunity for SCLBC members to engage 
in effective strategic descriptive representation for their black constituents.  
In Chapter 4, I find that SCLBC members are strategic in their committee 
assignment requests as measured by their black interest committee appointments.  
There is consistent evidence that the black lawmakers’ committee appointments to black 
interest committees were statistically significant irrespective of which political party 
controlled the House chamber. The evidence further suggests that SCLBC members were 
also strategic in their requests for appointments to prestige committees as well. These 
robust findings involving SCLBC members’ appointments clearly indicate that they did 
engage in some form of strategic consultation involving their committee preferences. 
What is less clear, however, is whether their strategic committee assignments efforts had 
a positive effect upon their black interest bills overall passage rate previously discussed 
in Chapter 3.   
In Chapter 5, I utilized House roll call votes to examine the question of whether 
SCLBC members strategically form alliances to advance black interest measures and 
negative veto coalitions to block anti-minority legislation. With regards to coalitions 




substantive content of the measure on which the roll call vote occurs has an impact.  
Also, in every model that examines alliance formations, the political party control 
variable always has a significant effect for the creation of both Democratic and 
Republican coalitions.  The model examining Democratic coalitions formed during 
Democratic-control sessions show that this coalition was significantly more likely to 
occur around advancement of salient black interest bills involving affirmative action and 
elections more often than the Republican-led coalition for these same measures. In this 
instance, the black lawmakers’ membership in the majoritarian political party that 
controlled the legislative chamber at that time, more than likely produces this result. The 
measures’ substantive content also have an impact on coalition formations during some 
Republican-led sessions. 
However, the caucus members’ strategic coalition efforts can be more readily 
seen in their negative veto coalition created to block anti-minority measures. These 
findings are unique for the following reason. Heretofore the measure involving negative 
veto of unwanted anti-minority legislation has been previously overlooked in studies 
involving black descriptive state level representation. Substantively, this work moves 
black legislative representation research forward. As I have previously argued, black 
legislative representation occurs beyond counting the number of bills black legislators 
propose or the number of bills passed. It involves other dimensions of representation. 
Thus, by examining the SCLBC members’ negative veto activities, we can expand the 
existing legislative representation dimensions and thus learn more about the actual impact 
of state-level black descriptive representation.  




party control of the legislative chamber clearly has an impact on the SCLBC members’ 
negative veto coalition success rate. As with the coalition created for black interest 
measures advancement, the negative veto coalitions’ success is also both partisan and 
issue dependent. For affirmative action and election measures, there is evidence that the 
SCLBC members were more likely to build strategic negative veto coalitions to block 
anti-minority measures during Republican-led sessions than during Democratic-
controlled sessions. But these coalitions were statistically more likely to fail during the 
Republican majoritarian sessions as opposed to the Democratic-led sessions.  This 
finding is significant across both the Democrat-controlled as well as Republican-
controlled House sessions.  This finding is also robust when considering the likelihood of 
other successful coalition formations around the same substantive measures.  
In sum, the strategic representation results of this study are unique for a variety of 
reasons. This is the only study that measures black legislative representation in so many 
different ways while also including the usual representation dimension involving bill 
sponsorship and bill passage variables. I also measure the data involving committee 
appointments. This measures involves black lawmakers’ strategic committee preference 
requests. In addition I measure selected roll call votes on black interest legislation. Unlike 
past scholars that examines the descriptive versus substantive representation link strictly 
through an individual legislator’s roll call vote, I measure their representation behavior 
through coalition formations. Moreover, I look at their proactive coalition formation 
behavior geared towards exhibiting their negative preferences involving detrimental anti-
minority legislation. Unmistakably, though, I have found strategic representation to be a 




Despite, the findings presented in this research, other questions and implications 
involving black legislative representation remains. In the remainder of this chapter, I will 
detail how this research fits specifically into the larger body of major empirical works 
involving descriptive legislative representation mentioned in the previous chapters. 
Second, I will consider implications of these findings involving the three additional 
dimensions to descriptive legislative representation, namely strategic bill sponsorship,  
strategic committee assignments requests, and strategic coalition formations.   
6.1 Overview: Strategic Representation in a Politically Constrained 
Legislative Environment 
 
This project expands the study of legislative descriptive representation.  Within 
the vast body of work examining descriptive representation, some scholars argue that 
descriptive representation produces better policy outcomes for blacks (Whitby1997; 
Haynie, 2001; Tate 2003; Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004; Owens, 2005). 
Other scholars argue that descriptive representation may not be only unnecessary for  
salient black interest measures implementation (Swain 1993) but may actually lead to 
poorer policy outcomes for the black constituency (Lublin 1997). This project provides 
support for the first contention raised. 
I find that by utilizing various strategic legislative activities, the South Carolina 
Legislative Black Caucus, have positively affected the substantive outcomes for their 
black constituents. These findings concur with the finding of other scholars (Nelson 
1991; Whitby, 1997; Haynie 2001; Tate, 2003; Owens 2005). It is true I also find that in 
some instances, the black lawmakers’ strategic legislative representational behavior also 
produces adverse substantive representation outcomes as others have argued (Swain, 




politically constrained legislative sessions associated with the Republican Party control of 
the legislative chamber. Even though Swain argues that white legislators may be as good 
at representing black constituency interests as black legislators, despite some of this 
projects’ findings that appear to support this contention, I still disagree with her overall 
conclusion.  
In fact, I find that white Republican lawmakers in the House continually work to 
diminish the black legislators’ efforts to provide meaningful, substantive representation 
to their black constituency. Moreover, I find that the Republican Party cohesion is race-
based and, during the Republican-controlled legislative sessions, rather than using their 
legislative majority to produce beneficial minority based policies, the white Republicans 
took the opposite approach and sponsored more anti-minority interest legislation instead. 
On the vast majority of the measures examined during the Republican-led 
sessions, (even when controlling for the percentage of the black population in the district) 
I find the SCLBC members representing their constituency interest in the Republican-led 
politically constrained legislative environment, do provide better substantive 
representation for black interests than the white Republican lawmakers.  
Also, during some Republican-led legislative sessions, the black legislators’ 
strategic legislative representation efforts at times produce certain positive, substantive 
representation as well. Thus, overall the strategic representation findings in most of the 
dissertation concur more than rebut the literature that descriptive representation produces 
positive substantive outcomes. I find that through utilization of strategic legislative 
behavior, black descriptive representatives in a politically constrained legislative 




constituency interests.  However, unlike where most of the studies find a positive link 
between descriptive and substantive representation through examinations of cumulative 
bill sponsorship and bill passage results, I see black legislators in this study using 
additional strategic legislative activities as added means to provide substantive 
representation. I see strategic bill sponsorship, strategic committee assignments requests, 
and strategic coalition formations generally and negative veto coalitions in particular, as 
strategic legislative measures that produce positive substantive legislative outcomes as 
well.   
6.2: Implications 
The findings of this study have several implications for black descriptive  
representation research. Given the recent rise of the Republican Party majorities in most 
Southern States legislative chambers, and with lingering questions about the effectiveness 
of the minority legislators’ ability to substantively represent minority constituents’ 
interests, it is important to assess black lawmakers’ representation behavior as it occurs in 
a politically constrained legislative environment.  
This study reveals that additional dimensions of representations, should also be 
included in any comprehensive study that involves minority lawmakers’ descriptive 
representation effectiveness particularly when that representation occurs in a politically 
constrained environment.  This work recognizes that descriptive representation also 
occurs through other legislative activities that expands the dimensions of legislative 
representation. This project demonstrates that black lawmakers also represent their 
particular constituency’s interests through strategic expressions of their committee 




passage of salient black interest legislation or conversely, construct strategic coalitions to 
derail anti-minority legislation. 
The hope is that incorporating these strategic representation dimensions into the 
descriptive representation discussion will compel scholars to reassess the state of the 
field.  Inclusion of the above-cited dimensions of representation is critical to analyze 
thoroughly the black lawmakers’ effectiveness, particularly, when they serve as 
representatives of racial minority interests in a state-level legislative chamber controlled 
by members of the opposite political party.   
There are also implications for the study of the legislative black caucus as a 
group. To date, state-level legislative black caucuses have been sparsely studied by 
scholars. This research shows that black caucus members can engage in group strategic 
legislative behavior that leads to positive descriptive representation outcomes. In some 
instances, when the SCLBC members make strategic bill selections, they may also 
increase the likelihood of having more positive outcomes for their sponsored measures.  
However, as important as it is for the SCLBC lawmakers to create and acquire 
eventual passage of black interest substantive policies, it is equally, if not more 
important, for them to prevent passage of anti-minority policies proposed by non-black 
caucus members. Positive outcomes in either instance lead to the black constituency 
interest being substantively represented. Thus, it is imperative that in future black 
descriptive representation studies, scholars incorporate and measure all of the dimensions 
of representation discussed in this project as additional aspects of Black Caucus 






This dissertation adds to the existing literature on legislative description  
representation. The findings involving the SCLBC members’ strategic representation in 
the South Carolina House of Representatives along with various implications were 
presented in this research. As the analyses in this project demonstrate, when we look at 
dimensions of black descriptive representation involving selective bill sponsorship, 
committee assignments preferences and alliances formations, being strategic in these 
legislative undertakings  is likely to show that overall black lawmakers are effective in 
providing substantive representation.  
More importantly, their impact on substantive representation of the black 
constituency interests in a Republican-controlled legislative chamber may be more 
pronounced than we would otherwise believe. But, for black lawmakers to maintain the 
level of efficient descriptive representation that will ultimately lead to consistent 
substantive representation, they must continue to strategically engage in the different 
legislative activities outlined in this research.  
In reality, while the black lawmakers are representing their constituency interests 
in the politically constrained legislative environment, they must increase the amount of 
strategically selected bills they sponsor to increase the likelihood that more of their 
selected bills will pass through the legislative chamber. They must also continue to make 
strategic committee assignments preferences so they can acquire more influence on black 
interest committees. Moreover, they must find a way to increase the success rate of their 





In essence, to consistently override the problematic status quo within the 
Republican-led House requires tremendous positive legislative power that the Black 
Caucus does not currently have. They must, therefore, be strategic in their legislative 
undertakings as they strive to provide effective substantive representation for their black 
constituency interests.  All of the strategic legislative activities discussed in this project 
demonstrate how the representation behavior the Legislative Black Caucus members 
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APPENDIX A –LIST OF CURRENT AND FORMER LEGISLATIVE 
BLACK CAUCUS MEMBERS 
CURRENT CAUCUS MEMBERS (2013-2015) 
REPRESENTATIVES 
Carl Anderson, Chairman 
John R. King, Chairman-Elect 
Harold Mitchell, Jr. Immediate Past Chairman 
Terry Alexander, Chaplin 
 
Justin Bamberg, Parliamentarian 
Robert L. Brown 



















Joseph H. Jefferson, Jr. 
 






Mia S. McLeod 
 
Cezar McKnight, Secretary 
 
Joseph H. Neal 
 




J. Todd Rutherford, House Minority leader 
 
J. David Weeks 
 











Kevin Johnson, Treasurer 
 








Clementa C. Pinckney (Died: 2015) 
 
Ronnie A. Sabb 
 







PREVIOUS CAUCUS MEMBERS 
 
REPRESENTATIVES    SERVED 
Alma Byrd, Richland     1991- 1998 
Amos L. Gourdine, Berkeley    1996-2004 
Anton Gunn, Richland    2008-2010 
 
* Benjamin. J. Gordon,    1973-1991 (Died: 1997) 
Williamsburg-Berkeley 
Bessie Moody-Lawrence, York   1992 - 2008 
Brenda Lee, Spartanburg    1995-2005 
Curtis Inabinett, Charleston-Colleton   1991-2000 
Donald W. Beatty, Spartanburg   1990-1995 
Earl Middleton, Orangeburg    1975-1984    (Died 2007) 
Ennis Fant, Greenville    1989-1991 
Ernest A. Finney, Jr., Sumter    1972-1975 
Floyd Breeland, Charleston    1992 – 2008 
Frank McBride, Richland    1984-1991 
Herbert L. Mitchell, Orangeburg   1984-1986 
* Hudson Barksdale, Spartanburg   1975-1981 (Died: 1986) 
I. S. Leevy Johnson, Richland   1971-72; 75-82 
Isaac C. Joe, Lee-Sumter    1981-1984 
James Faber, Richland    1984-1991 
James Felder      1984-1991 
Jesse E. Hines, Florence-Darlington   1992-2006 
Joe E. Brown, Richland    1986-2006 
 





* Juanita Goggins, York    1974-1978  (Died: 2010) 
 
* Juanita White, Jasper-Beaufort   1980-1996  (Died: 2011) 
 
Julius Murray, Richland    1979-1984 
 
Kenneth Bailey, Orangeburg    1985-1992 
 
Kenneth Kennedy, Williamsburg   1991-2010 
 
Larry Blanding, Sumter    1977-1991 
 
Levola Taylor, Richland    1991-1992 
 
Lucille Whipper, Charleston    1986-1996 
 
* Luther Taylor, Richland    1983-1990  (Died: 1997) 
 
Mack T. Hines, Florence-Marion   1995 -2006 
 
Mary P. Miles, Calhoun-Orangeburg-  1982-1984 
Lexington 
 
Ralph Canty, Sumter     1991- 2000 
 
Robert R. Woods, Charleston    1973-1986 
 
Samuel Foster, York     1981-1992 
 
* Sara V. Shelton, Greenville    1984-1988  (Died: 1994) 
 
* Tee Ferguson, Spartanburg    1983-1990  (Died: 2011) 
 
Theodore Brown, Georgetown-   1994-2000 
Williamsburg-Horry 
 
Thomas D. Broadwater, Richland   1981-1984 
 
Timothy Scott, Charleston    2008-2010 
 
* Tobias Gadson, Sr., Charleston   1981-1984 (Died: 1984) 
 
* Walter Lloyd, Colleton-Beaufort   1994-2005  (Died: 2005) 
 





Willie B. McMahand, Greenville   1992-1998 
 
* Cathy Harvin, Clarendon    2008-2010  (Died: 2010) 
 
SENATORS      SERVED 
 




Frank Gilbert, Florence-    1989-1992 (House: 1983- 1988)  
Darlington      (Died: 1999)    
 
Herbert Fielding, Charleston    1985-1992 (House: 1971-73; 83-84) 
 
* I. DeQuincey Newman,     1983-1985  (Died: 1985) 
Chester-Fairfield-Richland 
 
Kay Patterson, Richland    1985 - 2008 (House: 1975-1985) 
 
Maggie Glover, Florence-    1992-2004 (House: 1989-1992) 
Darlington 
 
McKinley Washington,     1991- 2000 (House: 1975-1990) 
Charleston-Colleton 
 
Theo Mitchell, Greenville    1985-1995 (House: 1975-1984) 
 





APPENDIX B-LEGISLATORS’ OVERALL BILL SPONSORSHIP AND 
BILL PASSAGE BY SESSION AND PARTY 
 
109th SESSION (1991-1992) DEMOCRAT BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                                         BILLS                   BILLS   BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED    PASSED        NOT PASSED 
ALEXANDER, M  D  W              7  2  5 
ALEXANDER, T  D  W             13  1             12 
ANDERSON, R  D  B       1  0  1 
BAILEY, G  D  W                        6              3              3 
BAILEY, J  D  W             36  9                        27 
BARBER, R  D  W  7  3  4 
BAXLEY, J  D  W             13  4  9 
BEATTY, D  D  B  0  0  0 
BENNETT, L  D  W              4  3  1 
BOAN,W  D  W             39  6             33 
BROWN, G  D  W  4  0  4 
BROWN, J  D  B  5  1  4 
BURCH, K  D  W  8  2  6 
BURCH, P M  D  W  9  3  6  
BYRD, A  D  B  0  0  0 
CANTY, R  D  B  0  0  0 
CARNELL, M  D  W               7  3  4 
CHAMBLEE, C  D  W               7  2  5 
COBB-HUNTER  D  B  0  0  0 
CROMER, J  I*  W             37               4             34 
DELLENEY, F  D  W  0  0  0 
ELLIOTT, L  D  W            4  2  2 
FABER, J  D  B  0  0  0 
FARR, T   D  W  9  3  6 
FELDER, J  D  W              12  3  9 
FOSTER, S  D  B               5  1  4 
GENTRY, L  D  W              11  3  8 
GLOVER, M  D  B  1  0  1 
GREGORY, J  D  W             12  8  4 
HARRELSON, J   D  W  9  0  9 
HARRIS, J  D  W              9  5  4 
HARRIS, P  D  W              36             17             19 
HARVIN, C  D  W             24  5              19 




HAYES, R  D  W             15  1             14 
HODGES, J  D  W             14  6  8 
HOLT, D  D  W              8  3  5 
HOUCK, W  D  W  3  0  3  
INABINETTE, C  D  B  2  0  2 
JENNINGS, D  D  W             10  2  8 
JOHNSON, J  D  W  1  0  1 
JOHNSON, J W  D  W  2  0  2 
KENNEDY, K  D  B  0  0  0 
KEMPE, K  D  W  6  1  5 
KEYSERLING, H H D  W             25  8             17 
KINON, M  D  W  1  0  1 
KIRSH, H  D  W             72             17             55 
MANLY, S  D  W             16  4             12 
MARTIN, D  D  B  3  1  2 
MARTIN,L  M  D  W  6  1  5 
MATTOS, J  D  W  3  2  1 
McABEE,  J  D  W             21  9             12 
McBRIDE, F  D  B  0  0  0 
McCRAW, E  D  W  0  0  0 
McELVEEN, J  D  W  6  2  4 
McKAY, W  D  W                        1  0  1                         
McLEOD, E  D  W             14  4             10 
McTEER, D  D  W               9  2  7 
NEILSON, D  D  W  4  0  4 
NETTLES, E  D  W               3  0  3  
PHILLIPS, O  D  W              10  6  4 
RHOAD, T  D  W               6  3  3 
ROGERS, T  D  W             12  1             11 
ROSS, L   D  W  6  3  3 
RUDNICK, I  D  W             70  3             67 
SCOTT, J  D  B  9  0  9 
SHEHEEN, R  D  W               8  2  6 
SHIRLEY, J  D  W  0  0  0 
SHORT, P  D  W  0  0  0 
SMITH, R  D  W             12  1              11 
SNOW, J  D  W             24             12              12  
STODDARD, E  D  W              6  1  5 
TAYLOR, L S  D  B  1  0  1 
TOWNSEND, R  D  W  7  4  5 
TUCKER, J  D  W  7  3  5 
WAITES, C  D  W             25  5              20 
WALDROP, D  D  W             24  3              21 
WHIPPER, L S  D  B  8  3  5 
WHITE, J  D  B              1  0  1 
WILDER, J  D  W  8  2  6 





WILLIAMS, D  D  B              2  0  2 
WILLIAMS, J  D  W  1  0  1 
    
NOTE** ALL SCLBC LEGISLATORS ARE DEMOCRATS (in bold)**          
 
 























109th SESSION (1991-1992) REPUBLICAN BILL SPONSORSHIP 
      BILLS       BILLS    BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED    PASSED           NOT PASSED 
BAKER, B  R  W  3  2  1 
  
BEASLEY, D  R  W              11  2  9 
BROWN, H  R  W  1  0  1 
CATO, H  R  W  3  1  2 
CLYBORNE, H   R  W             17  3             14 
COLE, J   R  W  1  1  0 
COOPER, D  R  W  3  1  2 
CORBETT, K  R  W  2  0  2 
CORK, H  R  W  6  1  5 
CORNING,R     R  W             22  2             20 
FAIR, M   R  W             19  1             18 
FULMER, R  R  W  6  0  6 
GONZALES, S  R  W             13  3              10 
HALLMAN, H  R  W  3  2  1 
HARRISON, J  R  W  4  2  2 
HASKINS, T  R  W  9  1  8 
HENDRICKS, B  R  W              1  0  1 
HUFF, T   R  W               7  4  3 
JASKWHICH, M  R  W             10  1  9 
KEEGAN, T  R  W              11  2  9 
KLAPMAN, J  R  W              2  0  2 
KOON, L  R  W             20  6             14 
LANGFORD, S  R  W  9  0  9 
LITTLEJOHN, L  R  W  2  1  1 
MARCHBANKS, C R  W  0  0  0 
MARTIN, L  R  W             15  1             14 
McCAIN, W  R  W  2  0  2 
McGINNIS, A  R  W  2  0  2 
MEACHAM, R  R  W             13  0             13 
QUINN, R  R  W              17  3             14 
RAMA, J  R  W              31  6             35 
RISER, J   R  W  0  0  0 
SHARPE, C  R  W             10  2  8 
SHISSIAS, J S  R  W  0  0  0 
STURKIE, C  R  W  5  0  5  
STONE, C  R  W  4  1  3 
VAUGHN, L  R  W  2  0  2 
WELLS, C  R  W  1  0  1 
WILKINS, D  R  W                       56             17             39 





WOFFORD, S  R  W  6  1  5 
WRIGHT, D  R  W             22  5             17 
YOUNG, A  R  W  6  1  5 





110th SESSION (1993-1994) DEMOCRAT BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                BILLS                      BILLS    BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED      PASSED         NOT PASSED 
ALEXANDER, M  D  W             10  4  6 
ALEXANDER, T  D  W             27  6              21 
ANDERSON, R  D  B       3  0  3 
ASKINS, H  D  W       1  0  1 
BAILEY, G  D  W                       10  4  6 
BAILEY, J  D  W             45  9             36 
BARBER, R  D  W              13  2              11 
BAXLEY, J  D  W              21  1              20 
BEATTY, D  D  B  3  0  3 
BOAN,W  D  W              14  5  9 
BREELAND, F  D  B  2  1  1 
BROWN, G  D  W               4  0  4 
BROWN, J  D  B             12  2             10 
BYRD, A  D  B  5  0  5 
CANTY, R  D  B  5  0  5 
CARNELL, M  D  W               9  4  5 
CHAMBLEE, C  D  W               5  0  5 
COBB-HUNTER, G D  B             20  1             19 
CROMER, J**  I*  W             53  3             50 
DELLENEY, F  D  W  1  0  1 
ELLIOTT, L  D  W  3  2  1 
FARR, T   D  W             10  2  8 
FELDER, J  D  W             10  3  7 
GOVAN, J  D  B  8  0  8 
HARRELSON, J   D  W  7  0  7 
HARRIS, J  D  W                3  1  2 
HARRIS, P  D  W              26  8             18                            
HARVIN, C  D  W             13  4  9 
HARWELL, B  D  W  8  4  4 
HINES, J  D  B  2  0  2 
HODGES, J  D  W              35  7             28 
HOLT, D  D  W              4  1  3 
HOUCK, W  D  W  9  3  6 
INABINETTE, C  D  B  4  0  4 
JENNINGS, D  D  W             15  6  9 
KENNEDY, K  D  B  4  2  2 
KEYSERLING, W  D  W  9  2  7 
KINON, M  D  W              0  0  0 
KIRSH, H  D  W             88             15             73 
LAW, J   D  W  3  1  2 
MARTIN, M  D  W  9  1  8 
MATTOS, J  D  W              6  1  5 




McCRAW, E  D  W  2  0  2 
McELVEEN, J  D  W             15  2             13 
McKAY, W  D  W                        6  1  5 
McLEOD, E  D  W             17  4             13 
McMAHAND, W D  B  2  1  1 
McTEER, D  D  W             11  2  9 
MOODY-LAWRENCE,  D  B  7  0  7 
NEAL, J   D  B             17  0             17 
NEILSON, D  D  W              23  3             20 
PHILLIPS, O  D  W              16  4             12 
RHOAD, T  D  W             10  4  6 
ROGERS, T  D  W             25  5             20 
RUDNICK, I  D  W             63  1             62 
SCOTT, J  D  B             14  1             13 
  
SHEHEEN, R  D  W             14  8     6 
SNOW, J  D  W             56              20             36 
SPEARMAN, M  D  W  9  2  7 
STILLE, H  D  W  5  1  4 
STODDARD, E  D  W              2  0  2 
TOWNSEND, R  D  W              8  1  7 
TUCKER, J  D  W              14  5  9 
WAITES, C  D  W              11  1             10 
WALDROP, D  D  W             14  3             11 
WHIPPER, L  D  B              11  1             10 
WHITE, J  D  B              2  2  0 
WILDER, D  D  W  7  2  5 
WILDER, J  D  W             12  4  8 
WILKES, T  D  W  8  1  7 





NOTE*   ALL SCLBC LEGISLATORS ARE DEMOCRATS (in bold)*  
 
           ** REPRESENTATIVE L.M. CROMER IS AN INDEPENDENT SO HIS BILLSPONSORSHIP 





110th SESSION (1993-1994) REPUBLICAN BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                  BILLS         BILLS    BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED      PASSED         NOT PASSED 
ALLISON, M  R  W              2  0  2 
  
BAKER, B  R  W  3  2  1 
BROWN, H  R  W               1  0  1 
CATO, H  R  W  5  0  5 
CLYBORNE, H   R  W             13  1             12 
COOPER, D  R  W  5  0  5 
CORNING,R     R  W             38  2             36 
DAVENPORT, G  R  W             42  1             41 
FAIR, M   R  W             32  5             27 
FULMER, R  R  W  4  1  3 
GAMBLE, M  R  W             10  3  7 
GONZALES, S  R  W             23  2              21 
GRAHAM L  R  W  4  0  4 
HALLMAN, H  R  W              6  0  6 
HARRELL, R  R  W  5  2  3 
HARRISON, J  R  W  7  3  4 
HASKINS, T  R  W             10  2  8 
HUFF, T   R  W               4  3  1 
HUTSON, H  R  W  7  1  6 
JASKWHICH, M  R  W             10  0             10 
KEEGAN, T  R  W  8  0  8 
KELLEY, M  R  W  9  0  9 
KLAUBER, J  R  W  7  2  5 
KOON, L  R  W              8  1  7 
LANGFORD, S  R  W  6  2  4 
LITTLEJOHN, L  R  W  4  2  2 
MARCHBANKS, C R  W  2  0  2 
MEACHAM, R  R  W             10  0             12 
QUINN, R  R  W  9  0  9 
RICHARDSON, S  R  W             16  2             14 
RISER, J   R  W  4  4  0 
ROBINSON, A  R  W              11  0              11 
SHARPE, C  R  W             19  0             19 
SHISSIAS, J  R  W             21  5             16 
SIMRILL, J  R  W             22  3             19 
SMITH, R  R  W  7  2  5 
SMITH, W  R  W             13  1             12 
STONE, C  R  W  4  2  2 
STUART, E  R  W  9  4  5 
STURKIE, C   R  W               7  0  7 
THOMAS, P  R  W  4  1  3 




VAUGHN, L  R  W  9  2  7 
WALKER, R  R  W  5  2  3 
WELLS, C  R  W  7  1  6 
WILKINS, D  R  W                       40  9             31 
WITHERSPOON, W R  W  9  1  8 
WOFFORD, S  R  W             17  8  9 
WORLEY, H  R  W  4  0  4 
WRIGHT, D  R  W  8  2  6 
YOUNG, A  R  W  8  1  7 
YOUNG, R  R  W  7  2  5 
 




114th SESSION (2001-2002) DEMOCRAT BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                                                       BILLS        BILLS    BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED     PASSED          NOT PASSED 
ALLEN, K  D  B  1  0  1 
ASKINS, H  D  W               5  1  4 
BALES. D  D  W             17  0              17 
BATTLE, J  D  W  3  1  2 
BOWERS, W  D  W              24  0              24 
BREELAND, F  D  B               1  1  0 
BROWN, G  D  W              2  0  2 
BROWN, J  D  B             34  2              32 
BROWN, R  D  B  5  0  5 
CARNELL, M  D  W              8  4  4 
CLYBURN, W    D  B  7  1  6 
COBB-HUNTER, G D  B             17               1              16 
COLEMAN, C  D  W  4  1  3 
DELLENEY, F  D  W              3  1  2 
EMORY, E  D  W  1  1  0 
FREEMAN, M  D  W  3  2  1 
GOURDINE, A  D  B  1  0  1 
GOVAN, J  D  B               4  1  3 
HARVIN, C  D  W              5  1  4 
HAYES, J  D  W  4  4  0 
HINES, J  D  B               1  0  1 
HINES, M  D  B  3  0  3 
HOSEY, L  D  B  0  0  0 
HOWARD, L  D  B  2  1  1 
JENNINGS, D  D  W              10  4  6 
KENNEDY, K  D  B               3  1  2 
KIRSH, H  D  W              54  6              48 
LEE, B   D  B  3  1  2 
LLOYD, W  D  B  2  0  2 
LOURIE, J  D  W              13  3              10 
MACK, D  D  B  0  0  0 
McCRAW, E  D  W              1  0  1 
McLEOD, W  D  W             12  4  8 
MILLER, V  D  W              13  5  8 
MOODY-LAWRENCE D  B              7  0  7 
NEAL, J M  D  W  1  0  1 
NEAL, J H  D  B              8  0  8 
NEILSON, D  D  W              3  1  2 
OTT, H   D  W  7  3  4 
PARKS, J  D  B  3  1  2 
PHILLIPS, O  D  W               2  2  0 
RHOAD, T  D  W               1  1  0 




RUTHERFORD, J  D  B  5  0  5 
SCOTT, J  D  B                7  1  6 
SHEHEEN, V  D  W  2  0  2 
SMITH, F  D  B  2  1  1 
SMITH, J  D  W             22  5              17 
SNOW, J  D  W             11  2  9 
STILLE, H  D  W              8  4  4 
WEEKS, D  D  B  0  0  0 
WHATLEY, M  D  W  2  0  2 
WHIPPER, J  D  B              12  1              11 
WILDER, D  D  W               4  1  3 
 
DEMOCRATS  (54) 
     
SCLBC LEGISLATORS  (24)       








114th SESSION (2001-2002) REPUBLICAN BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                                                                                            BILLS                    BILLS         BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED     PASSED              NOT 
PASSED 
ALLISON, M  R  W              13  1              12 
ALTMAN, J  R  W              50  3              47 
BARFIELD, L  R  W              4  0  4 
BARRETT, J  R  W              11  1              10 
BINGHAM, K  R  W  9  1  8 
CAMPSEN, G  R  W              39  8              31 
CATO, H  R  W              37              19              18 
CHELLIS, C  R  W  3  1  2 
COATES, M  R  W  5  2  3 
COOPER, D  R  W               9  1  8 
COTTY, B  R  W  7  1  6 
DANTZLER, T  R  W  1  0  1 
DAVENPORT, G  R  W             32  2              30 
EASTERDAY, M  R  W              13  1              12 
EDGE, T   R  W  9  2  7 
FLEMING, R  R  W              11  1              10 
FRYE, M  R  W  2  1  1 
GILHAM, J  R  W  6  1  5 
HAMILTON, G  R  W  3  0  3 
HARRELL, R  R  W              9  1  8 
HARRISON, J  R  W             57              11              46 
HASKINS, G  R  W  4  0  4 
HINSON, S  R  W  8  1  7 
HUGGINS, C  R  W              10  3  7 
KEEGAN, T  R  W              10  2  8 
KELLEY, M  R  W              20  3              17 
KLAUBER, J  R  W              14  3              11 
KNOTTS, J  R  W              56  2              54 
KOON, L  R  W               5  0  5 
LAW, J   R  W              11  2  9 
LEACH, R  R  W  4  0  4 
LIMEHOUSE, H  R  W              17  2              15 
LITTLEJOHN, L  R  W               7  1  6 
LOFTIS, D  R  W              13  1              12 
LUCAS, J  R  W  7  0  7 
MARTIN, B  R  W  6  1  5 
McGEE, J  R  W             20  3             17 
MEACHAM-R-R  R  W              11  2  9 
MERRILL, J  R  W              10  3  7 
OWENS, D  R  W  4  2  2 
OWENS P D  R  W  0  0  0 




QUINN, R  R  W               8  1  7 
RICE, R   R  W  6  2  4 
RISER, J   R  W               1  1  0 
ROBINSON, A  R  W              15  1              14 
RODGERS, E  R  W              31  7              24 
SANDIFER, W  R  W              10  2  8 
SCARBOROUGH, W R  W  9  3  6 
SHARPE, C  R  W              28  6              22 
SIMRILL, J  R  W              15  0              15 
SINCLAIR, P  R  W  5  0  5 
SMITH, D  R  W  1  1  0 
SMITH, G  R  W  4  1  3 
SMITH, J R  R  W              7  3  4 
SMITH, W  R  W             14  2              12 
STUART, E  R  W              1  0  1 
TALLEY, S  R  W             14  2              12 
TAYLOR, J  R  W             14  5  9 
THOMPSON, M  R  W  8  0  8 
TOWNSEND, R  R  W              36              13              23 
TRIPP, D  R  W  5  1  4 
TROTTER, T  R  W              1  1  0 
VAUGHN, L  R  W             12  4  8 
WALKER, R  R  W              7  2  5 
WEBB, B  R  W  0  0  0 
WHITE, W B   R  W              16  1              15 
YOUNG, A  R  W              11  2  9 






115th SESSION (2003-2004) REPUBLICAN BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                                                       BILLS        BILLS    BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED     PASSED          NOT PASSED 
ALTMAN, J  R  W              53  0             53 
BARFIELD, L  R  W              3  2  1 
BINGHAM, K  R  W  9  2  7 
CATO, H  R  W              42             10             32 
CEIPS, C  R  w              13  1             12 
CHELLIS, C  R  W  6  1  5 
CLARK, K  R  W  2  0  2 
CLEMMONS, A  R  W  9  5  6 
COATES, M  R  W  6  0  6 
COOPER, D  R  W              18  6             12 
COTTY, B  R  W              11  3  8 
DANTZLER, T  R  W               2  0  2 
DAVENPORT, G  R  W              41  2             39 
DELLENEY, F  R  W               6  2  4 
DUNCAN, J  R  W              10  4  6 
EASTERDAY M E R  W  5  2  3 
EDGE, T   R  W             20  3             17 
FRYE, M  R  W  3  1  2 
FUNDERBURK L S R  W  0  0  0 
GILHAM, J  R  W  3  1  2 
HAGOOD, B  R  W  8  0  8 
HAMILTON, G  R  W  5  4  1 
HARRELL, R  R  W             16  4             12 
HARRISON, J  R  W             40             10                 30 
HASKINS, G  R  W  6  0  6 
HERBKERSMAN, W R  W  7  1  6 
HINSON, S  R  W              11  2  9 
HUGGINS, C  R  W             10  0             10 
KEEGAN, T  R  W               7  1  6 
KOON, L  R  W               7  0  7 
LEACH, R  R  W             24  0             24 
LIMEHOUSE, H  R  W              17  2             15 
LITTLEJOHN, L  R  W               7  2  5 
LOFTIS, D  R  W             12  1              11 
LUCAS, J  R  W             11  4  7 
MAHAFFEY, J  R  W  3  1  2 
MARTIN, B  R  W  4  0  4 
McGEE, J  R  W  6  1  5 
MERRILL, J  R  W             13  0              13 
OWENS, P  R  W  2  1  1 
PERRY, R  R  W  1  0  1 
PINSON, L  R  W  2  0  2 




PITTS, M  R  W             11  2  9 
QUINN, R  R  W               8  1  7 
RICE, R F  R  W              11  0              11 
RICHARDSON, R  R  W              6  3  3 
SANDIFER, W  R  W             12  9  3 
SCARBOROUGH, W R  W             10  0             10 
SIMRILL, J  R  W               5  0  5 
SINCLAIR, P  R  W  7  0  7 
SKELTON, B R  R  W  3  1  2 
SMITH, D  R  W  0  0  0 
SMITH, G M  R  W             38  4             34 
SMITH, G R  R  W  2  0  2 
SMITH, J R  R  W              7  2  5 
SMITH, W D  R  W             18  0             18 
STEWART, J  R  W  3  0  3 
STILLE, H  R  W             14  2             12 
TALLEY, S  R  W             17  3             14 
TAYLOR, J  R  W  8  1  7 
THOMPSON, M  R  W  7  1  6 
TOOLE, M  R  W  6  0  6 
TOWNSEND, R  R  W             35  4              31 
TRIPP, D  R  W              9  0  9 
TROTTER, T  R  W              1  0  1 
UMPHLETTE, C  R  W  4  0  4 
VAUGHN, L  R  W             11  2  9 
VIERS, T  R  W             13  0             13 
WALKER, R  R  W             17  5             12 
WHITE, W  R  W             11  1             10 
WHITMIRE, W  R  W  2  0  2 
WILKINS, D  R  W              16  2             14 
WITHERSPOON, W R  W              26  9             17 
YOUNG, A  R  W              7  2  5 













115th SESSION (2003-2004) DEMOCRAT BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                          BILLS        BILLS         BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED     PASSED              NOT PASSED 
 
ALLEN, K  D  B  2  0  2 
ANTHONY, A  D  W  6  4  2 
BAILEY, G  D  W              6  3  3 
BALES   D  W  3  0  3 
BATTLE, J  D  W  2  1  1 
BOWERS, W  D  W              12  2              10 
BRANHAM, L  D  W  2  0  2 
BREELAND, F  D  B              2  0  2 
BROWN, G  D  W              5  3  2 
BROWN, J  D  B             29  1              28 
BROWN, R  D  B  4  0  4 
CLYBURN, W    D  B              5  0  5 
COBB-HUNTER, G D  B             18  1             17 
COLEMAN, C  D  W  0  0  0 
EMORY, E  D  W  0  0  0 
FREEMAN, M  D  W  1  0  1 
GOURDINE, A  D  B  2  0  2 
GOVAN, J  D  B               6  0  6 
HARVIN, C  D  W              4  2  2 
HAYES, J  D  W  6  4  2 
HINES, J  D  B               1  0  1 
HINES, M  D  B               1  0  1 
HOSEY, L  D  B  1  0  1 
HOWARD, L  D  B              4  0  4 
JENNINGS, D  D  W               9  5  4 
KENNEDY, K  D  B               3  0  3 
KIRSH, H  D  W             57  1             56 
LEE, B   D  B               0  0  0 
LLOYD, W  D  B               3  1  2 
LOURIE, J  D  W             21  2              19 
MACK, D  D  B  3  0  3 
McCRAW, E  D  W              2  1  1 
McLEOD, W  D  W             14  3              11 
MILLER, V  D  W             14  2              12 
MOODY-LAWRENCE D  B              7  0  7 
NEAL, J M  D  W  1  0  1 
NEAL, J H  D  B             16  0             16 
NEILSON, D  D  W             14  1             13 
OTT, H   D  W  3  0  3 
PARKS, J  D  B  9  0  9 
PHILLIPS, O  D  W               1  0  1 





RIVERS, R  D  W  3  2  1 
RUTHERFORD, J  D  B  7  0  7 
SCOTT, J  D  B             12  0             12 
SHEHEEN, V  D  W             15  4              11 
SMITH, F N  D  B  6  0  6 
SMITH, J E  D  W             25  2             23 
SNOW, J  D  W             14              1             13 
WEEKS, D  D  B  0  0  0 
WHIPPER, J  D  B              7  0  7 
 
 
DEMOCRATS  (51)    
SCLBC LEGISLATORS  (24)          





119th SESSION (2011-2012) REPUBLICAN BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                                                       BILLS        BILLS      BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED     PASSED            Not PASSED    
ALLISON, M  R  W              8  0  8 
ATWATER, T  R  W  9  0  9 
BALLENTINE, N  R  W              11  1              10 
BANNISTER, B W R  W              14  3              11 
BARFIELD, L  R  W               9  0  9 
BEDINGFIELD, E  R  W  5  1  4 
BIKAS, E  R  W  0  0  0 
BINGHAM, K  R  W              17  3             14 
BOWEN, D  R  W              19  0             19 
BRADY, J  R  W              21  2             19 
BRANNON, D  R  W  3  0  3 
CHUMLEY, W  R  W  0  0  0 
CLEMMONS, A  R  W              23  5             18 
COLE, J D  R  W  1  0  1 
COOPER, D  R  W              20  5             15 
CORBIN, T  R  W  5  1  4 
CRAWFORD H A             R               W  0  0  0 
CRAWFORD, K R R  W             12  1              11 
CROSBY, W  R  W  0  0  0 
DANING, J  R  W  7  2  5 
DELLENEY, F  R  W               5  0  5 
EDGE, T   R  W               7  1  6 
ERICKSON, S  R  W             10  1  9 
FORRESTER, P  R  W  3  0  3 
FRYE, M  R  W               3  1  2 
GAMBRELL, M  R  W  6  1  5 
HAMILTON, D P  R  W  2  0  2 
HARDWICK, N  R  W              11  8  3 
HARRELL, R  R  W              8  3  5 
HARRISON, J  R  W             27  8             19 
HARVIN C B  R  W  0  0  0 
HEARN, G M  R  W  1  0  1 
HENDERSON, P  R  W  2  0  2 
HERBKERSMAN, W R  W             34  4              30 
HIOTT, D  R  W  4  2  2 
HIXON, W M  R  W  6  3  3 
HORNE, J  R  W  5  1  4 
HUGGINS, C  R  W              16  2             14 
JOHNSON K L               R              W  2  2  0 
LIMEHOUSE, H  R  W              22  3              19 
LOFTIS, D A  R  W              22  1              21 
LONG, D A               R  W              10  0              10 




LUCAS, J H  R  W              11  0              11 
McCOY, P M  R  W             13  0              13 
MERRILL, J  R  W             26  2              24 
MOSS, D C   R  W              11  1              10 
MOSS, V S  R  W  0  0  0 
MURPHY, C  R  W  6  0  6 
NANNEY, W K   R  W             13  2              11 
NORMAN, R W   R  W  2  1  1 
OWENS, P  R  W              7  4  3 
PARKER, S  R  W  3  1  2 
PATRICK, A   R  W  3  1  2 
PINSON, L  R  W              4  1  3 
PITTS, M  R  W             39  8             38 
PUTMAN J  R  W  3  0  3 
POPE, T   R  W  8  3  5 
QUINN, R  R  W               7  0  7 
RYAN, R  R  W             10  0             10 
SANDIFER, W  R  W             33             12             21 
SIMRILL, J  R  W              6  0  6 
SKELTON, B R  R  W               1  0  1 
SMITH, G R  R  W              20  0             20 
SMITH G M  R  W             14  4             10 
SMITH, J R  R  W              7  1  6 
SCOTTILE, F M  R  W  4  0  4 
SOUTHARD, E L  R  W  0  0  0 
SPIRES, L K  R  W             10  0             10 
STRINGER, T M  R  W             14  1             13 
TALLON, E R   R  W             11  2  9 
TAYLOR, B  R  W  3  0  3 
THAYER, A J   R  W  4  3  1 
TOOLE, M R  R  W              15  0              15 
TRIBBLE, D  R  W  0  0  0 
UMPHLETTE, C  R  W              5  0  5 
VIERS, T T   R  W              13  1             12 
WHITE, W  R  W             17  4             13 
WHITMIRE, W  R  W              1  0  1 
WILLIS, M N   R  W  2  1  1 
YOUNG, T R  R  W              17  4              13 
    
                                          










119th SESSION (2011-2012) DEMOCRAT BILL SPONSORSHIP 
                                                       BILLS        BILLS    BILLS                    
NAME                        PARTY          RACE      SPONSORED     PASSED          NOT PASSED 
AGNEW, P  D  W  1  0  1 
ALEXANDER, T  D  B  1  0  1 
ALLEN, K B  D  B               5  1  4 
ANDERSON, C  D  B  1  0  1 
ANTHONY, M  D  W             1  0  1 
BALES, J C  D  W               6  0  6 
BATTLE, J  D  W              2  1  1 
BOWERS, W  D  W              12  1             11 
BRANHAM, L  D  W              1  0  1 
BRANTLEY, C  D  B  3  0  3 
BROWN, G A  D  W              2  1  1 
BROWN, H B  D  W             14  0             14 
BROWN, R L  D  B             13  1             12 
BUTLER GARRICK, M D  B  5  0  5 
CLYBURN, W    D  B              9  1  8 
COBB-HUNTER, G D  B             14  0             14 
DILLARD, C  D  B  1  0  1 
FUNDERBURKE, L D  W             15  4              11 
GILLARD, W G  D  W             27  1             26 
GOVAN, J  D  B               6  1  5 
HART, C R  D  B             11  0             11 
HAYES, J E  D  W             2  1  1 
HODGES, K  D  B  5  1  4 
HOSEY, L  D  B               2  0  2 
HOWARD, L  D  B              4  0  4 
JEFFERSON, J  D  B  6  0  6 
KING, J R C                D  B             18  1             17 
KNIGHT, P   D  W  0  0  0 
MACK, D  D  B               3  0  3 
McEACHERN, J   D  B  9  0  9 
McLEOD, W  D  W             11  1              10 
MITCHELL, H  D  B  4  0   4 
MUNNERLYN, E  D  W  1  1  0 
NEAL, J M  D  W              4  1  3 
NEAL, J H  D  B              3  0  3 
NEILSON, D  D  W              2  0  2 
OTT, H   D  W              4  2  2 
PARKS, J  D  B               0  0  0 
RUTHERFORD, J  D  B             36  4             32 
SABB, R A   D  B  0  0  0 
SELLERS, B T  D  B             21  1             20 
SMITH, J E  D  W             31  4             27 




VICK, T M   D  W  4  2  2 
WEEKS, D  D  B              1  0  1 
WHIPPER, J  D  B              1  0  1 
WILLIAMS, R Q   D  B  3  0  3 
 
DEMOCRATS (48)      SCLBC LEGISLATORS (28  )              
 
NOTE** ALL SCLBC LEGISLATORS ARE DEMOCRATS (in bold)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
